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Abstract
This thesis examines Kant's and Nietzsche's treatments of the moral agent.
It argues for three broad conclusions. Firstly, it argues that, although Nietzsche's
explicit criticisms of Kant's conception of the moral agent can be understood only
in the context of Nietzsche's broader moral philosophy, neither these criticisms
nor their context are well understood by the prevailing literature. The thesis thus
engages with existing scholarship on the nature of Nietzsche's moral philosophy
and with the scanty literature on the relationship between Kant's and Nietzsche's
moral philosophies. Secondly, the thesis argues that Kant's conception of the
moral agent is not undermined by the criticisms which Nietzsche explicitly levels
at it, or, indeed, by others which are commonly made in Nietzsche's name. In
doing so, the thesis combines original interpretations of Kant with elements of
recent Kant scholarship. Finally, however, the thesis argues that neglected
elements of Nietzsche's own moral philosophy provide for a more sophisticated,
telling, and, indeed, original critical engagement with Kant's conception of the
moral agent. Thus the thesis defends an original interpretation of Nietzsche's
moral philosophy and its critical relation to Kant's, and demonstrates the
pertinence of a certain neglected critical approach to Kant's conception of the
moral agent. On the basis of these conclusions, the thesis ultimately defends a
conception of the moral agent which, although Kantian, owes something to both
Kant and Nietzsche.
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Introduction
At first glance, the prospects for a telling critical engagement between
Kant's and Nietzsche's moral philosophies might not seem good. Nietzsche's few
explicit references to Kant's moral philosophy rarely extend beyond a few words
of scathing derision for a caricatured 'Kant', while Kant would probably have
anticipated many by dismissing Nietzsche's empirical claims and informal
techniques as he dismisses those of his 'popular' contemporaries - namely, as 'a
disgusting mishmash of thrown-together observations and half-rationalized
principles, on which shallow heads feast because it is something useful for
everyday prattle'. I Nor does the literature since suggest that a critical engagement
between Kant's and Nietzsche's moral philosophies might progress beyond this
impasse. Despite the rehabilitation of Nietzsche's moral philosophy and the quality
and volume of the literature on Kant's moral philosophy, Kant scholars generally
maintain a stony silence towards Nietzsche, and the paltry literature on the relation
between Kant's and Nietzsche's moral philosophies is written almost exclusively
by Nietzsche sympathisers who, like Nietzsche himself, rarely offer more than
derision and caricature in their treatments of Kant.
The purpose of this thesis is to take issue with this impasse. Specifically,
by examining Kant's and Nietzsche's treatments of the moral agent, the thesis
argues for three broad conclusions. Firstly, it argues that, although Nietzsche's
explicit criticisms of Kant's conception of the moral agent can be understood only
in the context of Nietzsche's broader moral philosophy, neither these criticisms
1 G 409. See also G 410. Compare, for instance, Russell's remarks about Nietzsche in his History of
Western Philosophy, pp.728-39.
nor their context are well understood by the prevailing literature. The thesis thus
engages with existing scholarship on the nature of Nietzsche's moral philosophy
and with the scanty literature on the relationship between Kant's and Nietzsche's
moral philosophies. Secondly, the thesis argues that Kant's conception of the
moral agent is not undermined by the criticisms which Nietzsche explicitly levels
at it, or, indeed, by others which are commonly made in Nietzsche's name. In
doing so, the thesis combines original interpretations of Kant with elements of
recent Kant scholarship. Finally, however, the thesis argues that neglected
elements of Nietzsche's own moral philosophy provide for a more sophisticated,
telling, and, indeed, original critical engagement with Kant's conception of the
moral agent. In particular, Nietzsche presents an alternative, but nonetheless
Kantian, conception of the moral agent which raises substantial questions for
Kant's own conception. Thus the thesis defends an original interpretation of
Nietzsche's moral philosophy and its critical relation to Kant's, and demonstrates
the pertinence of a certain neglected critical approach to Kant's conception of the
moral agent. On the basis of these conclusions, the thesis ultimately defends a
conception of the moral agent which, although Kantian, owes something to both
Kant and Nietzsche.
These three broad conclusions are defended in the three parts of the thesis,
respectively. The first part is occupied with Nietzsche, and is primarily expository.
It begins with Nietzsche's critical treatment of a common sense conception of
agency, defined by a claim regarding choice and another regarding reasons. The
first and second chapters present Nietzsche's critical treatment of each claim, in
tum. The third chapter then argues that, despite its salient place in Nietzsche's
works, this critical treatment is poorly represented by the pertinent strands of the
2
literature. Finally, the fourth chapter turns to Nietzsche's explicit critical remarks
regarding Kant's moral philosophy, and argues, in particular, that these remarks
are strongly informed by Nietzsche's underappreciated concern with the common
sense conception of agency, and that they are also poorly represented by the
relevant literature. The first part of the thesis thus presents and defends an account
of Nietzsche's explicit criticisms of Kant's conception of the moral agent by
examining these criticisms and their place in Nietzsche's broader critical treatment
of a common sense conception of agency, and by critically engaging with the
relevant literature.
The second part of the thesis defends Kant's conception of the moral agent
against the criticisms identified in the first part. The first chapter of this part, the
fifth of the thesis, offers an interpretation of Kant's derivation of the basic features
of his conception. In this light, the following chapter defends Kant's formulas and
their place in his conception of moral judgement against Nietzsche's criticisms and
those commonly made in his name. Nonetheless, in so doing, this chapter also
argues that Nietzsche's criticisms of the common sense conception of agency
require certain accommodations on Kant's part. The seventh chapter then argues
that Nietzsche's criticisms of Kant's insistence on spontaneity in choice are
misplaced, but that Kant's arguments for this spontaneity are equally
unconvincing. Finally, the eighth chapter demonstrates that, despite Nietzsche's
allegation to the contrary, Kant neither claims that there is evidence of human
progress nor conceives of human progress in moral terms. The second part of the
thesis thus defends the second broad conclusion, that Kant's conception of the
moral agent is not undermined by the criticisms which Nietzsche explicitly levels
at it, or by others which are commonly made in Nietzsche's name.
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The third, and final, part of the thesis consists of a single chapter. This
chapter defends the third broad conclusion of the thesis, that neglected elements of
Nietzsche's moral philosophy provide for a more sophisticated, telling, and
original critical engagement with Kant's conception of the moral agent than the
criticisms considered in the first two parts of the thesis would suggest. In
particular, it argues that Nietzsche articulates an alternative conception of the
moral agent which, although Kantian, differs from Kant's own in revealing ways.
In the light of these differences, the chapter defends a Kantian conception of the
moral agent that draws from both Kant and Nietzsche.
In interpreting and discussing Kant's and Nietzsche's moral philosophies, I
attempt to maintain the integrity of textual and argumentative contexts, individual
texts, and chronological periods. The method, particularly common in the literature
on Nietzsche, of selecting passages apparently by whim or, at best, by theme
serves only to obscure the grounds, nature, implications, and developments of the
claims made in them. In those cases in which I concentrate on a particular text,
part of a text, or passage, I attempt to justify this by appeal to the author's own
indications of its significance, along with its maturity, extensiveness, or
explanatory power. I also take it that the coherence of the position which I attribute
to Nietzsche demonstrates that, at least as far as this position extends, those
commentators who suppose his texts to resist coherent formulation are mistaken.
I refer to Kant's and Nietzsche's notes and, occasionally, their
correspondence only in footnotes, and only to indicate cases in which claims made
in their published works are also made in notes or correspondence. My
interpretative claims therefore do not rely on such evidence. This contrasts with
the previously common practice of referring freely to Nietzsche's notebooks, as if
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they had a status equal to his published works. This practice has been criticised,
primarily on the grounds that only Nietzsche's published works can be presumed
to contain his considered and polished thoughts, and that he intended his
notebooks neither to be published nor preserved posthumously.r Besides such
reasonable, principled considerations, in presenting and defending an
interpretation of Nietzsche's published moral philosophy, I have neither found any
need to refer to his notes or correspondence for clarification or explanation, nor
discovered many radically divergent claims in these other sources.'
Finally, translations of Kant's and Nietzsche's texts are my own, although I
have consulted the available translations. Insertions and omissions are indicated by
square brackets, emphasis and punctuation are original, and original German terms
are italicised. References are given in footnotes to the first instance of each
quotation, according to the scheme of abbreviations which immediately precedes
this introduction.
2 See, in particular, Magnus, 'The Use and Abuse of The Will to Power', Clark, Nietzsche on Truth
and Philosophy, pp.25-7, and Leiter, Nietzsche on Morality, pp.xvii-iii.
3 The treatment of Nietzsche's theoretical philosophy might require a different strategy, however.
See Poellner's remarks in his Nietzsche and Metaphysics, pp.IO-il.
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Part I
Choice, Reasons, and Kant: Nietzsche's Criticism of the Moral Agent
6
Introduction to part I
This part of the thesis demonstrates that, although Nietzsche's explicit
criticisms of Kant's conception of the moral agent can be understood only in the
context of Nietzsche's broader moral philosophy, neither these criticisms nor the
pertinent context are well represented by the prevailing literature.
This part begins by demonstrating that Nietzsche's critical claims and
arguments regarding moral agency, throughout his texts, are directed at a
conception of agency which he considers to strongly inform common sense. This
conception makes two distinctive claims. Firstly, it considers an agent's action to
be sufficiently explained by the agent's 'willing' of it, in the sense that the action
is, given the circumstances, causally necessitated in the agent's conscious choice
of it. Secondly, this conception considers the agent to consciously choose, or
'will', an action for normative reasons, in the sense that her cognitive
acknowledgement of reasons motivates her choice. Nietzsche's critical treatment
of these two claims is presented by the first and second chapters of this first part of
the thesis. The third chapter then demonstrates that this treatment is poorly
represented by pertinent strands in the prevailing Nietzsche literature.
The final chapter turns to Nietzsche's explicit remarks regarding Kant's
moral philosophy. It argues, in particular, that these remarks are strongly informed
by Nietzsche's critical treatment of the common sense conception of agency, and
that they offer little support to the claims standardly made in the literature on the
relationship between Kant's and Nietzsche's moral philosophies.
7
1.
Choice
Nietzsche's basic critical object with regard to choice is a particular
common sense claim. This claim is that an agent's action is sufficiently explained
by her 'willing' of it, in the sense that the action is, given the circumstances,
causally necessitated in the agent's conscious choice of it. However, Nietzsche's
critical discussions of this claim are divided between those which consider the
claim as such, and those which consider one of two particular instances of it. This
chapter is therefore divided into two sections, corresponding to Nietzsche's own
divided concerns.
8
Willing
I.
Nietzsche's critical treatment of the common sense claim regarding choice
is first and most clearly aired in a section of the first edition of The Gay Science.
There he writes the following.
Aftereffects of the most ancient religiosity. - Every thoughtless person thinks that the
will alone is effective [Wirkende]; that willing is something simple, simply given,
underivable, in-itself-intelligible. He is convinced that when he does something, for
example, strikes something, it is he who strikes, and that he struck because he willed
[wollte] to strike. He notices no problem at all here, the feeling of will is enough for
him not only for the assumption of cause and effect, but also for the belief that he
understands [verstehen] their relation. He knows nothing of the mechanism of the
event and of the hundredfold fine work that must be done for the strike to happen, or
of the incapacity of the will in itself to do even the slightest part of this work. The
will is for him a magically effective [wirkend] force: the belief in the will, as the
cause of effects, is the belief in magically effective forces. Now man believed
originally that everywhere he saw an event, a will [had] to be effective in the
background as cause and personal willing being - the concept of mechanics lay far
off. But because man believed for an immensely long time only in persons (and not
in matter, forces, things, and so on), the belief in cause and effect became for him the
basic belief, which he uses wherever something happens - also still now instinctive
and a piece of atavism of the most ancient origin. The propositions, 'no effect
without cause', 'every effect in tum a cause' appear as generalisations of much more
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limited propositions: 'where [something] is effected, there [something] has been
willed', 'there can be effects only on beings that will', 'there is never a pure,
consequence-less suffering of an effect, but all suffering is an excitement of the will'
(to action, resistance, revenge, retribution) - but in the prehistoric ages of humanity
these propositions were identical, the first were not generalisations of the second, but
the second explanations of the first.I
Nietzsche's critical object here is the common sense claim regarding
choice. He first states this claim as the supposition that an agent performed an
action simply 'because he willed to', and that this 'willing' is 'something simple,
simply given, underivable, in-itself-intelligible'. However, Nietzsche proceeds to
analyse this supposition in terms of a particular causal account of an action. In
particular, he maintains that common sense considers 'willing' to be something
'effective', or an 'effective force', such that, with the 'feeling' of 'willing', one
assumes that 'willing' and action are 'cause and effect' and that one 'understands
their relation'. Thus what is 'felt' in 'willing' is supposed to be a causal power
which, given the circumstances, necessitates a succeeding event - namely, the
agent's action.
This passage clearly indicates that Nietzsche considers it misguided to
account for an event by identifying a necessitating causal power. Indeed, he also
maintains here that it is precisely the common sense claim regarding choice which
misleads us to 'instinctively' account for other events in this manner, whether by
the primitive supposition of a 'personal willing being' behind each event or in
modem explanations of changes of state among 'matter, forces, things, and so
on'. However, Nietzsche's objection to such causal accounts is clearest in an
1 FW 127.
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earlier section of the same book of The Gay Science, entitled 'Cause and effect'.
There he states his position as follows.
We describe better - we do not explain any more than our predecessors. We have
uncovered a multiple one-after-another where the naive man and inquirer of older
cultures saw only two separate things, 'cause' and 'effect' is what one says; we have
merely perfected the image of becoming, but without reaching beyond the image,
behind the image. In every case the series of 'causes' stands before us much more
completely, we infer: this and that must first precede in order that this may then
follow - but this does not involve any comprehension [begrif.fen]. In every chemical
process, for example, quality appears as a 'miracle', as ever, also every locomotion;
nobody has 'explained' a push.'
With this, Nietzsche endorses the 'Humean' claim that we do not
experience causal powers which would necessitate a succeeding event, and which
would thus provide for the event's 'explanation'. In Nietzsche's terms here, we
have no 'comprehension' of the event. Nonetheless, Nietzsche also admits the
equally 'Humean' claim that we experience regular correlations, or 'a multiple
one-after-another', between distinct events of the same types, according to which
we justify causal universals of the form 'this and that must first precede in order
that this may then follow'. For Nietzsche, we can thus causally 'describe' an
event by subsuming it under an appropriate causal universal, and one such causal
'description' can be 'better' or more 'complete' than another, in the sense that it
acknowledges universals which justifiably encompass and exceed those which the
1FW 112. See also M 121, JGB 21, and KGW VII: I 24 [9] (Winter 1883-1884), VII:3 34 [53]
(April-June 1885), VII:3 36 [28] (June-July 1885), VIII:12 [83, 89, and 139] (Autumn 1885-
Autumn 1886), and 7 [56] (End 1886-Spring 1887), and VIII:3 14 [98] (Spring 1888).
11
other acknowledges.' Further, as the remark regarding our not 'reaching beyond
the image' intimates and as he proceeds to elaborate in the succeeding, unquoted
part of the section, Nietzsche parts company from the 'Humean' by insisting that
our experience of regular correlations between distinct events of the same types is
a reflection of human beings' particular experiential apparatus." However, since
the interpretation and plausibility of this further claim is notoriously controversial
and not directly pertinent to Nietzsche's critical treatment of the common sense
conception of agency, I will not consider it here.
In 'Aftereffects ... ', Nietzsche invokes the 'Humean' position articulated in
'Cause and effect' to dispose of the common sense claim regarding choice.
Regarding the assumption that 'willing' provides for the 'understanding' of the
'relation' between 'cause and effect', he refers to his denial of causal
'explanation' when he insists on 'the incapacity of the will in itself to do even the
slightest part of this work'. Regarding the assumption that 'willing' and action are
'cause and effect', on the other hand, he complains that one thus 'knows nothing
of the mechanism of the event and of the hundredfold fine work that must be done
for [... it] to happen'. With this, he insists on the inadequacy, and the insufficient
complexity, of the common sense claim as a causal 'description' of choice. As he
also puts it later in the section, 'willing is only a mechanism which is so well
practised that it almost escapes the observing eye,.5
3 My interpretation of how Nietzsche understands 'explanation' and 'description' here agrees with
Poellner's discussion, in his Nietzsche and Metaphysics. pp.36-46. 53-5. and 267-8. In the light of
the 'Humean' echoes of Nietzsche's position. it is also worth emphasising that. unlike Hume,
Nietzsche attributes the misconception of causal accounts of events to the common sense claim
regarding 'willing'. rather than to habit.
4 Besides FW 112. see WS 11. FW99. 121. and 357, and JGB 21.
5 FW 127.
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II.
Only in Twilight of the Idols does Nietzsche restate, if only in part, the
criticism of the common sense claim regarding choice which he offers in the first
edition of The Gay Science. In a section of the chapter, 'The four great errors', he
again holds this claim responsible for our general commitment to causal
'explanation' and criticises it precisely for pretending to provide such unavailable
'explanations'. Regarding this claim he writes the following.
Error of a false causality. - In every age one has believed that one knows what a
cause is: but from where did we get our knowledge, more precisely, our belief that
we know here? From the realm of the famous 'inner facts', none of which have until
now proved factual. We believed ourselves to be causal in the act of will: we thought
there, at least, we were catching causality in the act. [... ] Today we don't believe a
word of all that anymore. The 'inner world' is full of illusions and will-o' -the-wisps:
the will is one of them. The will no longer moves [bewegt], consequently also no
longer explains [erkliirt] - it merely accompanies [begleitet] processes, it can also be
absent.6
The critical object of these remarks is the common sense belief that in
choosing an action an agent experiences a causal power which necessitates the
action, given the circumstances, and which thus provides sufficient explanation of
it. As Nietzsche puts it here, the agent is supposed to be 'causal in the act of will',
or to succeed in 'catching causality in the act' as she wills. Against this, Nietzsche
insists that '[t]he will no longer moves, consequently also no longer explains', and
6GD VI3.
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that it 'merely accompanies processes' or is entirely 'absent' from them.' He thus
denies that choosing serves to account for an event in the sense of providing a
necessitating causal power, that which 'moves' the event. That this denial rests, as
in 'Aftereffects ... ', on Nietzsche's denial that we experience any such causal power
is indicated by the remainder of the section. There he denies that there is any
'''empirical evidence" for the common sense supposition of causality in 'willing',
and laments that we nonetheless extend this notion of causality to every event.
This extension is, he maintains, merely '[tlhe most ancient and longest-lived
psychology [... J: every event [... J an action, every action the consequence of a
will' .8
III.
Although in 'Error of a false causality' Nietzsche states that 'willing'
either 'merely accompanies processes' or is entirely 'absent' from them, there he
does not emphasise the other criticism of the common sense claim regarding
choice which he makes in 'Aftereffects... ', that it is inadequate as a causal
'description' of choice. However, he arguably raises this criticism again in a
section of Beyond Good and Evil, although the continuity between this section and
his critical discussions elsewhere is not immediately obvious. That the common
sense claim regarding choice is his critical object in this section is indicated by his
insistence that he is there concerned to dispense with the 'popular prejudice' that
7 In GD III 5, Nietzsche similarly refers to 'the error that the will is something that effects [wirkt], -
that will is an ability [or faculty, Vermogen)', and he makes a similar remark atA 14.
8 GD VI 3. See also KGWVII:124 [9] (Winter 1883-1884), VIII: I 2 [83] (Autumn 1885-Autumn
1886), VIII: I 5 [9] (Summer 1886-Autumn 1887), and VIII:3 14 [81-2, 98, 125, 129, 146, and 152]
(Spring 1888).
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'the will is the most familiar thing in the world', and, in particular, the belief 'that
willing suffices for action'. 9 However, rather than raising his 'Humean' doubts
regarding causal powers or directly dismissing the common sense claim as an
inadequate causal 'description', Nietzsche here provides a phenomenology of
choice which is intended to show how, considering choice phenomenologically,
the common sense claim is unsurprising, yet false.
In outline, Nietzsche's phenomenology here considers 'every willing' to
include phenomenological elements of 'feeling', 'thought', and 'affect', The
elements of feeling include feelings of one's original condition, of leaving this
condition and arriving at another, and of the condition at which one arrives, and
accompanying muscular feelings which arise 'through a sort of habit, as soon as
we "will'". Besides such feelings, Nietzsche proposes that 'willing' involves 'a
commanding thought' and 'the affect of command'. He does not elaborate on the
'commanding thought' here, but he is presumably referring to the intentional
content of an agent's choice. The 'affect of command', on the other hand,
Nietzsche describes as the affect of directing attention to the performance of the
chosen action - in his terms, as 'that unconditional evaluation "now necessarily do
this and nothing other"'. Corresponding to the thought and affect of command,
Nietzsche further insists, is 'something in [the agent] himself which obeys or
which he believes obeys', 'the successful executive instruments, the serviceable
"under-wills" or under-souls', Thus, Nietzsche writes, 'as the obedient one we
know the feelings of constraint, compulsion, pressure, resistance, movement,
which tend to begin immediately after the act of willing' ,10
9 JGB 19.
10 JGB 19.
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Given this phenomenology, Nietzsche accounts for the common sense
belief in the sufficiency of choice for action, and the falsity of this belief, as
follows. Encouraged by the affect of command, he claims, what
(phenomenologically) 'obeys' in agency tends to be obscured by, and confused
with, what (phenomenologically) 'commands', such that the successful
performance of the action tends to be mistakenly attributed simply to the latter.
Thus, he writes, '''Freedom of the will" - that is the word for the multifaceted state
of pleasure of the willer, who commands and at the same time identifies himself
with the executor [of the command], - who, as such, enjoys the triumph over
resistances, but by himself judges, [that] it is his will itself which really overcomes
the resistances' .11 In other words, in the light of his phenomenology of choice
Nietzsche argues that the common sense belief in choice as providing sufficient
explanation of an action gains phenomenological plausibility from the 'affect of
command', and its encouragement of an over-interpretation of 'command' in
'willing' .
Arguably, however, Nietzsche's primary intention in thus considering
choice phenomenologically is to better, on phenomenological grounds, the
common sense claim as a causal 'description' of choice. That is, he intends his
phenomenology of choice to better this claim as any causal 'description' betters
another, namely, by acknowledging regular empirical correlations which
encompass and exceed those acknowledged by the other. This intention is
indicated particularly by the manner in which Nietzsche introduces his
phenomenology: he states that, in contrast to common sense and its philosophical
advocates, '[w]illing appears to me above all as something complicated', and then
11 JGB 19. See also KGW VII:1 24 [9] (Winter 1883-1884), VII:3 38 [8] (June-July 1885), and
VIII:3 14 [98] (Spring 1888).
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proposes, '[l]et us therefore be careful for once, let us be "unphilosophical'" .12
These remarks suggest that Nietzsche presents his phenomenology on empirical
grounds, as an account of how choice 'appears to' him, and that he considers it to
better common sense by showing how choice is more 'complicated' than common
sense supposes, or how common sense is not 'careful' in its description of choice.
This section of Beyond Good and Evil can thus be treated as continuous with the
critical strategy which Nietzsche adopts towards the common sense claim
regarding choice in the first edition of The Gay Science and, later, in Twilight of
the Idols.I3
12 JGB 19. See also KGW VII:3 38 [8] (June-July 1885).
13 A similar interpretation might be offered for Nietzsche's statement at A 14: 'The old word "will"
only serves to designate a resultant. a kind of individual reaction. which necessarily follows a host
of partly contradictory. partly harmonious stimuli'.
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'I' and 'free will'
With the exception of his phenomenology of choice in Beyond Good and
Evil, Nietzsche's critical discussions of choice between the first edition of The Gay
Science and Twilight of the Idols make no reference to the common sense claim as
such, but are rather occupied with two particular instances of it. His critical
discussions before the first edition of The Gay Science are yet more restricted,
being almost exclusively concerned with one of these instances and a single, later
abandoned objection to it. The two instances are distinguished by their manner of
conceiving of choice: one attributes it to a substantial agent, or'!' , and the other to
'free will'. Nietzsche's considered critical account of these two instances is most
clearly presented in a series of six consecutive sections in the first part of Beyond
Good and Evil, one of which presents his phenomenology of choice. I will focus
on this series, and mention only secondarily Nietzsche's discussions of these two
instances in On the Genealogy of Morality and Twilight of the Idols, to
demonstrate that the latter discussions make, and, in minor respects, clarify or
obscure, claims which are already made in the sections of Beyond Good and Evil.
I.
Nietzsche's critical concern in the series of sections in Beyond Good and
Evil is with the common sense claim regarding the sufficiency of choice for
action, as it is in the section in which he presents his phenomenology of choice. In
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that section, besides insisting that common sense misinterprets the
phenomenology of 'command' in choice, Nietzsche also attributes this
misinterpretation to 'the synthetic concept "1"', with which, he claims, we
obscure the phenomenological 'duality' of 'command' and 'obedience' in
choice.l" With this, he proceeds beyond his phenomenology, and invokes his
discussion in the first and second sections of this series. These sections describe
an instance of the common sense treatment of choice which is distinguished by its
attributing choice to a substantial agent - that is, to an agent considered as a
'substratum' which persists beyond the observable, changing properties of choice.
Thus, regarding what he calls the apparent 'immediate certainty' of the statement
'1 will', in these two sections Nietzsche raises three sceptical questions: namely,
why must there be a 'something' that wills, and why must this 'something' be an
'1'?; why must willing be thought of as 'an activity and effect on the part of a
being thought of as a cause'?; and, how does one identify this activity, and
distinguish it from other activities? Nietzsche maintains that even to replace'!'
with 'it', so as to state 'it wills' or 'there is willing', is still to presuppose an actor
for the activity, a substantial agent which wills. 'One infers here according to the
grammatical habit "[ ... J to every activity belongs one that is active [... ]''',
Nietzsche maintains. In other words, he insists that to attribute choice to a
substantial agent is to misinterpret the 'process [Vorgang]' of choice in terms of a
subject that 'does not belong' to it, under the influence of the 'grammatical habit'
of treating activity as a predicate with a subject."
14 JGB 19.
IS JGB 16, 17. Nietzsche presents his remarks in these sections in terms of the statement 'I think'.
but indicates in the first sentence that he is also concerned with the statement 'I will'. See also JGB
34.
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Nietzsche's insistence on the unfortunate effects of this 'grammatical
habit' on the interpretation of basic activities might appear to complete his critical
account of apparent 'immediate certainties' such as the statement 'I will'. But in
the fifth in the series of sections in Beyond Good and Evil, he states otherwise.
Referring to the grammatical function of 'the subject-concept' in particular, he
writes, 'the spell of certain grammatical functions is in the last analysis the spell
of physiological value judgements and racial conditions', and, under such spells,
philosophers' 'thinking is in fact much less a discovering than a recognising, a
remembering, a return and home-coming to a far-off, primeval total household of
the soul out of which [... their philosophical] concepts once grew: -
philosophising is to that extent a species of atavism of the first rank' .16 Thus
Nietzsche insists on the primeval nature of the 'grammatical habit', or 'spell',
which misleadingly suggests that choice must be attributed to a substantial agent.
It is plausible to suppose, then, that he is thus referring to his account of the
misleading influence of the common sense claim regarding choice on the
primitive and modem conceptions of causality, particularly regarding choice
itself. Indeed, as I will demonstrate below, he makes this reference clear in his
later discussions.!"
In the last of the series of sections in Beyond Good and Evil, Nietzsche
proceeds to identify a further instance of the common sense claim regarding the
sufficiency of choice for action. This instance is distinguished by treating choice as
16 JGB 20. See also JGB V, and KGWVII:3 38 [3] (June-July 1885), and VIII:2 10 [158] (Autumn
1887). Note that, although the first part of JGB is entitled 'On the prejudices of philosophers' and
Nietzsche refers to philosophers' errors throughout the series of sections which discuss 'I' and 'free
will', in these sections he does not draw a strict distinction between the errors of philosophers and
those of common sense. Regarding choice, his position is presumably that expressed in JGB 19,
namely, that philosophers 'always tend to' have simply 'adopted and exaggerated a popular
prejudice' .
17 Note also that Nietzsche's claim that primeval errors regarding nature persist in subject-predicate
grammar echoes Lubbock, in his The Origin of Civilisation, pp.219-20. In making this claim,
Lubbock follows Max MUller, a volume of whose essays Nietzsche also possessed.
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'free will' - that is, as undetermined by antecedent causes. In this section,
Nietzsche refers to this instance as "'freedom of will", in that metaphysical
superlative sense', according to which one is supposed 'to be [... ] causa sui and,
with more than Mlinchhausen temerity, to pull oneself into existence out of the
swamp of nothingness by one's own hair'. He objects to this instance with the
simple statement that '[t]he causa sui is the best self-contradiction hitherto
imagined' .18 By this, he presumably means that to conceive of choice as a 'cause
of itself' is to conceive of it as both a cause and the effect of that cause, which
generates a 'self-contradiction' on the plausible assumption that a cause and its
effect are not identical. However, Nietzsche also here objects that 'free will'
underwrites an over-inflated sense of responsibility. 'The desire for' such
undetermined choice is, he writes, 'the desire to bear the whole and ultimate
responsibility for one's actions and to absolve God, world, ancestors, chance,
society from responsibility for them' .19 Nietzsche apparently considers such a
sense of responsibility to be self-evidently absurd.
Notably, Nietzsche's objections to 'free will' in this section differ from that
which he endorses in passages of Human, All Too Human, Assorted Opinions and
Maxims, The Wanderer and His Shadow, and Daybreak. In these earlier texts, his
discussions of agency almost exclusively conceive of choice as 'free will' and
object to it on the grounds that 'freedom' in this sense is incompatible with the
principle of causal determinism - namely, that every event, or set of events, has a
sufficient antecedent cause.20 Now, although Nietzsche's objection to 'free will' as
181GB 21. See also WS 23, and FW 110 and 345.
191GB 21.
20 See MA 39,70,99,106-7,133, and 376, MS 33, WS 12,24, and 28, M 120. 124, and 128, and
even KGW 1:2 13 [6 and 7] (April-October 1862). This feature of these texts might reflect
Nietzsche's reading of Schopenhauer, who articulates this objection to 'free will' in, for example,
Uber die Freiheit des Menschlichen Willens, ch.3, Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung, §23. See
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a 'self-contradiction' in Beyond Good and Evil might follow from the principle of
causal determinism, he need not, and in this section does not, also endorse this
principle.r' Furthermore, in the remainder of the section, he effectively dismisses
his earlier objection, by denying that, in the absence of 'free will', determination
by antecedent causes precludes choice. In his terms here, he asks that one also
'erase from [... one's] head the reversal of the non-concept "free will": I mean the
"unfree will", which amounts to an abuse of cause and effect' .22 As this remark
suggests, his argument here once again calls upon his 'Humean' position regarding
causation. He writes the following.
One should not mistakenly objectify [verdinglichen] 'cause' and 'effect', as [... when
one] has the cause press and push, until it 'effects'; one should help oneself to
'cause' and 'effect' only as pure concepts, that is, as conventional fictions for the
purpose of description, of communication, not of explanation. It the 'in-itself there
is nothing of 'causal associations', of 'necessity', of 'psychological unfreedom',
there 'the effect from the cause' does not follow, there no 'law' rules. It is we alone
who have invented causes, succession, for-each-other, relativity, compulsion,
number, law, freedom, ground, purpose; and if we write, mix this symbol-world into
things as 'in-itself, we thus carry on as we always have carried on, namely,
mythologically. The 'unfree will' is mythology [... ]. - It is almost always a
also n.21 below. Itmight also reflect the influence of Ree, whose friendship with Nietzsche
extended from the mid-1870's until late 1882 and who wrote his Der Ursprung der moralischen
Empfindungen, while Nietzsche wrote MA, during their stay in Sorrento in the winter of 1876-7.
Indeed, MA 39 corresponds precisely - even, in two sentences, almost word-far-word - with Ree's
views on the history of morality and on the implications of causal determinism in Der Ursprung
der moralischen Empfindungen. See esp. pp.17, 39, and 61-3.
21 Nonetheless, it is worth noting that Nietzsche's terms in JGB 21, including the reference to
Munchhausen, echo those of Rudolf von Ihering, in the first paragraphs of his Der Zweck im Recht,
and those of Schopenhauer, in his Uber die vier/ache Wurzel des Satzes vom zureichenden Grunde,
ch.2, §8, and Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung, §7, and Suppls., ch.8. In these passages both
writers object to the conception of agency as 'causa sui' on the grounds that it is incompatible with
the principle of causal determinism. Some of Nietzsche's notes on Ibering's book can be found at
KGW VII: I 7 [69] (Spring-Summer 1883).
22 JGB 21.
22
symptom, of what is lacking in him, when a thinker senses in every 'causal
connection' and 'psychological necessity' something of compulsion, need, having-to-
obey, pressure, unfreedom.f
Thus Nietzsche again denies that we experience causal powers which
would necessitate a succeeding event, and which would thus provide for the
'explanation' of it. Indeed, he also raises his further, un- 'Humean' doubts about
our experiences of regular correlations between distinct events of the same types,
according to which we 'describe' an event by subsuming it under an appropriate
causal universal. In his terms here, we should neither have 'the cause press and
push, until it "effects''', nor 'write, mix [... ] into things' the descriptive concepts
of causal universals, such as 'succession', 'number', 'law', and 'ground'. Despite
the latter doubts regarding causal 'description', however, Nietzsche also proposes
that we continue to practise it, and his objection to 'unfree will' does not concern
these further doubts regarding it. Specifically, his objection to 'unfree will' is that,
however complete the description of an event as 'necessary' given antecedent
conditions, this 'necessity' consists neither of a causal power, since experience of
such a power is unavailable to us, nor of a command, since the 'necessity'
concerned is not of this, normative kind.24 Nietzsche concludes that there is thus
nothing of 'compulsion, need, having-to-obey, pressure, unfreedom' in the causal
determination of choice, and that it is therefore mistaken to suppose, as proponents
of 'unfree will' do, that determination by antecedent causes precludes choice, by
making it merely a passive, obedient effect of other causes.
23 JGB 21. See also WS 61, A 15, and KGW VIII:2 9 [91] (Autumn 1887).
24 Nietzsche also objects to the misconception of the 'rule' of 'law' as a command at MS 9, FW 59
and 109, JGB 9 and 22, and KGWVII:3 36 [18] (June-July 1885), VIII: I 1 [44] (Autumn 1885-
Spring 1886),2 [139 and 142] (Autumn 188S-Autumn 1886), and 7 [14] (End l886-Spring 1887),
and VIII:3 14 [79 and 98] (Spring 1888).
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Finally, Nietzsche also remarks that, just as 'free will' underwrites an over-
inflated sense of responsibility, so 'unfree will' underwrites an under-inflated
sense, by reducing responsibility to nothing. In particular, he writes that 'unfree
will' is embraced by those who 'want [... ] not to be responsible, to be guilty of
nothing[,] and desire, out of an inner self-contempt, to be able to shift the blame
for themselves to somewhere else', while it is resisted by those who 'want at no
price to let go of their "responsibility", the belief in themselves, the personal right
to their merit' .25 Nietzsche apparently does not object to the latter sense of
responsibility. In particular, he does not suggest that it is, or that it presupposes,
the over-inflated 'whole and ultimate responsibility' which 'free will' underwrites.
However, here he provides little indication of how responsibility is to be judged
rightly, remarking only that 'in real life it is only a matter of strong and weak
wills' .26
II.
The two instances discussed, and some of the claims and criticisms made
of them, in the series of sections in Beyond Good and Evil recur in Nietzsche's two
other critical discussions of agency in his later texts - namely, the thirteenth
section of the first essay of the Genealogy, and certain sections of the chapter,
'The four great errors', in Twilight of the Idols. These discussions provide little
novelty, however, and are perhaps most notable for their modest elaboration of
Nietzsche's remarks regarding the misleading influence of 'free will' on the
25 JGB 21.
26 JGB 21.
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determination of responsibility. Here, then, I will first note the other, recurrent
claims which Nietzsche makes in these discussions, before considering his
elaboration of his objection to 'free will' .
Nietzsche's discussion in the thirteenth section of the first essay of the
Genealogy is distinguished, and obscured, by its unfortunate conflation of the two
instances discussed separately in Beyond Good and Evil. He refers to the instance
which affirms a substantial agent, or '1', when he refers to the supposition of a
'''being'' behind the doing, effecting, becoming' of agency. Regarding this, he
maintains that "'the doer" is merely imagined into the doing, - the doing is
everything', and that this imaginary '"doer''' arises 'only through the seduction of
language (and the fundamental errors of reason petrified in it), which understands
and misunderstands every effecting as conditioned by an effective thing, by a
"subject"'. Nietzsche thus again maintains that the attribution of choice to a
substantial agent, or '1', derives from certain errors of common sense, which are
expressed in subject-predicate grammar. However, here he also describes the
notion of a substantial agent as one with which 'popular morality [... ] detaches
strength from the expressions of strength as if there were behind the strong an
indifferent substratum, which is free to express strength or not to'. With this, he
writes, '[t]he people basically double the doing, [... ] this is a doing-doing: it posits
the same event first as cause and then once again as its effect'. Nietzsche thus
refers to the other instance of the common sense treatment of choice, that which
regards choice as 'free' in the sense of not determined by antecedent causes,
objects that it conceives of choice as both a cause and an effect of that cause, and
suggests that it derives from certain 'popular' errors. Given his earlier discussions,
then, this section is distinguished by Nietzsche's conflation of the two instances,
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and his objections to them - his critical object here is, as he expresses it towards
the end of the section, 'the belief in the indifferent freely choosing "subject" _27
In sections of the chapter, 'The four great errors', in Twilight of the Idols,
on the other hand, Nietzsche clearly distinguishes the two instances, by treating
them as two distinct 'errors'. In 'Error of a false causality', he refers to the belief
in 'the I (the "subject") as cause' and rejects it as 'a fiction, a play on words', thus
referring to the instance which attributes agency to a substantial agent, and again
rejecting it as a fabrication deriving from certain errors expressed in grammar.
Notably, in this section he also makes clear what he merely suggests in Beyond
Good and Evil, namely, that he considers these errors in the light of his account of
the primitive and modem misconceptions of causality and their origins in the
common claim regarding choice. While in the Genealogy he notes only that these
errors are 'petrified in' grammar, in 'Error of a false causality' he indicates that
their origins are not merely grammatical, and that they arise from common sense's
basic error regarding the experience of a necessitating causal power in choice. In
particular, he writes that the attribution of choice to a substantial agent, along with
the belief that an agent chooses for reasons, 'were merely born afterwards, after
causality had been firmly established by the will as given, as empirical
evidence' .28
Nietzsche's discussion of 'free will' in 'The four great errors', in two
sections under the title 'The error offree will', is more lengthy. It is also explicitly
27 GM I 13. A clearer formulation can be found at KGW VIII: 1 2 [84] (Autumn 1885-Autumn
1886). Nietzsche's example of 'the lightning' and 'its flash' in this section might derive from
Lubbock, who, in discussing subject-predicate grammar and the primitive conception of nature,
maintains that Aryan languages have tended to confuse the subject of a sentence like 'the sky
thunders' with a proper name, and that this confusion partly explains the idea that a spirit is
responsible for the thunder - that 'Zeus thunders', for example. See Lubbock, The Origin of
Civilisation, pp.219-220.
28 GD VI 3. See also GD III 1-3 and 5, and KGW VIII: I2 [139] (Autumn l885-Autumn 1886),
VIII:l 7 [1] (End 1886-Spring 1887), VIII: 29 [98] (Autumn 1887), and VIII:3 14 [98] (Spring
1888).
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restricted to 'the psychology of every making-responsible' - that is, to the role of
'free will' in determining an agent's moral responsibility." This element of
Nietzsche's criticism of 'free will' is first introduced in the last of the series of
sections in Beyond Good and Evil, and provided with some elaboration in both of
his later discussions. In the thirteenth section of the first essay of the Genealogy,
the terms in which he elaborates on this element echo his remark regarding 'strong
and weak wills' in Beyond Good and Evil. For there he writes that an agent's
'strength', or 'force', is 'a quantum of drive, will, effect', and constitutes 'his
essence, his effect, his whole unique inevitable, undetachable reality'. In this light,
he insists that those who uphold the 'belief [... ] that the strong one is free to be
weak, and the bird of prey to be a lamb[, ... ] with it [damit] gain for themselves
the right to hold accountable the bird of prey, for being a bird of prey'. Equally,
Nietzsche continues, this belief permits 'weakness' to be treated as 'a voluntary
achievement, something willed, chosen, an act, a merit'. Among the 'weak', then,
Nietzsche claims that it is 'no wonder if the suppressed, hiddenly glowing affects
of revenge and hate exploit this belief for themselves' - that is, for the
promulgation of supposed moral requirements which serve the interests of the
'weak' in constraining the 'strong' .30 In this section of the Genealogy, therefore,
he maintains that 'free will' legitimates the consideration of an agent's 'strength'
or 'weakness' as something for which the agent is responsible, and that this
legitimation is exploited by the 'ressentiment' -fuelled 'slave revolt' with which the
first essay is primarily concerned.
In the two sections under the title 'The error of free will' in Twilight of the
Idols, on the other hand, Nietzsche makes no reference to 'strength' or 'weakness',
29 GD VI 7.
30 GM I 13. See also GM II 7. and EH 16.
27
but rather refers simply to an agent's 'nature', or her 'being this or that'. In
particular, he writes that, with 'free will', 'being this or that is traced back to will,
to intentions, to responsible acts', or the agent is supposed to be 'responsible for
being at all, for being constituted as this or that, for being in these circumstances,
in these surroundings'. This treatment of choice, Nietzsche maintains, 'has its
presupposition in this, that its authors, the priests at the head of ancient
communities, wanted to create for themselves a right to impose punishments - or
wanted to create a right for God to do so'. Against this, Nietzsche's 'teaching' is
simply that '[n]o one gives a human being his qualities, neither God, nor society,
nor his parents and ancestors, nor he himself. 'The fatality of [... one's] nature',
Nietzsche continues, 'is not to be detached from the fatality of all that was and will
be'."
Nietzsche's only hint of what one's 'nature', or one's 'being this or that',
might consist of is a remark which he makes at the beginning of 'The four great
errors', in a discussion under the title, 'The error of confusing cause and
consequence'. There his example is Luigi Cornaro, a sixteenth-century Venetian
writer who attributed his longevity to a paltry diet. To this, Nietzsche counters that
Cornaro's slow metabolism was the 'precondition' of his longevity, and made
necessary his paltry diet. Thus, Nietzsche remarks, Cornaro's 'frugality was not a
"free will": he became ill when he ate more'. Generalising this, Nietzsche insists
that, just as Cornaro's metabolism required him to restrict his diet, so the happy
functioning of 'the order which [... one] physiologically represents', or the extent
of one's 'instinct degeneration, [... ] disgregation of will', requires one to do or
refrain from certain things. Nietzsche concludes that for supposed moral
31 GD VI 7, 8. For similar remarks, see GD V 6, A 14-15 and 38, EH IV 8, and KGWVIII:3 15 [30]
(Spring 1888).
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requirements to ignore these conditions is simply for them to be instances of
'unreason,.32 Assuming that the 'free will' to which his remark regarding Cornaro
refers is precisely the 'free will' which he elsewhere associates with an over-
inflated sense of responsibility, therefore, Nietzsche can be supposed to include an
agent's physiological constitution, and the state of her 'instincts' and 'will', within
the 'fatality' for which she cannot reasonably be held responsible.Y
This and Nietzsche's corresponding account of 'strength' and 'weakness'
in the Genealogy serve to express a conception of responsibility as restricted to
what is within the agent's control, and the claim that 'free will' underwrites a
sense of responsibility which oversteps this restriction. However, since these
accounts provide only the broadest intimations of precisely how the restriction is
thus contravened, Nietzsche's commitment to it remains largely formal, and his
understanding of the rightful scope of an agent's responsibility remains largely
indeterminate.
Finally, although it is plausible to suppose that 'free will' would logically
underwrite a sense of responsibility that would overstep Nietzsche's restriction,
less convincing is his allegation that, in fact, proponents of unfulfilable
requirements have in appealed to 'free will' to underwrite them. Important
counter-examples are provided by Christianity, at which he generally directs this
allegation." Calvin, for instance, held the agent responsible for those
predetermined events of which she is the most immediate or relevant instrumental
32 GD VII, 2.
33 This is also implied by GM II 22, in which Nietzsche criticises the denial of certain natural
noncognitive motivating states as 'a kind of madness of the will' for the impossibility of its
demands. At EH 'M' 2, he also maintains that the 'sense' of 'free will', among other concepts, is
'to ruin humanity physiologically'.
34 For Nietzsche's concern for Christianity in this regard, see GM 113, and GD VI 2,7, and 8.
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cause.35 Even Augustine, who is often considered the first to conceive of the
responsible agent in terms of a spontaneous causal 'will', held that the human will
could do good only with divine gracc.'" Similarly, other philosophers that deny
'free will' do not necessary satisfy Nietzsche's restriction of responsibility to what
is within the agent's control - consider the compatibilisms of Hobbes, Locke,
Hume, or Leibniz, for example." Indeed, despite Nietzsche's claim in Beyond
Good and Evil that the notion of 'free will' 'still rules in the heads of the half-
educated', common sense arguably makes rare recourse to 'free will', but
nonetheless endorses at least some unfulfilable . 38requirements. Such
counterexamples, of which Nietzsche was surely aware, leave somewhat puzzling
his confidence that to dispel 'free will' is to dispel over-inflated senses of
responsibility - his confidence that in dispelling 'free will', 'the innocence of
becoming is restored', and 'we redeem the world', in the emphatic terms with
which he concludes 'The error a/free will' .39
35 See. for example. Calvin. Institution de la religion chrestienne, bk.I, ch.15, §8, and ch.l7, §§3-6.
36 See. for instance. Augustine. De libero arbitrio, bk.3. ch.17, De spiritu et littera, ch.30, and De
civitate Dei, bk.5, chs.8-1O. For a typical interpretation of Augustine as the originator ofthe
modern conception of the will. see Dihle, The Theory of Will in Classical Antiquity, ch.6.
37 See, for instance, Hobbes, Leviathan, ch.z l, Leibniz, 'On Freedom', and Discours de
Metaphysique. §§30-2. Locke. An Essay Concerning Human Understanding. hk.2, ch.l l , §§5-30,
and Hume, Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, §8.
38 JGB 21.
39 GD VI 8.
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Conclusions
Nietzsche's critical treatment of the common sense claim that an agent's
action is sufficiently explained by her 'willing' of it, in the sense that, given the
circumstances, it is causally necessitated in the agent's conscious choice of it, can
be summarised as follows. By denying that we experience necessitating causal
powers, with which a succeeding event could be 'explained', he denies that we
experience such a power in an agent's choosing. Indeed, he also holds the common
sense claim itself responsible for our general commitment to such causal
'explanation'. Considered simply as a causal 'description' according to
experienced regular correlations between types of events, Nietzsche also suspects
that the common sense claim obscures significant causes of chosen action other
than conscious choice itself.
Nietzsche also objects to two particular instances of the common sense
claim. With regard to an instance which attributes choice to a substantial agent, or
'1', he insists that such an agent is simply not part of choice. It is added to choice,
he maintains, only under the misleading influence of subject-predicate grammar,
which is ultimately merely a particular expression of our mistaken general
commitment to causal 'explanation'. With regard to an instance of the common
sense claim which conceives of choice as undetermined by antecedent causes,
Nietzsche objects that it is incoherent, since it conceives of choice as both a cause
and the effect of that cause, and that it underwrites an over-inflated sense of
responsibility. Indeed, at least in his later texts, Nietzsche argues that the contrary
notion that causal determination precludes choice, by making it merely a passive,
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obedient effect of other causes, is equally mistaken. This notion relies, he
maintains, on our misconceiving causal determination in the 'explanatory' terms of
necessitating causal powers or on our misconceiving as normative commands the
regular correlations according to which we causally 'describe' events.
32
2.
Reasons
The common sense conception of agency which Nietzsche criticises not
only considers an agent's conscious choice to sufficiently explain her action, but
also considers this choice to be made for reasons, in the sense that it is motivated
by the cognitive acknowledgement of normative reasons for action. Nietzsche
consistently denies this claim and treats actions as instead motivated by
noncognitive states informed by reasons. However, in only one passage does he
provide an argument for this position, being overwhelmingly concerned with its
consequences for the practice of making moral judgements about reasons for
action, and the moral philosophy parasitic on this practice. In this chapter, then, I
elucidate the grounds of Nietzsche's consistent denial of practical reason, before
showing how it informs the 'revaluation of values' with which he proposes to
replace the moral philosophy of practical reasons.
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Against practical reason
Like that of the common sense claim regarding choice, Nietzsche's critical
treatment of the common sense claim regarding reasons is most clearly aired in a
section of the first edition of The Gay Science. The relevant section in this case,
entitled 'Long live physics!', begins with the common sense claim regarding
reasons, stated with regard to moral reasons by Nietzsche's common sense
'friend': "'when the human being judges 'this is right', [and] when he concludes
from this 'hence it must happen!' and then does what he has thus recognised as
right and described as necessary, - then the nature of his action is moral!'''. For
Nietzsche, the prevalence of this moral version of the claim best 'testifies to'
common sense's general lack of understanding of the role of reasons in agency.
Regarding it, he objects that the judgement 'this is right' is generally made
uncritically, particularly by appeal to 'conscience', and that it thus generally
merely symptomises the judge's particular inclinations and experiences.'
However, Nietzsche's more fundamental criticism is that no agent is motivated by
such a judgement per se. Rather, he insists, an agent can always ask regarding such
a judgement, "'what actually drives me to give a hearing to it?"', and this
motivation consists of her 'drives, inclinations, aversions', in contrast to the
'belief' of the judgement itself. In the case of a moral judgement, Nietzsche
suggests that what motivates might resemble discipline, love, fear, or simple
stupidity.i In short, then, Nietzsche here insists that an agent is motivated not by
1 FW 335. As applied to moral judgement. this objection is frequently made elsewhere. See. for
instance.M 10, 11,21, and 24. and FW 338.
2 FW335.
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reasons, considered as cognitive states ('beliefs'), but by noncognitive states
(,drives, inclinations, aversions') informed by reasons.'
After making important remarks regarding Kant to which I will return in
the following chapter, Nietzsche proceeds to provide grounds for his denial of
practical reason. He writes the following of someone who has 'taken five steps in
self-knowledge' .4
he would know that there neither are nor can be identical actions, - that every action
which has been done was done in a completely unique and irretrievable way, and that
this will be just as true of every future action, - that all rules of action (and even the
most inward and subtle rules of all moralities so far) refer only to the coarse exterior,
- that they can well reach an appearance of identity, but only an appearance, - that
in looking forward to or back upon any action, it is and remains an impenetrable
thing, - that our opinions of 'good', 'noble', 'great' can never be proven by our
actions, because every action is unknowable, - that certainly our opinions,
valuations, and tables of what is good belong among the most powerful levers in the
mechanism of our actions, but that in every single case the law of their mechanism is
unprovable."
In this passage, I propose, Nietzsche argues that a reason could not
motivate an agent because it prescriptively underdetermines action. Here he refers
to a reason as a 'rule of action' - that is, a prescription of a type of action in a type
of circumstance. For instance, the 'thoughtless person' to whom Nietzsche refers
3 Versions of this venerable position are adopted by. among others. Hume and Schopenhauer, with
whose claims Nietzsche was acquainted, first- and second-hand. See, for instance. Hume, A
Treatise of Human Nature, bk.I, pt.3, §IO. bk.2. pt.3, §§3 and 6. and bk.J, pt.I, §I, and
Schopenhauer, Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung, §§23 and 55.
4 FW335.
s FW335.
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in 'Aftereffects ... ' might have a reason to 'strike something' in the presence of the
'something' and in the absence of physical obstructions to striking it. As a reason,
such a prescription also has normative grounds, if not necessarily distinctively
'moral' ones - reasons are, as Nietzsche puts it, 'opinions of "good", "noble",
"great'" , or 'opinions, valuations, and tables of what is good' .
In the first half of the passage, Nietzsche argues that a reason prescriptively
underdetermines action because an action and its circumstances are singular, while
a reason's prescription is made in terms of general types of action and
circumstance. In his terms, there is no 'identity' among actions and circumstances
which would allow a 'rule of action' to grasp more than their 'coarse exterior', or
to express more than a mere 'appearance of identity' among them. Since he
provides no further argument for this singularity here, he presumably considers it
to be confirmed simply by empirical 'self-knowledge'. In the second half of the
passage, Nietzsche concludes that any particular action must be motivated other
than by reasons, and, furthermore, that its motivations are undeterminable. Thus he
proceeds from a reason's expression of a mere 'appearance of identity' among
actions to the 'impenetrable' or 'unknowable' character of an action for one
'looking forward to or back upon' it. I take it that Nietzsche considers common
sense to 'look forward' to an action primarily from the perspective of reasons,
which prospectively prescribe actions, and to 'look back upon' an action primarily
with a view to causally 'describing' it, and particularly the reasons according to
which it was chosen. From both perspectives, then, Nietzsche's claim is that, as he
writes of reasons in the last phrase, 'in every single case the law of their
mechanism is unprovable' .
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With the first conclusion, Nietzsche effectively denies that an agent could,
as common sense supposes, simply do 'what he has [... ] recognised as right and
described as necessary' with reasons. 'Long live physics!' thus provides what is
lacking elsewhere in Nietzsche's texts - namely, grounds for his consistent denial
of practical reason. In Beyond Good and Evil, for instance, he writes of the belief
in '[t]he intention as the whole origin and prehistory of an action' that, in fact, 'the
intention is only a sign and symptom that first needs interpretation, moreover a
sign that means too many things and consequently almost nothing by itself'. In a
section of the second edition of The Gay Science, he similarly insists that, although
'one is used, according to an ancient error, to seeing the driving force [of an
action] precisely in the goals (purposes, professions, etc.)', in fact these are
'relatively discretionary, arbitrary, almost indifferent'. Indeed, Nietzsche here also
refers to the denial of this 'ancient error' as 'one of my most essential steps'. He
again articulates this position in 'Error of a false causality' in Twilight of the Idols,
where he treats the common sense claim regarding reasons as a supposed 'inner
fact', according to which 'all the antecedentia of an action, its causes, were to be
sought in consciousness and could be discovered there, if one sought them - as
"motives": otherwise one would not have been free for it, not responsible for it'.
This claim is simply an 'error', Nietzsche insists, because a reason is '[m]erely a
surface phenomenon of consciousness, an accompaniment of the act, which
conceals the antecedentia of an act rather than represents them' .6
Nietzsche's second conclusion in this passage of 'Long live physics!'
threatens further claims that he makes, however. For in numerous passages,
including 'Long live physics!', Nietzsche accounts for actions as motivated not by
6 JGB 32, FW360, GD VI 3. See also MA 34, and KGWVIII:l 7 [1] (End of 1886-Spring 1887).
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reasons, but by noncognitive states informed by reasons.' Presumably by
elimination, then, he supposes that if reasons do not motivate an agent to act, then
noncognitive states informed by reasons do. But his second conclusion in the
passage of 'Long live physics!' is that the motivations of any particular action are
undeterminable. His grounds for this conclusion are presumably those of his
premise, that an action and its circumstances are singular. For it follows from this
premise that no causal 'description' could be provided of an action at all, since no
investigation of conditions and consequences according to observed regularities
could be undertaken. Thus, although the singularity of an action and its
circumstances provides grounds for Nietzsche's denial of practical reason, it also
undermines his consistent provision of alternative causal 'descriptions' of actions
in terms of noncognitive states. In response, it may be suggested that, to articulate
this denial and provide these alternative 'descriptions', Nietzsche need be
committed merely to the particularity, rather than singularity, of an action and its
circumstances, and hold simply that noncognitive states might capture this
particularity, while reasons cannot. For particularity, unlike singularity, admits the
investigation according observed regularities which causal 'description' requires.
Nietzsche's argument would thus tum on the relative generality of reasons'
prescriptions, noncognitive states informed by reasons, and actions and their
circumstances. Nonetheless, any such modification of his argument in 'Long live
physics!' must admit that there Nietzsche himself makes a more radical claim.
7 See. for instance. MA 57. 107. 132-3. and 138. M 133. and FW 3. Nietzsche objects to uncritical
causal accounts of moral and immoral actions more generally at MA 13. and GD VI 4-6. and makes
related remarks atJGB 192 and FW355.
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The 'revaluation of values'
Nietzsche's primary concern regarding his denial of practical reason is with
the consequences of this denial, rather than its grounds. In particular, he takes this
denial to undermine the practice of making judgements about reasons for action,
and the moral philosophy which undertakes to provide moral 'grounds' for such
judgements. In the place of such moral philosophy, Nietzsche proposes a
'revaluation' of obedience to moral reasons, consisting of both a symptomatology
of the relevant noncognitive motivating states and an evaluation according to his
own particular concern for 'humanity'. These programmatic claims are most
clearly expressed in the fifth part of Beyond Good and Evil, 'On the natural history
of morality', and in its opening few sections in particular. I will therefore first
focus on these sections, before considering the 'revaluation of values' which
Nietzsche proceeds to offer in the Genealogy.
I.
Nietzsche begins the fifth part of Beyond Good and Evil, 'On the natural
history of morality', by raising moral philosophers' concern for 'the grounding of
morality'i'' As he proceeds to make clear, he considers a 'ground' of morality to
express a requirement of reason which is supposed to be unconditional and
overriding - that is, a rational requirement which is supposed to bind an agent as
8 JGB 186.
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such, irrespective of her contingent concerns, and to trump any other requirement.
Such a 'ground' would serve to guide the judgement of reasons for action in
specific circumstances, by providing for the derivation, testing, and reform of
more specific reasons, which are thus gilded with an equally unconditional and
overriding authority. In these opening sections, Nietzsche refers in particular to
Schopenhauer's principle of compassion, Kant's categorical imperative, and the
reformist undertakings of utilitarians and 'anarchists'. In later sections, he writes,
regarding the 'Socratism' in Plato's moral philosophy and in 'every utilitarianism',
that 'rationality [... ] wants to know according to grounds, according to a "why?",
according to purposiveness and utility evaluated and acted upon', and that a
'moral' requirement is one which it is considered to be an 'error' for any agent to
contravene. He also remarks of 'morals' which appeal to the supposed
'"happiness''' of the individual, among which he includes those of the Stoics,
Spinoza, Aristotelianism, and religion, 'all of them speaking unconditionally,
taking themselves unconditionally'."
In the opening section, Nietzsche first criticises moral philosophers for,
particularly in their choice of 'ground', having 'known moral facta only crudely,
in an arbitrary extraction or as chance abbreviation' - for instance, as the
requirements which prevail in a particular environment.'? His more fundamental
objections, however, derive from his denial of practical reason. Presumably on the
grounds that agents are motivated to act not by reasons, but by noncognitive states
informed by reasons, he objects, firstly, that what should occupy judgement is not
the reasons according to which an agent acts, but rather the noncognitive states
which motivate the agent; and, secondly, that an agent can be meaningfully
9 JGB 190,191, 198. See also JGB 186-8, 199, and 200-202.
10 JGB 186.
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considered to have a reason to do or refrain from an action only relative to her
particular concerns, as determined by her particular motivating states, and that an
unconditional and overriding reason is therefore incoherent. He insists on the first
objection when he writes in the opening section, 'what the philosophers called
"grounding of morality" [... ] was, seen in the right light, only an erudite form of
good faith in the prevailing morality, a new means of its expression'. In the
following section, he also provides a list of different motivations for obedience to
moral reasons and 'grounds', before concluding with the general statement that
'even morals are only a sign language of affects'. He emphasises his second
objection in the later sections. For instance, he writes of 'Socratism' that the
supposition of an unconditional and overriding rational requirement constitutes
'the irrational in moral judgements', because 'reason is only a tool' - and a 'tool'
of an agent's 'faith', or 'instincts', in particular. Of moral reasons directed at the
individual's supposed "'happiness"', he similarly writes, 'all of them baroque and
unreasonable in form - because they are directed at "everyone", because they
generalise what may not be generalised'. At best, he suggests, these reasons might
hold relative to the particular 'dangerousness' of an agent's circumstances, or to
'his passions, his good and bad tendencies', or as 'small or large clevernesses and
artifices' .11
In place of the practice of judging reasons for action and the provision of
'grounds' for such judgement, Nietzsche proposes to provide a symptomatology of
II JGB 186. 187. 191. 198. See also JGB 6.193.194. and 200. Elsewhere. Nietzsche dismisses
brands of rational egoism on related grounds. In M 99-105. he prefaces a statement of these
grounds by dismissing the claim. which he attributes to La Rochefoucauld, that moral requirements
are justified only with regard to an agent's own interests, despite agents' deceptive. and self-
deceptive. claims to other motivations. See also WS 20 in this regard. In GM I 1-3 he similarly
dismisses the 'English' position that moral requirements are justified only with regard to their
consequences for an agent's own 'utility'. despite the processes of forgetfulness. habit. or
association which account for other. spurious moral concepts and motivations. In this regard. see
also FW 4.21.345. and 373. JGB 228. GM V 4 and 7. and GD 112. and IX 5.37, and 38.
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the noncognitive states which motivate obedience to moral reasons and an
evaluation of this obedience according to his own particular concern for
'humanity'. This genuine "'science of morality'" requires, as he puts it in the
opening section of 'On the natural history of morality', the 'collection of material,
conceptual formulation and ordering together of an enormous realm of tender
value feelings and value distinctions, which live, grow, procreate, and are
destroyed [... ] - as preparation for a doctrine of types of morality'. He indicates in
the second section that he intends to distinguish 'types' of morality by reading the
'sign language of affects' expressed in obedience to moral reasons. Then, in the
lengthy third section, he indicates that he also intends to provide a particular kind
of evaluation of such obedience. He begins this section with the following
statement: 'Every morality is, in opposition to laisser aller, a piece of tyranny
against "nature", also against "reason": but that is still no objection to it, for which
one would have to again decree from some other morality that every kind of
tyranny and unreason is forbidden' .12 He thus refuses to evaluate obedience to
moral reasons according to either a 'ground' or to 'laisser aller', the contingent
concerns of particular individuals or 'types' of individuals. He considers the
former incoherent and the latter, apparently, simply of dubious promise or use. He
proposes instead to evaluate obedience to moral reasons as a 'means' of
developing practices which 'make [... ] it worthwhile to live on earth, for example
virtue, art, music, dance, reason, intellectuality'. 13 He concludes this section as
follows.
12 JGB 188.
13 JGB 188.
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this tyranny, this arbitrariness, this strict and grandiose stupidity [of obedience to
supposed moral reasons] has trained the spirit; slavery in the cruder and the more
refined senses is, it seems, the indispensable means even for spiritual discipline and
breeding. Consequently one may regard every morality [as follows]: the 'nature' in it
teaches hatred of the laisser aller, the all-too-great freedom [.... ] 'You should obey,
someone, and for a long time: otherwise you will be destroyed and lose the last
respect for yourself - this seems to me to be the moral imperative of nature, which is
of course neither 'categorical', as the old Kant asked of it (hence the 'otherwise' -),
nor directed at the individual [... ], but rather to peoples, races, ages, classes, but
above all to the whole 'human' animal, to the human."
Nietzsche thus proposes to evaluate obedience to a moral reason by
considering it as if it were the prolonged obedience of a group, and even humanity
in general, to a reason whose justification is neither unconditional and overriding
nor relative to the contingent concerns of particular individuals or 'types', but
rather might lie in upholding the 'self-respect' of the group, and of humanity in
general. However, that he, or anyone else, is committed to such an evaluation
Nietzsche considers to be a matter of noncognitive motivating states appropriately
orientated to such a normative perspective. Thus when he returns to this proposal
in the concluding section of 'On the natural history of morality' , he addresses it to
'[w]e who are of another faith' .15 He also there refers to it by the name which he
employs throughout his succeeding texts, namely, a 'revaluation of values' .16
14 JGB 188.
IS JGB 203. Arguably, Nietzsche also addresses himself to this 'we' in his earlier texts. See, for
instance, GT23, H 4, and RW 4.
16 JGB 203.
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II.
Nietzsche provides brief examples of such a 'revaluation of values'
throughout 'On the natural history of morality' and elsewhere in Beyond Good and
Evil, and he commits himself to it again in the second edition of The Gay Science,
and, at some length, in the preface to the Genealogyi' The three essays of the
Genealogy can be considered as his most considered attempt to provide a
'revaluation of values', given his commitment in the preface, his note, on the
reverse side of the title page, that the text is intended to provide a 'supplement and
clarification' of Beyond Good and Evil, the relative length and sophistication of
the essays themselves, and the absence of conflicting treatments in his later texts.
Of course, this is not to say that Nietzsche considers the Genealogy to provide a
conclusive 'revaluation of values'. On the contrary, he suggests that the
'revaluation of values' which the Genealogy provides is speculative and
incomplete. IS Nor is it to deny that he also employs other critical strategies in this
text and elsewhere - I have considered other such strategies above, and will
consider more below. Nonetheless, I propose that the Genealogy is devoted in
large part to a 'revaluation of values', the basic elements of which are the
following.
In the first essay, Nietzsche considers two instances of the same kind of
moral reason, a kind concerned with the morally 'good' agent in particular." He
refers to the two instances as reasons of 'good and bad' and reasons of 'good and
17 See JGB 187-9, 195-202, and 260, FW 345, and GM V 3, 5, 6, and 7, I 17n, and III 12, and also
KGWVIII:27 [6 and 8) (End 1886-Spring 1887).
18 See GM 117 and 17n, and III 27, EH 'GM', and KGB 971 (4th January 1888). Nietzsche's
continued commitments to a 'revaluation of values' in his succeeding texts also suggest that he
hardly considers GM to provide the conclusive such 'revaluation'. See GD V, VI 2, VII 1, and X 5,
A 13,61, and 62, and EH I I, II 9, 'MA' 6, 'M' I, 'JGB' I, 'GD' 3, 'W' 4, and IV 1.
19 See Nietzsche's remarks on 'good' at GM 12-5,7,11, and 13.
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evil', respectively. First, he presents reasons of 'good and bad' as ultimately
justified only by appeal to a distinguishing characteristic of exemplary 'good', or
'bad', agents, a characteristic which is supposed to bestow 'goodness', or
'badness', on their actions. Thus an agent is required to do, or not do, x ultimately
because agents with a distinguishing characteristic y do, or do not do, x. Nietzsche
illuminates this with an account of the 'concept transformation' with which
"'noble", "aristocratic" in the social sense' became "'good" in the sense of "noble
soul", "aristocratic", of "soul of a high order", "privileged soul"', and the
'subjective tum' with which this 'good' was often then identified with 'a typical
character trait' - with 'the blond-headed', 'the warrior', or 'the truthful', for
instance. By simple negation, Nietzsche claims, the opposite of "'noble",
"aristocratic" in the social sense', and then the opposites of 'good' character traits,
became correspondingly conceived as 'bad' .20
However, Nietzsche's primary concern in the first essay is with a second
instance of this kind of reason. Indeed, he 'revalues' only this second instance, by
distinguishing its corresponding motivating state from that of the first. That is,
reasons of 'good and evil' ostensively differ from those of 'good and bad' only by
their 'inversion' of the latter's 'goodness' - and 'badness' -bestowing
characteristics." Thus, for instance, Nietzsche has the proponents of 'good and
evil' requirements say, ""[ ... ] good is everyone who does not violate, who injures
no one, who does not attack, who does not requite, who leaves revenge to God,
who keeps himself hidden as we do, who avoids all evil and in general desires
little from life, like us, the patient, humble, just" .22 However, Nietzsche also
argues that, while obedience to reasons of both 'good and bad' and 'good and evil'
20 GM I 4, 5. See also JGB 260, and GM I 2, 4, 5, 10, and 11.
21 GMI7.
22 GM I 13. See also GM I 7, 8, and 11.
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is motivated by a certain affirmation of one's 'self' as possessing 'goodness'-
bestowing characteristics, in obedience to reasons of 'good and evil' this
affirmation takes a distinct form. As Nietzsche presents it, this form is
distinguished by 'ressentiment', which he treats as an agent's basic feeling that
natural limits of, or threats to, his agency - 'his enemies, his accidents, his
misdeeds', as Nietzsche puts it - ought not to be.23 Thus in obeying reasons of
'good and evil', Nietzsche claims, one affirms one's 'self' as possessing
'goodness' -bestowing characteristics negatively, against such limits or threats.i"
With this claim, then, Nietzsche supposes to dispel the plausibility of professed
alternative motivations, such as Christian love or those which would, as in cases of
reasons of 'good and bad', refer simply to the 'goodness' -bestowing characteristics
themselves. He undertakes to substantiate his claim with an account of how the
'inversion' of 'goodness' - and 'badness' -bestowing characteristics originated in a
'ressentiment' -fuelled 'slave revolt' against reasons of 'good and bad' .25
In the second essay, Nietzsche 'revaluation' is a little more straightforward,
and a substantial part of the essay is occupied with other, extraneous matters which
I will consider in the third part of the thesis. The object of Nietzsche's
'revaluation' in this essay is a religious kind of reason which requires the denial of
certain natural noncognitive motivating states. As Nietzsche expresses this kind of
reason, it 'interprets' man's 'actual and inescapable animal instincts [... ]
themselves as guilt against God'. The motivation to obey such reasons, Nietzsche
argues, can lie only in instincts of cruelty - and, in particular, in instincts of cruelty
23 GMI 10.
24 See GM I 10-11, and III 14-15, EH 16, and KGW VIII: I 8 [2] (Summer 1887) and VIII:3 14 [29]
(Spring 1888).
25 GMI 7. See also JGB 195 and 260, GM 18, IQ, 11, and 13-6, A 24,40,45, and 51, and EH
'GM'. Note that Nietzsche also refers to the 'slave revolt' itself as a 'revaluation' of the
requirements of 'good and bad'. See JGB 46, GM I 7 and 8, GD VI 4, and EH IV 7.
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which, denied outer satisfaction by political constraints, are forced to 'tum
themselves inwards' on the agent. Such motivations are, he claims, distinctive of
'bad conscience'. The further appeal to divine grounds against 'instincts'
themselves, and the notion of 'guilt' associated with this, Nietzsche attributes to a
further 'entanglement' of 'bad conscience' with the supposed debts of a
community to its ancestors, once these supposed debts have been transformed,
under the influence of the relation between 'creditor' and 'debtor', into demanding
obligations to deities.i" Rather than a rational recognition of 'guilt against God',
then, Nietzsche insists that obedience to these reasons is motivated by instincts of
cruelty, turned against the agent herself.
Finally, in the third essay of the Genealogy, Nietzsche 'revalues' what he
calls 'ascetic ideals'. Again, this 'revaluation' is relatively straightforward,
although Nietzsche provides a relatively thorough presentation and discussion of
it. 'Ascetic ideals' are requirements to deny necessary features of human life for
the sake of another 'existence', supposed to lie beyond these features. As
Nietzsche puts it, these ideals express a particular 'evaluation of our life [... ]: it
(together with that to which it belongs, "nature", "world", the whole sphere of
becoming and transitoriness) is put in relation to an entirely different kind of
existence, to which it acts contradictorily and exclusively, unless it turns against
itself, negates itself: in this case, [... ] life is held to be a bridge for that other
existence' .27 Obedience to such reasons, Nietzsche argues, can be motivated only
by a 'ressentiment' associated with the inevitable 'suffering' of much of human
life. He refers, in particular, to 'suffering' at political constraints and at the
'undetermined' nature of human life. By evaluating this 'suffering' in terms of
26 GM 1122, 16,24,21. See also GM II 17-20 and 23, and EH 'GM'.
27 GMIII 11.
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another 'existence', Nietzsche argues, an ascetic ideal gives this 'suffering' a
'meaning' and directs the basic 'meaning' of the associated 'ressentiment' - that
'''[s]omeone must be to blame for my feeling bad'" - onto the sufferer herself.28
Indeed, he further argues that insofar as modem science, which does without
appeals to 'an entirely different kind of existence', is practiced by appeal to the
unconditional value of truth, it is equally an ascetic ideal."
With each of his 'revaluations' in the Genealogy, then, Nietzsche does not
undertake to judge agents' reasons for actions according to a 'ground'. Nor,
indeed, does he undertake to show that agents' professed reasons for actions differ
from the reasons which motivate them. Rather, in each case he intends to identify
the kind of noncognitive state which motivates obedience to a particular kind of
reason. In particular, he refers to certain feelings of 'ressentiment' and to certain
instincts of cruelty. Notably, this ought not to imply that Nietzsche considers a
kind of reason or a kind of noncognitive motivating state to exist in isolation. That
he rather considers each such kind as part of a complex, from which each
'revaluation' abstracts a distinct strand, is strongly suggested by the interrelations
between his 'revaluations' in the Genealogy. Among these interrelations, one
might note, for instance, that 'ressentiment' and the character of the 'priest' are
salient in the 'revaluations' of both the first essay and the third, that the objects of
'revaluation' in both the second and the third essay are both modes of religious
self-denial, that a particular instance of 'bad conscience' is considered as a
particular 'ascetic ideal' in the third essay, and that the implications of political
constraints playa role not only in the argument of the second essay, but also in
28GMIII 13,15.SeealsoGTV5,GMIII 14and 16-22,andll7,andGDV 1-5.andIX34.
29 See GM III 23-5.
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those of the first and third." Regarding 'ascetic ideals', Nietzsche even admits that
obedience to such reasons can be 'meaning' -less in the sense of being motivated
by noncognitive states which are, he argues, inessential to such obediencer"
Besides identifying a noncognitive state which motivates obedience to a
kind of reason, each 'revaluation' in the Genealogy also evaluates this obedience
in the manner which Nietzsche proposes in 'On the natural history of morality'.
That is, it evaluates whether obedience to a particular kind of reason, on a
relatively large scale, serves to uphold the 'self-respect' of 'humanity'. This is
particularly pronounced in the first and third essays. In the first, Nietzsche
denounces obedience to reasons of 'good and evil' on the grounds that it serves to
produce 'the "tame man", the hopelessly mediocre and uninspiring'. At least,
Nietzsche complains, there is something to 'admire' in the communities who,
rather than being 'tamed', allowed themselves a fearful violence towards those
'outside'. He nonetheless admits that his disappointment, or 'nihilism', is his own.
'What is it that is utterly unbearable to me in particular?', he asks regarding 'the
"tame man"', and he expresses his answer, that 'the "tame man'" is not 'a human
being that justifies the human being', exclusively in terms of 'I' and 'we,.32 In the
third essay, however, he is less modest, and more positive, in his evaluation of the
obedience concerned. He begins the essay by insisting on 'the basic fact of the
human will, its horror vacui: it needs a goal', and proceeds to treat this supposed
'fact' or 'need' in terms of a 'goal' which would answer the question, "'what is
humanity in general for?'''. In particular, Nietzsche treats ascetic ideals as
providing an answer to this question which has prevailed primarily for the lack of
30 For these interrelations, see. in particular. GM I 6-7. II 16-8. III 13. 15. and 19-21. and KGB 971
(41hJanuary 1888).
31 SeeGMIII4-10.
32 GMI 11. 12. See also GM 117. and. on 'taming'. GM 1115. GD VII 2-5. and KGWVIII:3 15 [55
and 72-3] (Spring 1888).
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an alternative answer - as he puts it, the human will 'would rather will nothingness
than not will' .33 With regard to the modem candidate for an alternative, the
practice of science, he maintains that insofar as it does not appeal to the
unconditional value of truth, and thus simply constitute another ascetic ideal, it
should be dismissed for failing to provide 'a goal, a will, an ideal, a passion of
great faith' at all.34 In the third essay Nietzsche thus, I suggest, attributes to 'the
human will' as such his own commitment to 'humanity', while elsewhere he
carefully indicates that this commitment, like every other, ultimately rests on
noncognitive motivating states which need not be possessed by every agent.
Indeed, he concludes the second essay precisely by warning against the criticism
of one 'ideal' by another, and rather hoping for the 'redemption' of the 'reality'
which every 'ideal' obscures."
33 GM III 1,28. See also GM III 23, and EH 'GM'.
34 GMIII 23.
3S GM II 24. See also EH V 2-3.
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Conclusions
Nietzsche, then, consistently denies the common sense claim that an agent
chooses for reasons, such that she is motivated by her cognitive acknowledgement
of reasons, and instead considers actions to be motivated by noncognitive states
informed by reasons. However, he provides grounds for this position only in a
section of the first edition of The Gay Science, entitled 'Long live physics!'. There
he argues that an agent could not be motivated to act by reasons because a reason
prescriptively underdetermines action, and that a reason prescriptively
underdetermines action because it prescribes a general type of actions in a general
type of circumstances, while an action and its circumstances are singular. He also
concludes from this singularity that no causal 'description' of an action can be
provided at all, a conclusion which undermines his own provision of such
'descriptions' in terms of noncognitive states. In response, I suggested that he need
be committed merely to the particularity, rather than singularity, of an action and
its circumstances, and hold simply that noncognitive states capture this
particularity, while reasons do not.
Nietzsche considers his denial of practical reason to undermine the practice
of making judgements about reasons for action, and to reveal the incoherence of
supposed unconditional and overriding reasons, such as the 'grounds' which moral
philosophy often undertakes to provide. He proposes that moral philosophy should
instead be occupied with the 'revaluation' of obedience to moral reasons, by
means of a symptomatology of noncognitive motivating states and an evaluation of
such obedience in the light of his own particular concern for 'humanity'. The three
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essays of the Genealogy provide his most considered attempt at such a
'revaluation', by providing 'revaluations' of obedience to three kinds of moral
reasons.
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3.
Prevailing approaches
In this brief chapter, I contrast the preceding interpretation of Nietzsche's
critical treatment of the moral agent with five pertinent strands in the prevailing
Nietzsche literature, and emphasise one notable implication of his criticism of the
common sense claim regarding choice in particular. Since I am concerned simply
to indicate that, for the most part, the literature overlooks or misappropriates this
significant element of Nietzsche's moral philosophy, I do not provide the thorough
discussions which these strands, and their broader contexts and relations, would
otherwise deserve.
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Five prevailing strands
Five prevailing strands can be distinguished among current interpretative
approaches to Nietzsche's moral philosophy, I suggest. The first strand presents
Nietzsche as accounting for and evaluating behaviour according to unconscious,
'power' -orientated drives. This project is sometimes, but not always, considered as
an instance of a broader metaphysics according to which every being and process
must be accounted for in such terms. The extensive and systematic interpretations
provided by Muller-Lauter and, more recently, John Richardson provide
representative examples.' Others have defended the project on more modest
metaphysical grounds - Peter Poellner, for instance, has Nietzsche appeal only to
an agent's correct interpretation of her own mental srates.' However, this project
clearly has no place in Nietzsche's critical treatment of the common sense
conception of agency, as I have presented this treatment above. For his criticism of
the common sense claim regarding choice consists of certain doubts regarding the
claim's adequacy as a causal account of choice, and certain arguments that two
particular instances of this claim either misrepresent choice or make it incoherent,
while his criticism of the claim regarding reasons consists of exposing the
motivation of action by noncognitive states. In neither case does Nietzsche appeal
to determination by unconscious, 'power' -orientated drives. In particular, his
I See Muller-Lauter, Nietzsche, esp. pp.(1l-22, 31-7, 43-9, 61-3, and 66-72), 'Nietzsches "Lehre"
vom Willen zur Macht', pp.(130-41, 147-53, and 156-9), and 'Nietzsches Auf-losung des Problems
der Willensfreiheit', pp.34-5 and 50-63, and Richardson, Nietzsche's System, esp. pp.18-n, 157-
60,203-19, and 262-90. For other examples ofthis strand in the literature, see Deleuze, Nietzsche
et la philosophie, esp. pp.I-82 (1-72), Danto, Nietzsche as Philosopher, pp.68-99 and 214-28,
Foucault, 'Nietzsche, la Genealogie, I'Histoire', and Blondel, Nietzsche, esp. pp.275-346 (201-59).
2 See Poellner, Nietzsche and Metaphysics, esp. pp.214-57. Similarly modest treatments include
Kaufmann, Nietzsche, pp.179-207, and Clark, Nietzsche on Truth and Philosophy, pp.205-44.
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symptomatologies of the noncognitive states which motivate professed obedience
to moral reasons betray no general commitment regarding the character of
noncognitive states at all - that is, no general commitment regarding, for instance,
their origins, objects, locus, structure, or ends, or their conscious or unconscious
status.
In this regard, one piece of textual evidence is also relevant. In a section of
Beyond Good and Evil that is often seized upon by advocates of this strand in the
literature, Nietzsche argues for 'the right to clearly determine all effective force as:
will to power'. However, his argument is premised precisely on the common sense
claim regarding choice: he writes, 'The question is ultimately whether we
acknowledge the will as really effective, whether we believe in the causality of the
will [... ] and the belief in this is basically just our belief in causality itself'. If this
belief were admitted, Nietzsche argues, then the 'right' to which he refers would
follow from certain further premises - in particular, the premise that right
'method' requires that kinds of causality be kept to a minimum, the premise that
"'will" can [... ] effect only "will"', and the premise that every human drive can be
reduced to 'one basic form of will', 'the will to power'r' Nietzsche thus offers a
hypothetical argument for a metaphysics of the kind commonly attributed to him,
but premises it on the claim regarding choice which he consistently and
emphatically rejects." Furthermore, he presents his last premise, that regarding the
3 JGB 36. Nietzsche makes related remarks at JGB 13, 22, and 23, and KGW VII:3 35 [15] (May-
July 1885).
4 This feature of the argument at JGB 36 is sometimes noted, particularly by those proposing
metaphysically modest interpretations. See, for example, Clark, Nietzsche on Truth and
Philosophy, pp.212-8. and, for a more cautious conclusion, Poellner, Nietzsche and Metaphysics,
pp.46 and 267-70.
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reduction of drives to 'one basic form of will', as a hypothesis which he is merely
'assuming', rather than as even a metaphysically modest commitment.i
Two further strands in the literature treat Nietzsche as conceiving of moral
agency primarily, or even exclusively, in terms of the agent's 'nature'. In
particular, one strand treats Nietzsche as considering moral agency to be a matter
of the agent's motivating states, while the other treats him as considering moral
agency to be a matter of the agent's constitution. Lester Hunt, for instance,
provides an extensive instance of the first of these approaches. According to him,
Nietzsche is occupied with a conception of a 'virtue' as a certain relation between
an agent, a passion, and its purpose, such that the agent gives the passion a purpose
which would integrate her particular self, as defined by her particular drives and
purposes." Brian Leiter, on the other hand, has recently taken the second approach.
He considers Nietzsche to hold that each individual has a fixed psycho-physical
constitution which causally, and non-trivially, circumscribes her possible actions
and beliefs, and which justifies normative judgements about her interests. This
position is supposed to dispose of certain descriptive claims regarding agency
which some kinds of moral judgement logically presuppose. However, according
5 Nietzsche expresses a similar hesitancy at the end of 1GB 19, and when he reduces particular
instances of human behaviour to 'power' -orientated drives, he consistently refrains from making
more general claims. See, for instance, MA 50 and 103, WS 6, M 146, 189, and 281, 1GB 23, 44,
and 259, GD IX 11 and 20, and X 3, and A 6, 16, and 17. In GM in particular, he draws very
limited conclusions from a 'power' metaphysics at GM I 13, and II 11-13, and even when he claims
at GM III 7 that '[e]very animal [ ... ] strives instinctively [... to] release its force completely and
reach its maximum in feeling of power', he does not deny other 'instincts' or motivations. Finally,
his redefinition of 'good', 'bad', and 'happiness' in terms of 'power' at A 2-6 is intended to express
his particular evaluative concern for 'humanity', rather than an account of human behaviour.
6 See Hunt, Nietzsche and the Origin of Yirtue, pp.70-144. More common, perhaps, is the simple
view that Nietzsche treats the 'power' characteristic of an agent's noncognitive motivating states as
basic to moral value. See, for instance, Slate, 'Nietzsche and Virtue Ethics' , esp. pp.24-5. Among
other variants of this strand are the following: Solomon, in his 'A More Severe Ethics', considers
Nietzsche to endorse a basic 'morals' of practices articulated in terms of 'virtues' of Aristotelian
form; Brobjer, in his Nietzsche's Ethics of Character, esp. pp.15-24, 31-40, and 54-97, maintains
that Nietzsche's basic moral concern is with an agent's 'character', determined by her unconscious,
physiological drives; and Swanton, in her 'Outline of a Nietzschean Virtue Ethics', esp. pp.31-5,
differs from the common variant by doubting that Nietzsche considers 'virtue' to be basic to moral
value.
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to Leiter, Nietzsche's primary concern is to promote the interests of individuals
with a certain, 'higher' constitution, a normative concern that, since it is not
relative to individuals' interests, lacks justification and mere reflects his own
particular constitution.7
Again, however, these two strands bear little relation to Nietzsche's critical
treatment of the moral agent, as I have presented it above. Regarding the common
sense claim regarding choice, his criticisms concern the claim's credentials as a
causal account of choice and how two particular instances of the claim
misrepresent choice or make it incoherent. His criticism of the claim that an agent
chooses for reasons equally makes no references to agents' motivating states or
constitutions, being rather concerned with reasons' underdetermination of action.
Regarding the evaluation of agents, Nietzsche is admittedly overwhelmingly
concerned with identifying the noncognitive states which motivate professed
obedience to reasons, and also concerned that rational requirements appreciate the
particularity of agents' motivating states, and agents' particular 'strengths' or
physiological constitutions. But he does not propose that agents should be
evaluated according to such states, 'strengths', or constitutions, or, indeed, that
particular agents should be evaluated at all. Even what he considers to be the
proper object of evaluation - namely, a group's obedience to moral reasons - he
refuses to evaluate according to the contingent concerns of particular individuals
or types of individuals, apparently because he considers such an evaluation to be
of little promise or use. Rather, he proposes an evaluation according to his
particular concern for 'humanity', a concern which he articulates in terms of the
7 See Leiter, Nietzsche on Morality, esp. pp.3-11, 26-8, 58-63, 78-112, and 136-56, and also
'Morality in the Pejorative Sense', pp.122-42, 'The Paradox of Fatalism and Self-Creation in
Nietzsche', pp.219-37, and 'Nietzsche's Metaethics'. For another example of the second approach,
see May, Nietzsche's Ethics and his War on 'Morality', esp. pp.9-22 and 26-38.
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'self-respect' or 'justification' of humanity, and not in terms of its 'nature' or the
'natures' of particular individuals or types within it.
Two other common strands in the literature present Nietzsche's treatment
of moral agency as concerned with an agent's self-relation. One such strand
conceives of this self-relation as a kind of 'self-creation'. A notable example is
Alexander Nehamas's interpretation, according to which proper evaluation
concerns whether the agent's 'interpretation' of herself - and, in particular, her
behaviour, thoughts, and desires - satisfies aesthetic standards such as unity and
complexity." Others, however, conceive of the pertinent self-relation as a kind of
'self-determination'. Robert Guay, for instance, has recently presented Nietzsche
as occupied with how the ultimate authority of a norm could lie in its being
essential to an agent's self-determination. Such authority, Guay argues, can be
substantiated neither by subjectivism, which would be arbitrary, nor by norms
'external' to the 'self', which would be inadequate. These constraints are
understood to preclude any a priori account of such authority, and to make such
authority rather one internal to practices which provide extra-subjective meanings
of, for instance, 'self', 'freedom', or 'agency'."
Once again, however, such concerns fail to surface in Nietzsche's critical
treatment of the moral agent, as I have presented it above. Nietzsche might display
a certain concern for the 'self' with his rejection of the notion of a substantial
8 See Nehamas, Nietzsche, esp. pp.76-8, 89-91, and 155-91. For other instances of this strand, see
Berkowitz, Nietzsche, esp. pp.I-21, and Lackey, 'Killing God, Liberating the "Subject''', esp.
fP.751-3.
See Guay, 'Nietzsche on Freedom', esp. pp.302-18. Havas's interpretation, articulated in terms of
linguistic 'responsibility', bears some comparison with Guay's. See Havas, Nietzsche's Genealogy,
esp. pp.182-238. Another notable instance is Ridley's account of GM as occupied with the
configurations of 'conscience', a capacity to act according to normative reflection on oneself. See
Ridley, Nietzsche's Conscience, esp. pp.15-22 and 39-40. Other instances of 'self-determination'
interpretations include Jenkins, 'Morality, Agency, and Freedom in Nietzsche's Genealogy of
Morals', pp.73-9, and the 'autonomy' interpretations of Nietzsche's criticism of Kant which I
outline in the first subsection of the following chapter.
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agent, or '1', his undertaking to investigate agents' noncognitive motivating states,
or his insistence that rational requirements appreciate these states and agent's
particular 'strengths' or physiological constitutions. But even these elements of his
critical treatment of the moral agent are decidedly distant from any concern for an
agent's relation to herself. The perspective from which he proposes to evaluate
professed obedience to moral reasons - namely, whether it serves humanity's
'self-respect' or 'justification' when practiced on a relatively large scale - is even
further removed from such a concern. Furthermore, insofar as they tend to attribute
to Nietzsche a conception of agency which, particularly in its commitment to
practical reason, echoes precisely that of common sense, these strands conflict
with his critical treatment of the latter.
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Responsibility
The above account of Nietzsche's criticism of the common sense claim
regarding choice has one broad implication for prevailing interpretative
approaches to Nietzsche that I shall note here: it reveals that, with this criticism,
Nietzsche does not deny responsibility as such. Some commentators claim the
opposite, on the grounds either that Nietzsche considers 'free will' to be a
necessary condition of responsibility, or that he objects equally to 'free will' and
compatibilist alternatives. Muller-Lauter provides an example of the former
approach, by interpreting Nietzsche as affirming a metaphysics of unconscious,
'power' -orientated drives that precludes 'free will' and thus responsibility.l"
Leiter, however, takes the latter approach, by arguing that, for Nietzsche,
conscious states are causally effective only by virtue of the agent's fixed psycho-
physical constitution, the psychological elements of which are inaccessible to
consciousness. Nietzsche is thus supposed to deny the effectiveness of conscious
states as such, as required by both incompatibilist and compatibilist conceptions of
responsible agency.'! However, although Nietzsche treats 'free will' as a necessary
condition of responsibility in passages from Human, All Too Human to Daybreak,
he explicitly dismisses this position in his later texts, and there merely dismisses
'free will' and the over-inflated sense of responsibility which, he claims, it
logically underwrites. He thus leaves open the possibility of conceiving of
responsibility differently, perhaps on the grounds of a compatibilist conception of
10 See the references in n.I above. For an example from another perspective. see Ridley.
Nietzsche's Conscience. pp.26-30.
11 See Leiter. Nietzsche on Morality, esp. pp.78-81 and 87-112. and also 'Morality in the Pejorative
Sense' , pp.122-6, and 'The Paradox of Fatalism and Self-Creation in Nietzsche' , pp.226-37.
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freedom. Indeed, this possibility is effectively, if not always explicitly, admitted by
much of the literature, insofar as Nietzsche is often attributed a positive conception
of responsibility.V
12 Thus some commentators consider Nietzsche to propose or presuppose a standard sense of
responsibility, according to which an agent is responsible for what she consciously chooses, given
standard qualifications regarding circumstantial and psychological constraints. See, for example,
Hunt, Nietzsche and the Origin of Yirtue, esp. pp.146-52, and Williams, 'Nietzsche's Minimalist
Moral Psychology', esp. pp.241-5. However, a variety of reformed senses of 'responsibility' have
also been attributed to Nietzsche. In Nietzsche's System, pp.207-16, Richardson considers
Nietzsche to identify an agent's 'freedom' and 'responsibility' with certain qualities of her
unconscious, 'power'-orientated drives. More modestly, perhaps, May maintains that, for
Nietzsche, an agent's 'freedom' and 'responsibility' consists of a certain expression and affirmation
of natural facts about herself. See May, Nietzsche's Ethics and his War on 'Morality', pp.21-2 and
29-30, and for a similar account, Solomon, 'Nietzsche as Existentialist and as Fatalist', esp. pp.44-
7, and 'Nietzsche on Fatalism and "Free Will"', esp. pp.74-83. Others present Nietzsche as
conceiving of responsibility as a kind of achieved 'self-mastery'. See, for instance, Schacht,
Nietzsche, pp.296-316, and Jenkins, 'Morality, Agency, and Freedom in Nietzsche's Genealogy 0/
Morals', pp.69-79. In a similar vein, Oaklander maintains that, for Nietzsche, responsibility rests
on an agent's achieved ability to realize her self-determined goals. See Oaklander, 'Nietzsche on
Freedom', pp.215-8.
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Conclusions
Despite its substantial character and its salience throughout his texts, then,
Nietzsche's critical treatment of the common sense conception of agency is not
well represented by pertinent strands in the prevailing Nietzsche literature. In
particular, this critical treatment displays no concern to account for or evaluate
agency in tenus of unconscious, 'power' -orientated drives, in tenus of motivating
states or natural constitutions, or in tenus of the agent's 'self-creation' or 'self-
determination'. Nor does this treatment deny responsibility as such.
I have, of course, not engaged thoroughly with these strands. Advocates of
them might therefore respond with indifference to my account, on the grounds that
these strands find confirmation in passages other than those which I have
considered, and that, for textual or other reasons, these passages ought to take
priority. This would be to marginalise a substantial collection of significant
passages in Nietzsche's texts, however. Furthermore, I will argue in the following
chapter that Nietzsche's concern with common sense, and not the prevailing
strands, strongly informs his explicit critical remarks regarding Kant's moral
philosophy. Then, in the second part of the thesis, I will argue that, thus
understood, Nietzsche's explicit criticisms are, if not conclusive refutations of
Kant, at least more pertinent to Kant's conception of the moral agent than the
prevailing strands in the Nietzsche literature. If I am right, then, to uphold these
strands is not only to marginalise substantial textual evidence. It is also to
misunderstand Nietzsche's explicit criticisms of Kant and to credit Nietzsche with
a less promising critical perspective on Kant than he in fact offers.
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4.
Nietzsche on Kant
In this chapter I consider the relationship between Kant's and Nietzsche's
moral philosophies as this is represented in the literature and in Nietzsche's own
explicit critical remarks regarding Kant. I first present, again in schematic form,
the literature's standard claims regarding this relationship, and then consider
Nietzsche's explicit critical remarks regarding Kant's moral philosophy. I argue
that, although these remarks provide some warrant for one kind of standard
interpretative claim, these remarks more often raise Nietzsche's criticisms of the
common sense conception of agency and further criticisms specific to Kant. I thus
defend an account of Nietzsche's explicit criticisms of Kant's conception of the
moral agent.
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Standard interpretations
The literature on the relationship between Kant's and Nietzsche's moral
philosophies is relatively small, and presents a surprisingly uncontested consensus.
It standardly claims that Nietzsche rightly reveals Kant's invoking of 'other-
worldly' entities and qualities as a shameful ruse to avoid critical reflection upon
his conception of moral goodness, its theoretical requirements, and its supposed
authority. By revealing the untenability of such 'other-worldly' entities and
qualities, so this literature claims, Nietzsche admits the required critical reflection
and proceeds to reveal the untenability of Kant's conception of moral goodness.
The literature typically concludes that Nietzsche thus provides for a moral
philosophy which is more critically sound, and richer in its insights and uses, than
Kant's.
The literature differs over the kind of critical reflection with which
Nietzsche effects this critical coup, however. Three kinds can be distinguished.
Firstly, some commentators, such as Ridley, present Nietzsche as simply insisting
that, although Kant dispels the rational credentials of certain traditional authorities,
his conception of 'autonomy' or 'reason' is not yet 'autonomous' or 'rational'
enough, since by invoking an authority beyond particularity, it is ascetic and
uncritical.' Others, such as Muller-Lauter, emphasise Nietzsche's metaphysics and
suppose that, with his criticism of 'other-worldly' entities and qualities, Nietzsche
overcomes the dualisms of Kant's moral philosophy and urges the affirmation of
1 See. in particular. Ridley. Nietzsche's Conscience. pp.l-Ll and 69-72. See also Owen, Maturity
and Modernity, chs.l-a, Nietzsche, Politics, and Modernity, pp.87-90, and 'Nietzsche,
Enlightenment, and the Problem of Noble Ethics', pp.3-11, and May, Nietzsche's Ethics and his
Waron 'Morality', p.13.
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what allegedly remains, a 'this-worldly' realm of drives or 'becoming'< However,
the literature most commonly considers Nietzsche's criticism of Kant to be based
on a commitment to 'autonomy', conceived as an individual's choice of, or
according to, her particularity or, more often, her singularity. This particularity or
singularity is generally defined in terms of the individual's drives or desires and
supposed to be created, discovered, selected, or organised by the individual
herself. Accordingly, Nietzsche is supposed to criticise Kant for betraying such
'autonomy', particularly by characterising moral goodness as universal.' In Will
Dudley's recent, relatively sophisticated version, for instance, Nietzsche is
considered to provide an 'autonomy' -based criticism of conceptions of freedom as
absence of constraint, but also to supersede Kant's uncritical, 'morality' -based
conception of 'autonomy' with an individualistic, instinct-based 'noble'
alternative, which is qualified by an individual's openness to the 'other' of her
chosen particularity." Although not articulated explicitly in terms of 'autonomy',
Hunt's account provides another representative instance. For Hunt similarly
considers Nietzsche to endorse an individual's giving of purposes to her singular
passions for the sake of integrating her particular self, and to direct this conception
of 'virtue' against a Kantian conception of 'morality' as requiring a spontaneously
2 See Deleuze, Nietzsche et la philosophie, pp.102-8 (89-94), Du Plessis, 'Nietzsche's Use and
Abuse of Kant's Philosophy', Strong, Friedrich Nietzsche and the Politics of Transfiguration,
pp.42-5, Ansell-Pearson, 'Nietzsche's Overcoming of Kant and Metaphysics', Muller-Lauter,
'Nietzsches Auf-losung des Problems der Willensfreiheit', esp. pp.25-7, and Simon, 'Moral bei
Kant und Nietzsche'.
3 See, for example, Olafson, 'Nietzsche, Kant, and Existentialism' , pp.196-200, Cartwright, 'Kant,
Schopenhauer, and Nietzsche on the Morality of Pity' ,p.83, Warren, Nietzsche and Political
Thought, pp.l72-4, White, 'Nietzsche contra Kant and the Problem of Autonomy' , and Nietzsche
and the Problem 0/ Sovereignty, esp. pp.36-44, Ansell-Pearson, 'Nietzsche and the Problem of the
Will in Modernity', pp.174-87, 'Nietzsche on Autonomy and Morality' , pp.273-80, and 'The
Significance of Michel Foucault's Reading of Nietzsche', pp.25-6, Gerhardt, 'SelbstbegrUndung',
esp. pp.40-4 (293-7), Brobjer, Nietzsche's Ethics of Character, pp.l03-4 and 206-21, and
Kerckhove, 'Nietzsche's Critique of Kantian Moral Autonomy', pp.15-20, 24-6, and 28-30.
4 See Dudley, Hegel, Nietzsche, and Philosophy, pp.3-8, 123-212, and 227-30.
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free agent to act for the sake of universal reasons' Also typical is Guay's remark
that Kant's identification of 'self-determination' with conformity to the moral law
is, according to Nietzsche's conception of 'self-determination', insufficiently
critical, since it appeals to something 'external' to the 'self,.6 Finally, an atypically
critical instance is provided by I.M. Bernstein, who argues that, by rightly
pursuing 'autonomy' beyond all determination, Nietzsche proceeds beyond Kant
to reveal the emptiness of 'autonomy' as a normative ideal.'
5 See Hunt, Nietzsche and the Origin of Yirtue, chs.2 and 5-8, esp. pp.22-3.
6 See Guay, 'Nietzsche on Freedom' , p.31 O.
7 See Bernstein, 'Autonomy and Solitude'. Several exceptions to this tripartite division of the
literature should be noted here. Kittmann's Kant und Nietzsche is devoted to thematic comparison,
rather than critical engagement, between Kant's and Nietzsche's moral philosophies. Solomon, in
his' A More Severe Morality', considers Nietzsche to dismiss Kant's 'morality' of unconditional
rational requirements in the name of a 'morals' of practices articulated in terms of 'virtues'. In
Nietzsche and Metaphysics, pp.259-65, Poellner distinguishes Nietzsche from Kant on the grounds
that Nietzsche's 'values', determined by his own unconscious drives, are predominantly concerned
with a certain kind of 'self-overcoming' for its own sake, rather than for a further end, as in Kant's
case. Finally, in his 'Nietzsche's Response to Kant's Morality', pp.206-12, Williams argues that
Nietzsche's individualistic conception of 'autonomy' reveals a better appreciation of moral
psychology than Kant's alternative conception, particularly regarding how general rules of action
tend to obstruct individuals' practice of critical judgement.
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Nietzsche's remarks about Kant
With the exception of the 'autonomy' -based interpretations, support for the
standard interpretative claims is difficult to find among Nietzsche's explicit
remarks regarding Kant's moral philosophy. Indeed, I will argue, firstly, that,
insofar as these remarks specify any critical grounds at all, they generally place
Kant's moral philosophy in the context of either Nietzsche's criticisms of the
common sense conception of agency, or the 'revaluation of values' which he
proposes and practices in his later texts. Admittedly, however, in some of these
remarks Nietzsche also makes emphatic use of the terms of an individualistic
conception of 'autonomy'. Nonetheless, I will argue, secondly, that this use is
unspecific, thus failing to support the particular kind of gloss standardly provided
in the literature, and that it is problematised by Nietzsche's critical treatment of the
common sense claim regarding reasons.
Before considering these remarks, it is worth noting that Nietzsche does
not make them on the grounds of a merely superficial acquaintance with Kant's
moral philosophy, despite common claims to the contrary.! Nietzsche's voracious
reading included numerous works which comment on, or are informed by, Kant's
moral philosophy or his philosophy more generally, and there is evidence that he
also read first-hand a number of Kant's works on moral philosophy. Most notably,
Nietzsche's own collection of books, his published works, his notebooks and
letters, and his borrowings from libraries reveal his reading of Arthur
Schopenhauer's Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung and aber das Fundament der
8 An influential example is Heidegger, Nietzsche, v.l, p.130 (v.l, p.lll). For other examples, see
the list in Dickopp, 'Aspekte zum Verhaltnis Nietzsche-Kant und ihre Bedeutung fur die
Interpretation des "Willens zur Macht"', n.S.
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Moral, Friedrich Lange's Geschichte des Materialismus, Kuno Fischer's
Immanuel Kant und seine Lehre, and Friedrich Uberweg's Grundriss der
Geschichte der Philosophie. They also reveal that he read Kant's Critique of
Judgement at the tum of 1868, and suggest that he read that text again, along with
Kant's Critique of Practical Reason, Religion within the Boundaries of Mere
Reason, and The Conflict of the Faculties, in the library at Chur, Switzerland,
between May and June 1887 - that is, immediately before he composed the
Genealogy.'
I.
Despite his quite conscientious study of Kant's moral philosophy, however,
the majority of Nietzsche's explicit remarks regarding it simply insist that it
betrays an unforgivable lack of critical reflection. to They often do so by presenting
Kant as invoking 'other-worldly' entities and qualities which preclude, and are
even intended to preclude, critical reflection on his conception of moral
requirements. In the preface to Daybreak, for instance, Nietzsche writes of Kant
that, 'to create room for his "moral realm", he saw himself necessitated to posit an
indemonstrable world, a logical "Beyond", - it was for just this that he needed his
critique of pure reason!'. 'In other words', Nietzsche continues, Kant needed to
9 For the evidence of Nietzsche's reading of these particular texts, and more extensive discussions
of the sources of his knowledge of Kant's moral philosophy, see, in particular, Brobjer, Nietzsche's
Ethics of Character, pp.198-201 and tables 2-4 to ch.7, and Hill, Nietzsche's Critiques, pp.9-20.
10 See MS 27, WS 216, M 142,197, and 481, FW 193 and 335, JGB 5, GM III 12, W7, GD III 6,
IV, and IX 1, 16,29, and 42,A 10,12,55, and 61, EH 'UB' 3, and 'W' 2-3, and KGWIII:4 19 [34,
53, and 136] (Summer 1872-Beginning 1873), V:1 6 [135] (Autumn 1880), VII: I 7 [21] (Spring-
Summer 1883), VII:3 35 [32] (May-July 1885), VIII: I2 [165 and 190] (Autumn 1885-Autumn
1886) and 7 [4] (End 1886-Spring 1887), VIII:2 9 [3 and 178] (Autumn 1887), and 10 [11]
(Autumn 1887), and VIII:3 14 [108 and 163] (Spring 1888).
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posit a theoretically 'indemonstrable world' precisely in order 'to make the "moral
realm" unassailable, better still incomprehensible to reason, - he felt too strongly
the assailability of a moral order of things to reason!' .11
Of the many passages in which he make such remarks, however, in only six
does Nietzsche indicate precisely how he considers Kant's moral philosophy to be
critically lacking. Furthermore, the exclusive concern of four of these six passages
is with epistemology. In particular, these four passages, found in Nietzsche's later
texts, articulate his denial of the sceptical notion that knowledge claims which
satisfy ordinary standards of justification might nonetheless be false. Besides
adopting this sceptical notion himself in earlier works and notes, he consistently
attributes it to Kant. Thus Nietzsche writes in perhaps the clearest of the four
passages, the chapter, 'How the ''True World" Finally Became a Fable', in
Twilight of the Idols, that, according to the 'Konigsbergian' conception, the 'true
world' is 'unattainable, indemonstrable, unpromisable, but merely as thought a
consolation, an obligation, an imperative'. However, Nietzsche argues, the
'unattained' status of the 'true world' renders it 'also unknown', and
'[c]onsequently also not consoling, redeeming, obligating', and thus renders it
entirely 'useless, superfluous' .12 This passage concisely expresses the objections to
the sceptical notion which Nietzsche expresses elsewhere - in particular, his
objections to its epistemological insignificance, its mischaracterisation of the
'true', and its suspiciously convenient serving of certain practical interests. In
conclusion, he writes, 'with the true world we have also done away with the
11 M V 3. Of the passages listed in the preceding footnote, the following echo the claims of M V 3
regarding Kant's metaphysics: MS 27, M 142, 197, FW335, GM III 12, GD III 6, IV, and IX 1,16,
and 29, A 10 and 55, EH 'W' 2-3, and KGW III:4 19 [34 and 53] (Summer 1872-Beginning 1873),
V:1 6 [135] (Autumn 1880), VIII: I 2[165] (Autumn 1885-1886), and VIII:2 9 [3 and 178] (Autumn
1887).
12GDIV.
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apparent!' - that is, he insists that to deny the 'true world' is also to deny the
scepticism which it underwrites.P
Nietzsche clearly considers this epistemological denial of scepticism to
dispose of the obstacle to critical reflection which, he maintains, Kant's invoking
of such entities and qualities raises. In the terms of the preface to Daybreak, he
considers Kant's "'moral realm'" to manifest an eminent 'assailability [... ] to
reason', if denied recourse to a theoretically 'indemonstrable world'. In this
respect, then, there is some credibility to the literature's standard claim that in
refusing 'other-worldly' entities and qualities, Nietzsche intends to admit critical
reflection on Kant's moral philosophy. However, being exclusively concerned
with epistemology, these four passages provide no indication of how Nietzsche
proposes that this critical reflection ought to proceed. In particular, in these
passages he notably fails to insist on the particularity of normative authority, urge
the affirmation of the 'this-worldly', or invoke a conception of 'autonomy', as the
standard interpretative claims would have him do.
II.
There remain, then, only two passages in which Nietzsche both dismisses
Kant's metaphysics for obstructing critical reflection on his moral philosophy and
13 GD IV. My interpretation of this passage, I maintain, applies equally to GM III 12, GD ill6, and
A 10, the other three passages in which Nietzsche expresses his epistemological concerns regarding
Kant's moral philosophy. For a thorough defence of this interpretation of these and other passages,
see my 'Two Interpretations of Nietzsche's Epistemology', and 'Friedrich Nietzsche and the "Real
World"'. Broadly-speaking, my interpretation corresponds with Clark's, in her Nietzsche on Truth
and Philosophy, pp.29-158, and 'On Knowledge, Truth, and Value'. In contrast, much of the
literature on the relation between Kant's and Nietzsche's theoretical philosophies remains wedded
to treating them both as brands of scepticism.
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indicates how this critical reflection ought to proceed. These two passages also
provide Nietzsche's most extensive discussions of Kant's moral philosophy, and in
both he apparently endorses an individualistic conception of 'autonomy'. I will
consider these two passages in some detail, therefore, before briefly summarising
Nietzsche's other explicit critical remarks regarding Kant's moral philosophy.
The first of these two passages is part of the section entitled 'Long live
physics!' in The Gay Science, the section which, I have argued, is unique in
providing grounds for Nietzsche's consistent denial of practical reason.
Immediately before providing these grounds, and in the context of his complaints
regarding the uncritical nature of many moral judgements and the failure of
common sense to appreciate that actions are motivated by noncognitive states,
Nietzsche raises the issue of Kant's conception of moral requirements and its
associated metaphysics. He writes the following.
And now don't talk about the categorical imperative [... ]: with it I remember the old
Kant, who, as punishment for having helped himself to the 'thing in itself - also a
very ridiculous thing! -, had the 'categorical imperative' creep in and with it in his
heart lost his way back to 'God', 'soul', 'freedom', and 'immortality' again, like a
fox who loses his way back to his cage: - and it was his strength and cleverness
which had broken open this cage! - What? You admire the categorical imperative in
you? This 'firmness' of your so-called moral judgement? This 'unconditionality' of
the feeling 'in this everyone must judge as I do'? Rather admire your selfishness in
that! And the blindness, pettiness and undemandingness of your selfishness! For it is
selfish to feel one's judgement as universal law; and on the other hand [it is] a blind,
petty and undemanding selfishness, because it betrays that you have not yet
discovered yourself, [that you have] created no particular, most particular ideal for
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yourself: - for this could never be that of another, let alone of everyone, everyone! -
- Whoever still judges, 'in this case everyone must act in this way', still has not
taken five steps in self-knowledge [... ].14
In this passage, Nietzsche first articulates his denial of the sceptical notion
of the 'true world', as a denial which originates in Kant's own 'strength and
cleverness', but which Kant also contravenes with the 'ridiculous' concept of 'the
"thing in itself" and then again with the concepts of '''God'', "soul", "freedom",
and "immortality'" implicated in his conception of moral requirements. Unlike the
typical passages in which he insists on Kant's lack of critical reflection, however,
here Nietzsche also provides the critical reflection that he considers to be required.
This reflection concerns Kant's conception of a moral judgement as a judgement
which, in the terms which Nietzsche borrows from Kant, distinctively holds 'as
universal law' or as 'categorical imperative'. Nietzsche also expresses this
supposed feature of moral judgement as the '''unconditionality'' of the feeling "in
this everyone must judge as I do"', and as that with which one 'judges, "in this
case everyone must act in this way"'. As Nietzsche understands it, then, the kind
of judgement concerned is distinguished by holding that every agent should do or
refrain from a type of action in a type of circumstance. IS By discussing such
judgement while criticising the common sense claim regarding reason, which he
considers to underpin the ordinary moral practice of judging reasons for actions,
Nietzsche also implies that Kant intends such judgement to be made of specific
actions in specific circumstances, retrospectively or prospectively.
14FW33S.
IS Thisunderstandingof a Kantianmoraljudgementis alsomanifestedatMA 25.
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Regarding this conception of a moral judgement, Nietzsche first complains
that 'it is selfish to feel one's judgement as universal law' .16 Presumably, he thus
alleges that one could justify such a judgement only on 'selfish' grounds.
However, that Nietzsche employs descriptive, rather than normative, terms in this
passage and, in particular, that he employs 'to feel [empfinden]' and 'feeling
[GefiihZ]' suggest that he is not only concerned with the normative grounds of
Kantian moral judgements, but also, as elsewhere in the section, with identifying
noncognitive states which motivate professed obedience to certain reasons. Thus
his complaint need not be only that one could make a Kantian moral judgement
only for 'selfish' reasons, but also that the noncognitive states which motivate
professed obedience to such a judgement are 'selfish'.
Although Nietzsche provides no argument for this complaint, he does
proceed to further specify it, by insisting that it is 'a blind, petty, and undemanding
selfishness' which makes or obeys a Kantian moral judgement. Presumably, the
'selfishness' is 'blind' because it betrays a lack of 'self-knowledge', a failure to
have 'discovered' oneself. Nietzsche immediately proceeds to identify the 'self-
knowledge' required as that which disposes of the common sense belief in
practical reason - namely, the knowledge that an agent could not act simply for
reasons because, given the singularity of actions and circumstances, reasons
inevitably underdetermine action. Thus Nietzsche effectively implicates Kant's
conception of moral judgement in the mistaken common sense claim regarding
reasons.
That the 'selfishness' which makes or obeys a Kantian moral judgement is
'petty' and 'undemanding', on the other hand, is due to its betraying a lack of a
16 Nietzsche makes a similar complaint at KGWIV:2 23 [154] (End 1876-Summer 1877).
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'particular, most particular ideal' which 'could never be that of another'. This
allegation strongly suggests a conception of 'autonomy' of the kind standardly
attributed to Nietzsche, and this suggestion is reinforced by the conclusion which
he draws immediately after dismissing the common sense belief in practical
reason. There he writes the following.
Let us therefore limit ourselves to the purification of our opinions and valuations and
to the creation of our own new tables of what is good: - but let us no longer want to
brood over the 'moral worth of our actions'! [... ] To sit in judgement morally should
go against our taste! Let us leave this talk and this bad taste to those who have
nothing more to do than to drag the past some small way further through time and
who are never themselves present, - the many therefore, the majority! We, however,
want to become who we are, - the new, the unique, the incomparable, those who give
themselves laws, those who create themselves! And for that we must become the best
students and discoverers of everything lawful and necessary in the world: we must be
physicists in order to be able to be creators in this sense, - while hitherto all
valuations and ideals have been constructed on ignorance of physics or in
contradiction to it. So: long live physics! And even more that which compels us to it,
- our honesty! 17
With this, Nietzsche first concludes that his preceding claims, and
particularly his immediately preceding denial of practical reason, dispose of the
practice of making moral judgements about reasons for action, which is his critical
object throughout the section. He here expresses this practice in Kantian terms as
the practice of judging 'the "moral worth of our actions"'. Instead, Nietzsche
proposes, we oUght to create 'our own new tables of what is good', and thus
17 FW335.
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become 'the new, the unique, the incomparable, those who give themselves laws,
those who create themselves'. These remarks undeniably suggest that Nietzsche
endorses a conception of 'autonomy' as an individual's singular and creative 'self-
legislation', and considers the practice of, or obedience to, Kantian moral
judgement to betray a failure to achieve such 'autonomy'. However, these remarks
provide no more specification of the conception than this, and Nietzsche's
immediately preceding and succeeding claims serve to problematise the
specifications standardly made of it. That is, they problematise the standard claim
that Nietzsche endorses a conception of 'autonomy' as an individual's choosing, or
choosing according to, her particularity or singularity, defined in terms of her
drives or desires and to be created, discovered, selected, or organised by the
individual herself.
Firstly, although Nietzsche expresses his proposal as the 'creation of our
own new tables of what is good' and thus echoes his preceding reference to
reasons as 'tables of what is good', he is presumably not proposing that an agent
act according to particular or singular reasons, and thus 'give' these reasons to
herself. For in the immediately preceding passage he denies that an agent is
motivated by reasons at all, on the grounds that an action and its circumstances are
singular, while reasons are general. He concludes from this not just that we ought
not to make Kantian moral judgements, but that we ought not to make any moral
judgements about reasons for action at all. It would therefore be surprising, to say
the least, if he should proceed to articulate an ideal in terms of reasons for action,
and particularly if he should do so in terms of singular reasons.
It seems likely, then, that the 'tables of what is good' and 'laws' concerned
refer to something other than reasons. They might refer to desires or drives, say, or
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other noncognitive states, and an agent might be supposed to 'give' or 'create' the
required 'tables' or 'laws' by being motivated by, or otherwise expressing,
particular or singular noncognitive states in action. Alternatively, the 'tables of
what is good' and 'laws' might refer to other kinds of normative considerations
regarding behaviour - the 'opinions of "good", "noble", "great'" to which
Nietzsche also refers, for instance - which an agent is supposed to 'give' or
'create' particularly or singularly for herself, and to express or fulfil with her
behaviour. However, such interpretative speculations not only founder on
Nietzsche's failure to specify the referents of these crucial terms. They also sit
uncomfortably with the other conclusion which he draws in the immediately
preceding passage. For in that passage Nietzsche argues that the inevitable
singularity of any particular action entails not only that it could not be motivated
by reasons, but also that its motivations are undeterminable. In the second chapter,
I suggested that this conclusion applies as much to desires, drives, or other
noncognitive states as to reasons, since it is effectively a preclusion of any causal
'description' of an action and its circumstances. It is therefore unlikely that
Nietzsche would proceed to propose that actions be judged according to any causal
'descriptions' of them at all, whether these 'descriptions' would concern their
motivation by reasons or noncognitive states, their expression of such states, or
their fulfilment of other normative terms.
Equally puzzling in this regard, although it might give some hope to those
who present him as urging the affirmation of the 'this-worldly', is Nietzsche's
further insistence that, in order to become 'the new, the unique, the incomparable',
we must also become good 'physicists', in the sense of 'students and discoverers
of everything lawful and necessary in the world'. For if, as I suggested,
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Nietzsche's conclusion that the motivations of any particular action are
indeterminable is effectively a preclusion of causal 'descriptions' of actions and
their circumstances according to observed regularities, then he could not
consistently include actions and their circumstances within 'everything lawful and
necessary in the world'. Indeed, in the concluding part of the section he asks
precisely that we no longer 'drag the past some small way further through time', as
the provision of causal 'descriptions' of actions and circumstances would have us
do. This leaves profoundly mysterious the supposed practical value of studying
and discovering 'everything lawful and necessary in the world' .
Arguably, however, these difficulties lend support to the modification of
Nietzsche's argument against practical reason which I suggested in discussing that
argument. According to this modification, in order to deny practical reason without
precluding his own provision of alternative causal 'descriptions' of actions,
Nietzsche need be committed to the mere particularity, rather than singularity, of
an action and its circumstances, and hold simply that noncognitive states and
beliefs capture this particularity, while reasons do not. If this were his position,
then he might also reasonably include actions and their circumstances among the
possible objects of causal 'descriptions', and therefore consider some such
'descriptions' to be of practical value. Furthermore, insofar as such 'descriptions'
could be considered to capture the relevant variables, they might be employed for
the sake of the judgement of actions. In particular, such a modification might
admit a conception of 'autonomy' as the relative or maximal particularity, but not
singularity, of the noncognitive states which motivate an agent's actions, or are
otherwise expressed in them, or as the fulfilment of other particular, but not
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singular, normative terms. Again, however, it should be emphasised that in 'Long
live physics!' Nietzsche manifestly fails to offer such a modified argument.
III.
Nietzsche's most extensive single discussion of Kant's moral philosophy,
and the second of the two passages in which he rejects Kant's metaphysics and
offers the critical reflection which he considers it to obstruct, is found in a series of
three sections in The Antichrist, notably composed in the year after he apparently
read a number of Kant's works on moral philosophy in the library at Chur. This
discussion begins with Nietzsche once again complaining that, as he expresses it
here, Kant's 'crafty-clever scepticism' serves to ensure that an epistemologically
inaccessible "'true world''' to which moral entities and qualities can be attributed
is 'if not demonstrable yet no longer refutable'. With this, Nietzsche
unsurprisingly insists, one simply inverts the order of 'reality'. However, he also
proceeds to object to Kant's conception of moral goodness, with '[a] word against
Kant as moralist' .18 He expresses his objections, somewhat repetitively, as
follows.
A virtue must be our invention, our most personal self-defence and need: in any
other sense it is merely a danger. What does not condition our life harms it: a virtue
merely from a feeling of respect for the concept 'virtue', as Kant wanted it, is
harmful. 'Virtue', 'duty', 'good in itself, good with the character of impersonality
and universality - phantoms, in which decline, the final debilitation of life,
18 A 10,11. See also A 17.
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Konigsbergian Chinadom expresses itself. The profoundest laws of preservation and
growth demand the reverse: that each should invent his virtue, his categorical
imperative. A people perishes if it confuses its duty with the concept of duty in
general. [... ] Kant's categorical imperative should have been felt as dangerous to
life! [... ] An action compelled by the instinct of life has in pleasure its proof of being
a right action: and that nihilist with Christian-dogmatic bowels understands pleasure
as [an] objection ... What destroys more quickly than to work, to think, to feel
without inner necessity, without a deep personal choice, without pleasure? as an
automaton of 'duty'? It is virtually the recipe for decadence, even for idiocy ... [... ]
Did Kant not see in the French Revolution the transition from the inorganic form of
the state to the organic? Did he not ask himself whether there was an occurence
which could not be explained other than by a moral predisposition of humanity, so
that with it the 'tendency of humanity towards the good' would be proved once and
for all? Kant's answer: The Revolution is that.' The erring instinct in all and
everything, anti-naturalness as instinct, German decadence as philosophy - that is
Kant!19
This passage reveals two important developments in Nietzsche's
understanding of Kant's conception of moral goodness, with respect to the earlier
discussion in 'Long live physics!'. Firstly, this passage presents a Kantian moral
judgement not as a judgement which holds that every agent should do or refrain
from a type of action in a type of circumstance, but as a judgement made
according to the "'good in itself', good with the character of impersonality and
universality'. Nor does the passage suggest that such judgements are supposed to
be made of specific actions in specific circumstances. Secondly, this passage
attributes to Kant himself an account of the motivation for obedience to such a
19A 11.
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judgement, as 'merely [... ] a feeling of respect for the concept "virtue'''. Nor is
Nietzsche's objection that of 'Long live physics!', namely, that the making or
obeying of a Kantian moral judgement betrays 'a blind, petty, and undemanding
selfishness'. Rather, Nietzsche's objection here is that to make or obey a Kantian
moral judgement is 'harmful'. In particular, he maintains that Kant 'understands
pleasure as [an] objection' in the making or obeying of a moral judgement, and
that thus 'to work, to think, to feel without inner necessity, without a deep personal
choice, without pleasure' is to 'destroy' oneself, to court 'decadence' and
'idiocy' .20 As in 'Long live physics!', however, Nietzsche articulates his counter-
proposal in the terms of an individualistic conception of 'autonomy': 'each should
invent his virtue, his categorical imperative', he writes, and thus serve 'the
profoundest laws of preservation and growth'. In conclusion, and presumably in
allusion to the second part of Kant's The Conflict of the Faculties, Nietzsche refers
dismissively to Kant's alleged claim that the French Revolution 'proved', or can
be 'explained' only by, a 'moral predisposition' or "'tendency [... ] towards the
good" on the part of humanity."
Nietzsche hardly elaborates here on how an agent should 'invent his virtue,
his categorical imperative', or should judge and act from an 'inner necessity' or
'deep personal choice'. With this lack of specificity regarding the terms of an
individualistic conception of 'autonomy', this passage echoes 'Long live physics!'.
However, here Nietzsche also articulates the 'harm' and 'preservation and growth'
with which he is concerned in terms of 'life', 'nihilism', 'decadence', and 'anti-
naturalness'. He thus refers to his broader concerns in TheAntichrist, and provides
some context for his affirmation of individual 'autonomy'. In the opening sections,
20 Nietzsche remarks similarly on Kant's supposed 'objection' to pleasure at M 339, GM II 6, GD
IX 49, and KGWIV:l 9 [1] (Summer 1875), and VIII:2 10 [11] (Autumn 1887).
21 Compare, in particular, SF 84-6.
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he writes that his 'problem' in this text concerns 'which type of human being one
should breed, should will, as the more valuable, more worthy of life, more certain
of the future'. In this light, he defines 'life' as 'instinct for growth, for persistence,
for accumulation of forces, for power', or 'will to power', and 'decadence' or
'nihilism' as the absence of such an 'instinct' or 'will' in values_22By criticising
Kant in terms of 'life', 'nihilism', and 'decadence', then, Nietzsche is pursuing
that element of a 'revaluation of values' which consists of evaluating professed
obedience to moral reasons by 'humanity', a concern whose particularity he once
again emphasises by using 'I' and 'we'. 23 His claim that Kant's conception
expresses 'anti-naturalness', on the other hand, is illuminated by one of the
following sections, in which Nietzsche defines 'hatred of the natural (- actuality! -
)' in terms which identify it with the 'ressentiment' which he claims motivates
obedience to 'ascetic ideals' in the third essay of the Genealogy. In particular, he
writes that the Christian belief in another, 'pure world offiction' is 'the expression
of a profound discontent with the actual' .24
IV.
For the most part, Nietzsche's other explicit critical remarks regarding
Kant's moral philosophy also place Kant's moral philosophy in the context of
Nietzsche's 'revaluation of values', as I have presented this above. Thus, as I have
22 A 3, 6. See also A 36-8.
23 For this emphasis, see, in particular, A V, 1,3,6,8, 13, and 62. In criticising Kant's conception
of moral judgement at MA 25, Nietzsche's primary concern is also with 'humanity's needs', and
f.tarticularly 'the conditions ofc~lture'. See also KGW V:l 6 [148] (Autumn 1880).
A 15. See also A 16 and 18. Nietzsche also refers to Kant's conception of moral goodness as
'ascetic' at M 339, GD IX 49, and A 20, and as an expression of 'anti-nature' at EH IV 7.
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already mentioned, in the opening sections of 'On the natural history of morality'
in Beyond Good and Evil Nietzsche considers Kant to exemplify moral
philosophers' misguided pursuit of an unconditionally and overidingly rational
'ground' for the judgement of reasons for action. Here and elsewhere, Nietzsche
insists that the value of Kant's moral philosophy instead lies merely in its
articulation of certain moral conceptions which prevailed in Kant's particular
environment, a fraction of the wealth of such conceptions which Nietzsche insists
must be articulated and subjected to 'revaluation' _2sIn the third essay of the
Genealogy, Nietzsche is a little more specific, with his remarks that Kant's
invoking of 'other-worldly' entities and qualities expresses 'something' of a
typically ascetic epistemology, and is implicated in the ascetic commitment of
some modem scientists to the unconditional value of truth." In the last of the three
sections in The Antichrist, Nietzsche also alleges that, in conceiving of moral
goodness as obedience to an unconditional and overriding reason, Kant uncritically
echoes the ascetic belief in an 'imperative of the beyond'. In particular, Nietzsche
writes, 'with the concept "practical reason": [... Kant] invented a reason
specifically for the case in which one need not concern oneself with reason,
namely, when morality, when the lofty demand "you should", becomes known' .27
Thus Nietzsche clearly commits himself to the particularity of nonnative authority,
and considers Kant to contravene this in a quasi- 'ascetic' manner.
Finally, Nietzsche also makes a few passing references to Kant in
criticising the common sense claim regarding choice. In particular, he twice
25 Besides JGB 186-8, see M 207, FW 193, JGB 11 and 210-12, and KGWIV:3 30 [188] (Summer
1878). VII:2 25 [437] (Early 1884), VII:2 25 [351] (Spring 1884), VII:3 34 [36,79, and 82] (April-
June 1885). VIII: 1 7 [4] (End 1886-Spring 1887). VIII:2 10 [11] (Autumn 1887), and VIII:314
[116] (Spring 1888).
26 See GM III 12 and 25, respectively.
27 A 12. Nietzsche makes related remarks at FW 5 and JGB 220.
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includes Kant's conception of the 'thing in itself' among the theoretical entities
erroneously posited under the influence of subject-predicate grammar.f More
pertinently for the criticism of Kant's moral philosophy, Nietzsche parenthetically
remarks on Kant in the sections under the title 'The error of free will' in the
chapter, 'The four great errors', in Twilight of the Idols. There Nietzsche accuses
Kant of propounding the conception of choice as 'free will', as follows: 'No one
gives a human being his qualities, neither God, nor society, nor his parents and
ancestors, nor he himself (- the nonsense of the idea last rejected here was taught
as "intelligible freedom" by Kant [... ])' .29 Thus Nietzsche concisely invokes
against Kant, firstly, the 'nonsense' of 'free will', which Nietzsche elsewhere
identifies as the incoherence of conceiving of choice as both a cause and the effect
of that cause; secondly, the implication of 'free will' in an over-inflated sense of
responsibility, according to which an agent could be responsible for her 'qualities'
and which Nietzsche rejects in 'The error offree will' and elsewhere; and, thirdly,
the objections which Nietzsche raises to the common sense claim regarding
choice, of which he considers 'free will' to be a particular instance.
28 See GM I 13, and GD VI 3.
29 GD VI 8. In 1885 Nietzsche also made a corresponding modification to MA 39 in his own copy.
See Handwerk's translation, p.325.
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Conclusions
The standard interpretations of the relationship between Kant's and
Nietzsche's moral philosophies therefore finds little support in Nietzsche's explicit
critical remarks regarding Kant's moral philosophy. Nietzsche certainly objects
that Kant's sceptical epistemology would obstruct critical reflection on his moral
philosophy, insists on the particularity of normative authority, and in important
passages proposes an individualistic conception of 'autonomy' as an alternative to
Kant. However, he neither restricts his critical reflection on Kant to his insistence
on the particularity of normative authority nor specifies his conception of
'autonomy'. Indeed, the standard specifications of his conception of 'autonomy'
sit uncomfortably with his critical treatment of the common sense conception of
agency, particularly insofar as they tend to attribute to Nietzsche the common
sense claim regarding reason.
Besides these points of contact with the standard interpretations,
Nietzsche's explicit remarks regarding Kant's moral philosophy also allege that it
is committed to the mistaken common sense claims regarding reasons and choice,
and to 'free will' and the associated, over-inflated sense of responsibility in
particular. Nietzsche also offers two critical accounts of making and obeying a
Kantian moral judgement, both of which are accompanied by affirmations of
individual 'autonomy'. Firstly, in 'Long live physics!', he conceives of a Kantian
moral judgement as a judgement of specific actions in specific circumstances,
according to which every agent should do or refrain from a type of action in a type
of circumstance. There he objects that such a judgement can be made or obeyed
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only on 'selfish' grounds. Later, in a section of The Antichrist, he conceives of a
Kantian moral judgement differently, as a judgement made on 'universal' grounds,
and objects that to make or obey such a judgement is, particularly in its exclusion
of 'pleasure', self-destructive, characteristic of 'ascetic ideals', and fails to satisfy
Nietzsche's particular evaluative concern for 'humanity'. There, in passing, he also
dismisses Kant's alleged claim that the French Revolution reveals 'the "tendency
of humanity towards the good" .
Whatever its textual credentials, and like Nietzsche's critical treatment of
the common sense conception of agency, this account of his explicit criticisms of
Kant might appear deflationary to some Nietzsche partisans. Once again, then, it is
worth emphasising that in the following part of the thesis I will attempt to show
that the prevailing approaches to Nietzsche's criticism of moral agency and his
critical relation to Kant in fact have little bearing on Kant's own concerns, while
my account credits Nietzsche with, if not conclusive criticisms of Kant, then at
least some concerns that engage with Kant's own.
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Conclusions of part I
In this part of the thesis, I have argued that Nietzsche's explicit criticisms
of Kant's conception of the moral agent are strongly informed, although not
exhausted, by Nietzsche's critical treatment of a certain common sense conception
of agency, and that neither these criticisms nor this critical treatment are well
represented by the prevailing literature.
I began with Nietzsche's critical treatment of a common sense conception
of agency, defined by two claims. The first claim is that an agent's action is
sufficiently explained by the agent's 'willing' of it, in the sense that the action is,
given the circumstances, causally necessitated in the agent's conscious choice of it.
In the first chapter, I demonstrated that Nietzsche objects to this claim on the
grounds that, as a causal account of choice, it founders on the unavailability of
experience of necessitating causal powers or, if not, at least on a failure to
appreciate other significant causes of action in the experience of regular
correlations between pertinent kinds of events. With regard to two particular
instances of the claim, Nietzsche also insists that no substantial agent, or 'I', is part
of choice, and that to conceive of choice as undetermined by antecedent causes is
to conceive of it incoherently, as both a cause and the effect of that cause, and to
underwrite an over-inflated sense of responsibility.
The common sense conception's second claim is that an agent consciously
chooses, or 'wills', an action for normative reasons, in the sense that her choice is
motivated by her cognitive acknowledgement of reasons. In the second chapter, I
demonstrated that Nietzsche's objection to this claim is that since a reason
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prescribes a general type of action in a general type of circumstances, while an
action and its circumstances are singular, a reason prescriptively underdetermines
action, and therefore could not motivate an agent to act. Nietzsche consistently
accounts for actions as motivated not by reasons, but by noncognitive states
informed by reasons, and thus presumably concludes that if actions are not
motivated by reasons, then, by elimination, they are motivated by noncognitive
states informed by reasons. Given that his accounts are causal accounts resting on
investigations of regular correlations between types of events, however, I
suggested that the premise of his objection ought to be reduced to the particularity,
rather than singularity, of an action and its circumstances. Beyond this objection, I
demonstrated that Nietzsche considers his denial of practical reason to undermine
the practice of making moral judgements about reasons for action, and to reveal
the incoherence of supposed unconditional and overriding reasons, such as the
rational 'grounds' for moral judgement which moral philosophy has hitherto
offered. In the place of such moral philosophy, Nietzsche proposes the
'revaluation' of obedience to moral reasons, by means of a symptomatology of
noncognitive motivating states and an evaluation of such obedience according to
his own particular concern for 'humanity'.
In the third chapter, I demonstrated that Nietzsche's critical treatment of
the common sense conception of agency is not well represented by prevailing
strands in the literature. In particular, I argued that this critical treatment displays
no concern to account for or evaluate agency in terms of unconscious, 'power'-
orientated drives, in terms of motivating states or natural constitutions, or in terms
of the agent's 'self-creation' or 'self-determination'. I also noted that this
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treatment does not deny responsibility as such, as Nietzsche is occasionally
supposed to do.
In the final chapter of this part of the thesis, I turned to Nietzsche's explicit
criticisms of Kant's moral philosophy. With these criticisms, Nietzsche confirms
standard interpretative claims that he objects to Kant's sceptical epistemology as
an obstruction to critical reflection on his moral philosophy, insists on the
particularity of normative authority, and proposes an individualistic conception of
'autonomy' as an alternative to Kant. However, Nietzsche also neither restricts his
critical reflection on Kant to his insistence on the particularity of normative
authority nor specifies his conception of 'autonomy'. Indeed, I noted that the
standard specifications of his conception of 'autonomy' tend to attribute to
Nietzsche precisely the common sense claim regarding reason which he rejects.
Rather than the standard interpretative claims, I argued, Nietzsche's
explicit criticisms of Kant's moral philosophy are strongly informed by his critical
treatment of the common sense conception of agency. Thus Nietzsche accuses
Kant of endorsing both of the common sense claims which constitute this
conception, along with 'free will' and the associated, over-inflated sense of
responsibility in particular. Furthermore, Nietzsche offers two critical accounts of
making and obeying a Kantian moral judgement, both of which are accompanied
by affirmations of individual 'autonomy'. Firstly, in 'Long live physics!', he
conceives of a Kantian moral judgement as a judgement of specific actions in
specific circumstances, according to which every agent should do or refrain from a
type of action in a type of circumstance. There he objects that such a judgement
can be made or obeyed only on 'selfish' grounds. Later, in a section of The
Antichrist, he conceives of a Kantian moral judgement differently, as a judgement
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made on 'universal' grounds, and objects that to make or obey such a judgement
is, particularly in its exclusion of 'pleasure', self-destructive, characteristic of
'ascetic ideals', and fails to satisfy Nietzsche's particular evaluative concern for
'humanity'. There, in passing, he also dismisses Kant's alleged claim that the
French Revolution reveals 'the "tendency of humanity towards the good"'.
These, then, are the criticisms of Kant which I will evaluate in the
following part of the thesis.
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Part II
The Good Will: Kant's Analysis of the Moral Agent
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Introduction to part II
This part of the thesis defends Kant's conception of the moral agent against
the criticisms identified in the first part. In other words, it defends the second
broad conclusion of the thesis, that Kant's conception of the moral agent is not
undermined by the criticisms which Nietzsche explicitly levels at it, or by others
which are commonly made in Nietzsche's name.
My defence of Kant's conception of the moral agent begins with an
interpretation of his derivation of the basic features of this conception in the first
and second sections of the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals. This
interpretation also reveals, in particular, his underappreciated method and the
cogency of his derivations of formulas. On the basis of this interpretation, the sixth
chapter then defends Kant's formulas and their place in his conception of moral
judgement against Nietzsche's criticisms and those commonly made in his name.
The most telling of these criticisms, I argue, are Nietzsche's criticisms of the
common sense conception of agency, since, while they do not undermine Kant's
conception of the moral agent, these criticisms require certain accommodations on
Kant's part. The seventh chapter then argues that Nietzsche's criticisms of Kant's
insistence on spontaneity in choice are misplaced, but that Kant's arguments for
this spontaneity are equally unconvincing. Finally, the eighth chapter demonstrates
that, despite Nietzsche's allegation to the contrary, Kant neither claims that there is
evidence of human progress nor conceives of human progress in moral terms.
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5.
The argument of the Groundwork, sections I and II
The first section of Kant's Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals is
often treated with suspicion. Even sympathetic commentators often consider the
grounds and progress of its argument to be obscure, and allege that its infamous
discussion of 'duty', its presentation of three 'propositions', and its derivation of
the formula of universal law are faulty or inadequate. In the light of this,
commentators generally avoid detailed textual examination of the section by
offering creative interpretations of isolated claims or passages, or by simply noting
the section's broadest claims and proceeding swiftly to the second section, which
is generally considered to provide a more substantial argument and to refer, at
most, only to the broadest claims of the first. This chapter takes issue with this
common interpretative and critical approach. In particular, it argues that the first
section of the Groundwork provides a sophisticated argument which is not
vulnerable to the criticisms which are persistently levelled at it, and that the
argument of the second section proceeds from, and depends upon, that of the first.
The following chapters undertake to show, further, that the argument of the first
and second sections of the Groundwork substantially informs other branches of
Kant's moral philosophy, and his conception of the moral agent in particular.
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This chapter is divided into three sections. The first two sections concern
the first and second sections of the Groundwork, respectively, while the final
section considers how Kant's argument illuminates his method.
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From a good will to the formula of universal law
Kant's argument in the first section of the Groundwork is a little
complicated, and his presentation of it is not always clear. Before considering the
details of the argument and Kant's presentation of it, then, it is worth outlining the
argument schematically. As the schematic outline on the following page shows,
Kant's argument proceeds from a conception of the goodness of a good will to two
distinctive features of moral goodness, which the formula of universal law is
intended to express.
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Kant's argument in the first section of the Groundwork
Kant's conception of the goodness of a good will
According to Kant's conception of the goodness of a good will, a good will is:
(a) the only good which is good in all contexts,
and,
(b) a condition of the goodness of every other good.
Kant draws two conclusions from this conception
From (a), Kant concludes:
(a') a good will does what is morally good because it is morally good (,from
duty').
From (b), Kant concludes:
(b') moral goodness is a goodness which only a will can achieve.
On the basis of these conclusions, Kant identifies two distinctive features of moral
goodness
From (b'), Kant identifies the first distinctive feature of moral goodness:
(i) moral goodness is a goodness of a will's reason for action alone (the 'second
proposition').
(Note that (i) does not follow from (a'), and Kant does not hold that it does.)
From (a') and (i), Kant identifies the second distinctive feature of moral goodness:
(ii) moral goodness is good for a will as such (the 'third proposition').
Kant then derives the formula of universal law as an expression of these two
features
Kant derives the formula of universal law as an expression of features (i) and (ii),
but intends this formula to emphasise only feature (ii).
95
I. Kant's analysis of the goodness of a good will
Kant's argument in the first section of the Groundwork begins with two
basic claims regarding a good will, which he makes in the opening two paragraphs.
These two basic claims are identified as (a) and (b) in the outline above. The first
claim is famously expressed in the first sentence: 'It is not possible to think of
anything in the world, or even out of it, which could be considered good without
limitation, except a good will'. Kant's following remarks regarding other goods
indicate that by 'good without limitation', he means 'good in all contexts'. Indeed,
towards the end of the second section, he states precisely that a good will 'cannot
be evil'. The second claim, as Kant expresses it a few pages into the first section,
is that a good will is 'not [... ] the sole good and the complete good, but [... ] the
highest good and the condition of every other'. In the opening paragraphs, he
makes this claim by referring to other goods not only as goods which in some
contexts are not good, but also as goods which can be good only in the context of a
good will.I
According to the opening two paragraphs of the first section, then, a good
will is (a) the only good which is good in all contexts, and (b) a condition of the
goodness of every other good. Kant attributes this conception of the goodness of a
good will to 'common moral rational cognition', according to which, he writes,
'good and desirable' things other than a good will 'can also be extremely evil and
harmful, if the will which is to make use of [... them] is not good,.2 It is important
to note, however, that the two basic claims, (a) and (b), are logically distinct. Kant
occasionally refers to a good will as 'unconditionally' good, and it is perhaps
1 G 393,437, 396. See also G 394 and 454-5, KpV 62, and KU 443.
2 G 393. See also KU 443.
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tempting to suppose that what is 'unconditionally' good in the sense of being
'good in all contexts' must also be 'unconditionally' good in the sense of being 'a
condition of the goodness of every other good', and vice versa. However, there is
no such logical entailment between the two claims, or between the two senses of
'unconditional' goodness, and Kant's references to a good will's 'unconditional'
goodness are better understood as a succinct way of referring to the two, logically
distinct claims'
Kant begins his analysis of these two claims with a particular analysis of
the first, (a). From this analysis he draws conclusion (a'), that a good will is one
which does what is morally good 'from duty'. That is, he concludes that a good
will does what is morally good precisely because what is morally good is morally
good, rather than because it happens to coincide with the satisfaction of
inclination, and so irrespective of whether it does so coincide. Kant's well-known
examples are intended to reveal this, by revealing that what a will is inclined to do
is only contingently related to what it is morally good to do, and that the moral
goodness of a will which, according to claim (a), is good in all contexts therefore
cannot be conditional upon its inclinations.
As Kant presents it, this analysis proceeds by employing the concept of
'duty' to 'explicate [or expand, entwickeln], the concept of a good will. This is so,
Kant insists, because 'the concept of duty [... ] contains that of a good will,
although under certain subjective limitations and hindrances, which, far from
concealing it and making it unrecognisable, rather bring it out by contrast and let it
shine forth all the more brightly'. Kant's examples - preserving one's life in the
face of adversity and grief, being beneficent to others despite one's indifference to
3 For Kant's references to the 'unconditional' goodness of a good will, see G 394, 401, and 437.
Note that in later texts, he clearly distinguishes the two claims. See KpV 62 and R 3.
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their suffering or one's preoccupation with one's own, and, in the case of the gout
sufferer, refusing the temptation to secure more determinate and certain
satisfactions than those of one's health - indicate that the 'subjective limitations
and hindrances' to which he refers are provided by inclinations, and reasons for
action which concern them, insofar as they fail to coincide with doing what is
morally good. This has led critics since Schiller to suppose that Kant adopts the
objectionable position that a will can act 'from duty' only against such
inclinations." However, Kant's concern in this analysis is simply to reveal that an
inclination, and so any reason for action which concerns an inclination, is only
contingently related to what it is morally good to do. As Kant expresses it, an
inclination, and so any reason which concerns one, 'lacks moral content', and so
either 'fortunately hits upon' what is morally good or unfortunately provides
'subjective limitations and hindrances' to doing what is morally good. In contrast,
Kant holds that to act 'from duty' is to act precisely because the action is morally
good, and thus for a reason which is necessarily related to such action. He
concludes from this that the goodness of a will which is good in all contexts must
'shine forth' only in action 'from duty'. Kant thus does not hold that acting 'from
duty' presupposes the 'subjective limitations and hindrances' of countervailing
inclinations. Rather, he holds simply that acting 'from duty' is acting because the
action is morally good, irrespective of whether the action also coincides with the
satisfaction of inclination."
However, as he explains before considering his examples, Kant does hold
that it is 'difficult to notice' whether a will which does what is morally good acts
.. For early statements of this persistent criticism of Kant, see, for instance, Schiller, Xenien, 'Die
Philosophen'; and Schopenbauer, Uber das Fundament der Moral, pt.Il, §6, and Die Welt als Wille
und Vorstellung, v. I, App ..
s G 397, 398. See also G 390 and 399, KrVB28-9, KpV93, and TP 278-9.
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'from' an inclination or 'from duty' in a certain kind of case - namely, when an
inclination succeeds in 'hitting upon' what is morally good and, unlike the
inclination of the 'prudent' shopkeeper not to exploit inexperienced customers,
does so with regard to effects which are 'immediately' related to the action." Kant
insists that the goodness of a good will therefore 'shines forth all the more
brightly' when no inclination 'hits upon' what is morally good than it does when
inclinations 'immediately' coincide with what is morally good. It is this, and not
an objectionable notion of action 'from duty', which explains Kant's insistence on
the presence of 'subjective limitations and hindrances' in his examples.'
Kant's analysis of his first claim regarding the goodness of a good will
thus provides his first substantial conclusion, (a'), that a good will is one which
does what is morally good precisely because it is morally good, rather than 'from'
a concern for inclination. However, this conclusion alone can establish nothing
about what first makes an action morally good to do, a 'duty' - that is, this
conclusion alone can establish nothing about moral goodness itself. For a will can
do what is morally good 'from duty' according to any account of what first makes
the action morally good to do. For instance, a will might do 'from duty' what is
determined to be morally good by a consequentialist theory, or a divine command
6 G 397. See also G 425, TP 278-9, and MS 382n. At G 397, Kant insists that in the presence of a
coinciding inclination which is not 'immediately' related to the action, such as the prudent
shopkeeper's inclination to his own 'advantage', it is 'easy to distinguish' between action 'from'
this inclination and action 'from duty'. He contrasts this inclination of the shopkeeper with the
possibility of the shopkeeper having 'an immediate inclination towards the customers, in order
from love, as it were, to give no one preference over another in price'.
7 I take it that the passages to which I have referred also discredit Latham's and Wood's recent
defences of the notion of action 'from duty' which Kant's critics have persistently found
objectionable. In particular, these passages render problematic the response which Latham and
Wood offer to these critics, namely, that Kant admits that a will which does what is morally good
'from' a coincident inclination, rather than 'from duty'. can nonetheless be a good one. See
Latham, 'Causally Irrelevant Reasons and Acting Solely from the Motive of Duty'. pp.613-7, and
Wood, Kant's Ethical Thought, pp.26-3S, 120, and 133. I also take it that these passages discredit
the now well-discussed claim that Kant allows actions 'from duty' to be 'overdetermined' in the
sense that, although 'duty' is 'sufficient' for action. the will also acts 'from' inclination. See, in
particular, Henson, 'What Kant Might Have Said', and, for a thorough critical discussion, Baron,
Kantian Ethics Almost Without Apology, pp.146-87.
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theory. It is therefore mistaken to suggest, as some commentators' remarks do,
that Kant's discussion of action 'from duty' in the first section already expresses
the grounds from which he intends to derive a substantial position regarding
moral goodness. 8 Of course, this is not to say that after arguing for his substantial
position, Kant does not then express it in terms of action 'from duty'."
It is appropriate, then, that Kant rests the claims which he proceeds to
make about moral goodness itself not only upon this first conclusion, (a'), drawn
from his analysis of his first claim regarding the goodness of a good will, (a), but
also upon his analysis of his second claim regarding a good will's goodness, (b).
From this second claim (b), that a good will is a condition of the goodness of
every other good, Kant draws the conclusion (b'), that moral goodness is a
goodness which only a will can achieve. His argument for this conclusion is
simply that if a good will is a condition of the goodness of every other good, then
its goodness, which he equates with moral goodness, must be such that only a will
can achieve it, since otherwise this condition could be fulfilled by other causes.
Kant presents this analysis of his second claim regarding the goodness of a
good will in the paragraphs which follow his consideration of examples of action
'from duty' and which precede his first expression of the formula of universal
law. However, these paragraphs are primarily concerned with presenting the two
distinctive features of moral goodness which Kant proceeds to derive from the
8 See, for instance, Paton, The Categorical Imperative, pp.58, 61-2, and 69-71, Korsgaard, 'Kant's
Analysis of Obligation', pp.47, 55, and 60-3, Reath, 'The Categorical Imperative and Kant's
Conception of Practical Rationality', pp.389-90 and nn.lO and 13, Allison, Kant's Theory of
Freedom, pp.I20-I, and 'On a Presumed Gap in the Derivation of the Categorical Imperative',
pp.I44-5, and Baron, Kantian Ethics Almost Without Apology, pp.I81-4. For criticism on the
grounds mentioned in the text above, see Teale, Kantian Ethics, pp.98-lOI, Hill, 'Kant's
Utopianism', p.69, Johnson, 'Expressing a Good Will', pp.I61-6, Wood, Kant's Ethical Thought,
p.48, and Gaut and Kerstein, 'The Derivation without the Gap', p.25. Nonetheless, it should be
noted that those commentators whose remarks suggest such a questionable interpretation generally
also suppose what I take to be a further, substantial element in Kant's argument, his identification
of moral goodness as (i).
9 See, for instance, G 400, 401n, and 402.
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conclusions of his two analyses. Indeed, his conclusion that moral goodness must
be such that it can be achieved only by a will is made explicit only in the last of
these paragraphs, in which he summarises the argument which is made in them.
Before considering how Kant presents his analysis of his second claim regarding
a good will's goodness, then, it is worth outlining his consequent derivation of
two distinctive features of moral goodness.
Kant derives the first of the distinctive features of moral goodness, (i),
from the conclusion which he draws from his analysis of his second claim
regarding the goodness of a good will, (b'), that moral goodness is a goodness
which only a will can achieve. He argues that if this is so, then moral goodness
must be a goodness of a will's reason for action alone, rather than of actions'
effects or of reasons for action insofar as they concern actions' effects. He calls
this the 'second proposition' (the 'first proposition' is not explicitly identified),
and he expresses it as the claim that 'an action from duty has its moral worth not
in the intention [Absicht] to be achieved by it, but in the maxim according to
which it is decided upon, [and] therefore depends not upon the actuality of the
object of the action, but merely upon the principle of willing according to which
the action happens without respect for any object of the ability of desire'. Kant
then derives a second distinctive feature of moral goodness, (ii), from this 'second
proposition' and his conclusion regarding a good will's action 'from duty'. Given
these claims, namely (i) and (a'), Kant argues that moral goodness must also be
good for a will as such, rather than good for a will only for satisfying certain of its
inclinations. Kant calls this the 'third proposition', and expresses it as the claim
that 'duty is the necessity of an action from respect for law'. In presenting his
derivation, he also refers to this 'law' as 'the mere law for itself', and expresses
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this feature as the claim that what must 'determine' the will in acting 'from duty'
is 'the maxim of complying with such a law even with the demolition of all my
inclinations' .10 By a 'law', then, Kant means a reason which concerns what is
good for a will as such, rather than only for satisfying certain of its inclinations.
Before considering how Kant presents this argument, it is illuminating to
compare it with Christine Korsgaard's well-known interpretation. According to
Korsgaard, in his discussion of action 'from duty', Kant identifies the reason why
a good will performs a morally required action (or has a morally required
purpose) with the reason why the action (or purpose) is morally required, and
argues that, since the former concerns the reason's 'capacity to express a
[normative] demand made on us', the latter is also this capacity, which Korsgaard
also calls a reason's 'legal character'." For Korsgaard, it follows from this that
the capacity of a reason to express a normative demand must derive from a
quality of the reason itself, rather than from a source which is external to the
reason. This is so, she maintains, because only in this way can this capacity itself
make an action (or purpose) morally required, and a good will perform the action
(or have the purpose) because a reason has this capacity. Finally, according to
Korsgaard, Kant derives the formula of universal law on the grounds that the
capacity to express a normative demand can derive from the quality of a reason
itself only if the reason and its 'becom[ing] a universal law' can both be willed,
which Korsgaard also calls the reason's having 'lawlike form' .12
Korsgaard's interpretation bears some similarity to that presented above,
particularly in emphasising a concern with identifying moral goodness as a
goodness of a will's reason for action alone - that is, a concern with the first
10 G 399-400, 400-1.
11 Korsgaard, 'Kant's Analysis of Obligation', p.61.
12Ibid .. See also pp.47, 55, and 60-5.
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distinctive feature of moral goodness, (i). However, Korsgaard fails to provide
adequate grounds for the first premise of the argument which she attributes to
Kant, namely, his identification of a good will's reason for performing a morally
required action (or having a morally required purpose) with the reason why the
action (or purpose) is morally required. Korsgaard simply appeals to Kant's
discussion of action 'from duty' , and is therefore vulnerable to the criticism raised
above, that a good will's reason for doing what is morally good can be that it is
morally good, or 'duty', according to any account of why it is morally good.
Korsgaard's interpretation thus leaves unexplained Kant's concern with
identifying moral goodness as a goodness of a will's reason for action alone.13
Furthermore, her interpretation also attributes to Kant an inadequate derivation of
the formula of universal law, since, as critics have noted, the requirement that a
reason's normative demand derive from a quality of the reason itself is satisfied
not only by the formula of universal law, but equally by other, weaker principles.
For example, it is satisfied by the principle that any reason which is held to be
required, reasonable, or permissible for a will in certain circumstances must be
held to be required, reasonable, or permissible for any will in relevantly similar
circumstances.l" Finally, Korsgaard's interpretation is a relatively creative one,
providing little extended textual examination of the first section of the
Groundwork. In particular, Korsgaard fails to relate her account to Kant's
opening claims regarding a good will, except insofar as she supposes these claims
13 Cummiskey closely follows Korsgaard' s interpretation of the first section of G, but Cummiskey
also holds that Kant's identification of moral goodness as a goodness of a will's reason for action is
a consequence of his presupposition of 'internalism', understood as the claim that moral
requirements provide motivating reasons for action and overriding justifying reasons for action.
However, Cummiskey treats this as a mere presupposition, and thus,like Korsgaard, does not
explain why Kant should insist on this feature of moral goodness. See Cummiskey, Kantian
Consequentialism, pp.25-35 and 164-9.
14 See Gaut and Kerstein, 'The Derivation without the Gap', pp.24-5.
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to already express the first premise of the argument which she attributes to Kant.
The interpretation presented above, and defended below, suggests that attending
more carefully to Kant's opening claims and to how he presents his following
argument provides an explanation for his identification of moral goodness as a
goodness of a will's reason for action alone, and, as will be explained below, also
a more satisfactory derivation of the formula of universal law. IS
As mentioned above, it is only after having presented his derivation of two
distinctive features of moral goodness, (i) and (ii), that Kant makes explicit his
analysis of his second claim regarding the goodness of a good will, (b), and the
role which the conclusion of this analysis, (b'), plays in his derivation. The
paragraph which follows, and summarises, his presentation of this derivation
reads as follows.
The moral worth of an action therefore does not lie in the effect expected from
it, [and] therefore also not in any principle of action which needs to borrow its
motive from this expected effect. For all these effects (agreeableness of one's
condition, indeed even the promotion of others' happiness) could also have been
15 Besides Korsgaard, a few other commentators suggest aspects of the interpretation which I
present, although none provides textual evidence for the suggestions or relates Kant's argument to
his opening claims regarding the goodness of a good will. Robinson and Harre briefly suggest
that, for Kant, since '[a]ny state of affairs achieved through human activity qua activity could be
brought about in non-moral ways', the moral worth of an action must instead lie in the 'principle'
of action and its being 'answerable to a moral law' , which is 'possible [... ] only for an entity able
to comprehend justificatory principles' (,The Demography of the Kingdom of Ends' , p.6). Guyer
also interprets Kant's argument for the 'third proposition', and his general denial that inclination is
the source of moral value, as based on the 'assumption that moral worth can attach only to what is
an expression solely of the activity of the agent', an assumption which, Guyer holds, 'functions in
the Groundwork as a first principle that cannot itself be argued for because it cannot be derived
from anything more fundamental' ('Duty and Inclination', pp.345-6; see also pp.349-50).
Engstrom also holds that, for Kant, the intrinsic goodness of a good will, along with the
unconditional nature of 'duty', entails that 'the will's relation to what duty requires can be
understood only as a relation to what is required by its own inner law' , and Johnson briefly
suggests that Kant's argument is based simply on the intrinsic goodness of a good will, such that
this goodness entails that a good will's 'principle cannot be one that makes it only of extrinsic
value - as it would be were the principle simply a recipe for producing this or that end'
(Engstrom, 'Kant's Conception of Practical Wisdom', p.30, Johnson, 'Expressing a Good Will',
p.165; see also Engstrom, 'Kant's Conception of Practical Wisdom', p.31).
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achieved by other causes, and for this the will of a rational being, in which,
nevertheless, the highest and unconditional good can alone be found, would therefore
not have been necessary. This is why it can be nothing other than the representation
of the law in itself, which of course occurs only in a rational being, insofar as it, not
the hoped-for effect, is the determining ground of the will, which constitutes the
preeminent good, which we call moral, [and] which is already present in the person
himself who acts according to it, but may not first be expected from the effect."
Kant thus derives the first distinctive feature of moral goodness, (i) - which
he expresses in the first sentence and the last phrases of this paragraph - from the
claim that a will must be 'necessary' for the achievement of moral goodness, in the
sense that 'other causes' cannot achieve it. This claim is the conclusion, (b'),
which Kant draws from his analysis of his second claim regarding the goodness of
a good will, (b), that a good will is a condition of the goodness of every other
good. This is indicated, slightly less clearly, by his statement in the second
sentence that 'the highest and unconditional good can alone be found' in a will, a
succinct statement of the two claims which comprise his conception of the
goodness of a good will, (a) and (b).
This interpretation of Kant's derivation of the first distinctive feature of
moral goodness also illuminates the argument which he presents two paragraphs
earlier, immediately after first expressing this feature as the 'second proposition'.
There he writes that the negative aspect of this feature, that moral goodness is not
a goodness of actions' effects or of reasons for action insofar as they concern
these effects, 'is clear from what has gone before'. He then argues that if this is
so, then, by elimination, moral goodness 'can lie nowhere else than in the
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principle of the will without respect for the ends which can be produced through
such an action'. 17 The grounds of this argument would be mysterious were it not
for the conclusion which Kant draws from his claim (b) that a good will is a
condition of the goodness of every other good, namely, the conclusion (b') that
moral goodness is a goodness which only a will can achieve. This conclusion
explains why Kant claims that moral goodness is not a goodness of actions'
effects or of reasons for action insofar as they concern these effects, and why he
writes that this 'is clear from what has gone before'. It also explains why he
considers actions' effects, reasons for action insofar as they concern these effects,
and reasons for action insofar as they do not concern these effects to exhaust the
possible basic objects of moral goodness, since these possibilities exhaust the
objects of goodness which a will can achieve. Finally, and most importantly, it
explains why he insists that the basic object of moral goodness must be the last of
these possibilities, since it is only the goodness of this object which only a will
can achieve.
Kant's claim that the negative aspect of the first distinctive feature of
moral goodness 'is clear from what has gone before' can therefore be taken
simply to refer to the conception of the goodness of a good will with which he
opens the section, and to his second claim regarding this goodness in particular.
However, itmight instead be taken to refer to the expression of, and argument for,
the first distinctive feature of moral goodness which Kant provides immediately
after presenting his conception of the goodness of a will at the beginning of the
section. There, he expresses this first feature as follows: 'The good will is not
good through what it effects or achieves, through its suitability for the attainment
17 G400.
106
of some proposed end, but only through its willing, i.e. [it is] good in itself, and,
regarded for itself, is to be valued incomparably higher than everything which
through it could only be achieved in favour of some inclination, [and] indeed, if
one will, the sum of all inclinations' .ISIt is often supposed either that this claim is
simply a further claim which Kant attributes to 'common moral rational
cognition', without analytical relation to his preceding claims regarding the
goodness of a good will, or that it follows from the first of these claims, on the
grounds that what is good in all contexts simply is 'good in itself' in the sense
which Kant identifies.l" However, Kant's following sentence indicates that,
although he does understand his identification of the first feature of moral
goodness to follow from his conception of the goodness of a good will, he does
not understand it to follow from his claim that a good will is good in all contexts.
This sentence reads, 'Even if, through a special disfavour of fate, or through
meagre provision of a stepmotherly nature[,] this will would wholly lack in ability
to carry out its intention; if with its greatest endeavours it would yet achieve
nothing, and only the good will (of course not as a mere wish, but as the
summoning of all means, insofar as they are in our power) remain left: then it
would, like a jewel, still shine for itself, as something that has its full worth in
itself' .20 This sentence indicates that, for Kant, moral goodness is a goodness of a
will's 'willing' alone, and not of actions' effects or of 'willing' insofar as it
18 G 394.
19 For the interpretation of Kant's claim at G 394 as simply a further claim attributed to 'common
moral rational cognition', see, for example, Wood, Kant's Ethical Thought. pp.23-4, and Rawls.
Lectures on the History of Moral Philosophy, pp.155-6. For the interpretation of it as derived from
the claim that a good will is good in all contexts, see, for example, Paton, 'Analysis of the
Argument', p.17, Potter. 'The Argument of Kant's Groundwork, Chapter 1', p.3l, and Korsgaard,
'Two Distinctions in Goodness', pp.257-8, 'Kant's Formula of Humanity', p.1l7, and 'Kant's
Analysis of Obligation'. p.55. The latter interpretation is also implied, without explanation of the
entailment, in Allison. Kant's Theory of Freedom. p.l07. Hoffe.lmmanuel Kant, p.14l. and
Herman. 'Leaving Deontology Behind', p.213.
20 G 394.
107
concerns these effects, because moral goodness cannot be a goodness which a
will may lack the 'ability to carry out'. Although Kant again does not make the
grounds of his argument explicit here, the implicit premise is that moral goodness
must be a goodness which a will as such can achieve, a premise which is included
in the conclusion which he draws from his second claim regarding the goodness
of a good will, namely, the conclusion (b') that moral goodness is a goodness
which only a will can achieve."
Kant's derivation of the second distinctive feature of moral goodness, on
the other hand, is not made clear by the summarising paragraph, which indicates
only that his derivation rests upon the first distinctive feature and upon his
conception of the goodness of a good will. However, his derivation is presented
more clearly in the preceding paragraph, in which he expresses this feature as the
'third proposition'. There he again argues by elimination. He first appeals to the
first distinctive feature of moral goodness, (i), which he here expresses in terms of
the notion of 'respect'. That is, he states that there can be respect only for
'activity of a will', and not for what is 'merely an effect', and therefore only for
'that which is connected with my will merely as ground and never as effect' .22 He
then appeals to his claim regarding action 'from duty', the claim (a') that a good
will does what is morally good precisely because it is morally good, rather than
because it coincides with the satisfaction of inclination. He concludes that if
moral goodness lies in a will's reason for action alone and a good will's reason
for doing what is morally good is not concerned with its inclinations, then 'there
21 This interpretation of Kant's argument at G 394 also suggests an interpretation of the argument
which follows at G 394-6. and which is generally ignored or dismissed, since it appears to rest upon
an unsupported and questionable teleological assumption. This 'teleological assumption' is better
interpreted as (b'), I would suggest.
22 G 400. Kant makes similar remarks in the paragraph at G 399 which precedes his statement of
the 'second proposition', and in the footnote attached to the paragraph at G 401. See also E 337-8.
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remains nothing left for the will which could determine it, other than objectively
the law and subjectively pure respect for this practical law, [and] therefore the
maxim of complying with such a law even with the demolition of all my
inclinations' _23 That is, Kant concludes that (ii) moral goodness must be good for
a will as such, a 'law' for it, because it must be a goodness of a will's reason for
action alone and a good will's reason for doing what is morally good is not
concerned with its inclinations, which are contingent for it.
This derivation is also indicated by Kant's statement that the 'third
proposition' is 'a conclusion of the two gone before'. 24 Kant does not explicitly
identify the first 'proposition', and his statement regarding the relationship
between the propositions is often dismissed.f However, Kant's statement is
accurate if, as I have suggested, his derivation of the second distinctive feature of
moral goodness, (ii), as expressed by the 'third proposition', rests upon the first
distinctive feature of moral goodness, (i), as expressed by the 'second
proposition', and his claim (a') regarding action 'from duty', which is commonly
supposed to be the 'first proposition' .26
To summarise, then, Kant argues from his conception of the goodness of a
good will to two distinctive features of moral goodness. He begins by analysing
23 G 400.
24 G 400.
2S For the dismissal of Kant's statement that the 'third proposition' is 'a conclusion of the two
gone before', on the grounds of differing interpretations of the first two 'propositions', see, for
example, Paton, 'Analysis of the Argument', p.21, Teale, Kantian Ethics, p.IO!, and Wood,
Kant's Ethical Thought, p.43.
26 For this common supposition, see, for example, Paton, 'Analysis of the Argument', p.19, Teale,
Kantian Ethics, p.98, Potter, 'The Argument of Kant's Groundwork, Chapter 1', p.31, Aune,
Kant's Theory of Morals, p.9, Allison, 'On a Presumed Gap in the Derivation of the Categorical
Imperative', p.l44 and n.6, Guyer, 'The Strategy of Kant's Groundwork', p.216, and 'Kant on
Common Sense and Scepticism', p.23, Wood, Kant's Ethical Thought, p.40, and Gaut and
Kerstein, 'The Derivation without the Gap', p.27. However, my interpretation is also consistent
with identifying the first 'proposition' as Kant's first claim regarding the goodness of a good will,
(a), as expressed in the opening sentence of the section, since this is the basis of his claim
regarding action 'from duty', (a'), and with identifying the first 'proposition' as Kant's conception
of a good will's goodness as a whole, (a) and (b), since my interpretation treats this as the basis of
all of his following argument.
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his first claim regarding a good will's goodness, (a), that a good will is the only
good which is good in all contexts, by means of examples of action 'from duty'.
From this analysis, he concludes that (a') a good will does what is morally good
precisely because it is morally good, and thus irrespective of whether what is
morally good coincides with its inclinations. He then employs his analysis of his
second claim regarding a good will's goodness, (b), that a good will is a condition
of every other good, to derive the first distinctive feature of moral goodness, (i),
as expressed by the 'second proposition'. That is, from his analysis of his second
claim, he concludes that (b') moral goodness is a goodness which only a will can
achieve, and from this conclusion, he derives the first distinctive feature of moral
goodness, (i), that moral goodness is a goodness of a will's reason for action
alone, rather than of actions' effects or of reasons for action insofar as they
concern actions' effects. Then, by appealing to this first distinctive feature of
moral goodness, (i), and to his conclusion regarding action 'from duty', (a'), Kant
derives the second distinctive feature of moral goodness, (ii), as expressed by the
'third proposition'. That is, he argues that if moral goodness is a goodness of a
will's reason for action alone and a good will's reason for doing what is morally
good is not concerned with its inclinations, then moral goodness must be good for
a will as such, a 'law' for it, rather than good for satisfying its inclinations, which
are contingent to it.
Unlike Korsgaard's interpretation, therefore, this interpretation explains
why Kant should insist that moral goodness is a goodness of a will's reason for
action alone, and places this insistence in the context of his opening claims
regarding a good will and the sophisticated argument which he bases upon these
claims. As will now be explained, this interpretation also provides the grounds of
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a persuasive account of Kant's derivation of the formula of universal law, a
derivation which Korsgaard's interpretation, like many others, fails to make
persuasive.
Il, The first derivation of the formula of universal law
Kant first expresses the formula of universal law immediately after having
derived the two distinctive features of moral goodness, (i) and (ii). He expresses
the formula in a number of ways here: he writes that what 'should serve the will as
its principle' is 'the conformity of actions as such with universal law [or the
universal conformity with law of actions as such, die allgemeine Gesetzmdjiigkeit
der Handlungen ilberhaupti'; he then identifies this principle with the principle, 'I
should never act other than in such a way that I could also will that my maxim
should become a universal law'; and after considering the example of a false
promise, he expresses the formula as the requirement that a maxim 'can fit
[passen] as principle in a possible giving of universal law [or universal giving of
law, allgemeine Gesetzgebung]'.z7
These brief remarks provide little indication of the intended derivation - or,
indeed, the meaning - of the formula of universal law. However, Kant's
surrounding remarks indicate that he derives the formula by combining the two
distinguishing features of moral goodness which he has already identified, (i) and
(ii), That is, he claims that the formula of universal law expresses what is required
for a goodness to be a goodness of a will's reason for action alone and good for a
27 G 402, 403.
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will as such. He indicates this derivation in a number of ways, but he indicates its
grounds most clearly by the question with which he introduces the formula,
immediately after the paragraph which summarises his argument for the two
distinctive features of moral goodness. There he asks, 'what kind of law can that
be, the representation of which, even without regard for the effect expected from
it, must determine the will, so that this [will] can be called good absolutely and
without limitation?' .28 With this, Kant indicates that his derivation rests upon the
two claims which comprise his conception of the goodness of a good will: the
claim (a) that only a good will is good in all contexts, or good 'without limitation',
and the claim (b) that it is a condition of the goodness of every other good, from
which he derives, via (b'), the first distinctive feature of moral goodness, (i), its
being a goodness of a will's reason for action alone, such that a good will is good
'absolutely' .29 By referring to 'law', he indicates that the formula also rests upon
the second distinctive feature of moral goodness, (ii), as derived from the first such
feature and the conclusion which he draws from his claim (a) that a good will is
good in all contexts, namely, the conclusion (a'), that a good will does what is
morally good 'from duty'. His appeal to this second feature is also indicated by his
immediate answer to the question asked, which begins with another argument by
elimination: 'Since I have deprived the will of every impulse which could arise for
it from obeying some law, there remains nothing but the conformity of actions as
such with universal law, which alone should serve the will as its principle'. After
re-expressing the formula, he then remarks that this 'mere conformity to law as
such' does not have 'at its basis some law determined for certain actions', and that
28 G 402.
29 For Kant's employment of the term 'absolute' to describe the goodness of a will which has this
first distinctive feature of moral goodness, see his expression of this feature at G 394. There he also
describes a will with this goodness as 'good in itself', and at G 403, he writes that a reason's being
a possible 'universal law' is 'the condition of a will good in itself.
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this must be so, 'if duty is not to be everywhere an empty illusion and chimerical
concept' .30
Besides referring to the grounds of his derivation of the formula in these
ways, Kant indicates how he derives the formula from these grounds in his
discussion of the example of a false promise. There he writes of the difference
between promising truthfully because so promising is morally good and promising
truthfully because so promising is prudent, 'in the first case the concept of the
action in itself already contains a law for me, in the second I must first look around
elsewhere, [to see] which effects on me might be connected with it' .31 Thus Kant
holds that the formula expresses a goodness for which one need not 'look around
elsewhere' - that is, beyond a reason for action alone, to the action's effects - for
its goodness, and which 'already contains a law' for a will - that is, is good for a
will as such, rather than for its inclinations, which are contingent for it. In other
words, Kant holds that the formula of universal law expresses the two distinctive
features of moral goodness which he derives from his conception of the goodness
of a good will.
This interpretation of Kant's derivation of the formula of universal law
reveals that allegations of 'gaps' in this derivation are misplaced - that is, he does
not undertake to derive this formula simply from the claim that a good will does
what is morally good 'from duty', or simply from a claim that the moral 'law'
must express a requirement which is necessary for a will as such. As mentioned
above, the first undertaking could not succeed, for the simple reason that Kant's
claim regarding action 'from duty' cannot itself establish anything about what first
makes an action morally good to do, a 'duty'. It is fortunate, then, that this claim is
30 G402.
31 G 402. Kant uses similar terms at R 4 and 42.
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simply a conclusion which Kant draws from one of his two claims regarding a
good will's goodness, and that his derivation of the formula combines this claim
with conclusions drawn from the other of these claims.
The more commonly alleged 'gap' is the second, however. As noted above,
a 'gap' can be found in Korsgaard's interpretation of Kant's derivation, since this
appeals only to a requirement close to the first distinctive feature of moral
goodness, (i), a requirement that a reason's normative demand must derive from a
quality of the reason itself. This requirement is equally satisfied by principles
other, and weaker, than the formula of universal law, such as the principle that any
reason which is held to be required, reasonable, or permissible for a will in certain
circumstances must be held to be required, reasonable, or permissible for any will
in relevantly similar circumstances. However, as commonly expressed, the
allegation of a 'gap' in Kant's derivation is directed at a different interpretation of
Kant's derivation. According to this interpretation, Kant appeals only to a claim
closer to the second distinctive feature of moral goodness, (ii), a claim that the
moral 'law' must express a requirement which is necessary for a will as such,
rather than conditional on contingent inclinations. The problem of a 'gap' is raised
here because this claim suffices only to justify the weak principle which also
satisfies Korsgaard's requirement, namely, the principle that any reason which is
held to be required, reasonable, or permissible for a will in certain circumstances
must be held to be required, reasonable, or permissible for any will in relevantly
similar circumstances. This principle is much 'weaker' than the formula of
universal law, in the sense that the former principle provides less, and, indeed,
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minimal, guidance for reasons - in particular, the former principle can be satisfied
by a reason concerned with the satisfaction of an inclination.V
This allegation of a 'gap' is usually directed at Kant's identification of 'the
conformity of actions as such with universal law', interpreted as an expression of
the weak principle, with the formula of universal law, expressed as the principle, 'I
should never act other than in such a way that I could also will that my maxim
should become a universal law'. It is also often directed at the passage in the
second section in which Kant identifies the conformity of maxims to 'nothing
other than the universality of a law as such', which the allegation interprets as an
expression of the weak principle, with the formula of universal law.33 In response
to this allegation, some commentators maintain that Kant can justify expressing
the formula of universal law here only by making a premature appeal to the
requirement of 'autonomy', understood as the requirement that reasons not
concern anything other than a will and as a requirement which he explicitly
introduces and justifies only in later passages of the Groundwork or in the Critique
of Practical Reason.34
However, the interpretation provided above reveals that Kant effectively
introduces the requirement of 'autonomy' in the first section of the Groundwork,
32 For this allegation as directed at the first section of G, and in many cases also at the second
section of G and at KpV, see Paton, The Categorical Imperative, pp.71-2, Potter, 'The Argument of
Kant's Groundwork, Chapter 1', pp.35-6, Aune, Kant's Theory of Morals, pp.29-34, Hill, 'Kant's
Argument for the Rationality of Moral Conduct', p.268, 'A Kantian Perspective on Moral Rules',
pp.38-9, and 'Is a Good Will Overrated?', n.14 to p.42, Wood, Kant's Ethical Thought, p.48 and
81-2, and Allison, 'On a Presumed Gap in the Derivation of the Categorical Imperative', pp.143-7
and 150-1. The allegation is occasionally directed only at the second section of G or at KpV,
however, as in Wood, Hegel's Ethical Thought, pp.135 and 161-9, Cummiskey, Kantian
Consequentialism, p.57, and Pippin, 'Kant's Theory of Value', p.249.
33 G 421.
34 For the response that Kant must make a premature appeal to the requirement of 'autonomy', see
Aune, Kant's Theory of Morals, pp.86-9, Allison, Kant's Theory of Freedom, pp.207-10 and 212-3,
and 'On a Presumed Gap in the Derivation of the Categorical Imperative' , pp.150-4, and Wood,
Kant's Ethical Thought, pp.48-9 and 81-2. These commentators differ, however, regarding whether
Kant explicitly introduces this requirement in the second section of G, the third section of G, or
KpV.
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as the requirement that moral goodness be a goodness which only a will can
achieve, so that it is a goodness of a will's reason for action alone. That is, he
introduces the requirement of 'autonomy' as the conclusion, (b'), which he draws
from his second claim regarding a good will's goodness, (b), and as the first
distinctive feature of moral goodness, (i), which he derives from this conclusion.
Thus the common allegation of a 'gap' in Kant's derivation can be dismissed, as
resting on a failure to appreciate his appeal to 'autonomy'. Furthermore, Kant's
derivation also does not suffer from a 'gap' similar to that found in Korsgaard's
interpretation. For it appeals not only to 'autonomy', in the form of the first
distinctive feature of moral goodness, (i), but also to the second distinctive feature
of moral goodness, (ii), the requirement that moral goodness be good for a will as
such. Indeed, even the latter requirement alone entails that moral goodness must be
expressed by a principle stronger than the weak principle which the allegation
identifies. For this requirement is not just the requirement that the moral 'law'
must be 'necessary' in the sense that it is valid irrespective of the contingent
inclinations of a will, a validity which is possessed by both the weak principle and
the formula of universal law. Rather, the requirement is that the moral 'law' must
express a goodness which is good for a will as such. It therefore excludes the
goodness of satisfying a will's contingent inclinations, and is thus stronger than the
weak principle which the allegation identifies.
Kant's derivation of the formula of universal law in the first section is
therefore not vulnerable to allegations of various kinds of 'gaps'. Nonetheless, and
despite the significance which sympathisers and critics have traditionally attributed
to it, Kant does not intend the formula of universal law to be a comprehensive
expression of the nature of moral goodness. At the conclusion of the first section,
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he writes that, with this formula, 'we have reached [gelangt], in the moral
cognition of common human reason, its supreme principle', but insists that
'common human reason is driven [... ] to go out of its sphere and to take a step into
the field of practical philosophy, in order to obtain on account of it information
and clear instruction regarding the source of its principle and correct determination
of it' .35 Kant also makes similar remarks elsewhere in the first and second
sections." He therefore does not intend the formula of universal law to provide the
complete 'determination' of 'the supreme principle of morality', and the
'examination' of it and its 'sources', which he promises in the preface.I' In this
sense, then, Kant can be said to part ways with many of his sympathisers, and to
concur with many of his critics, over the persistent issue of whether this formula
provides a comprehensive expression of the nature of morality. The precise sense
in which he holds the formula not to be comprehensive, however, is indicated by
his argument in the second section. As the following section will demonstrate,
Kant there continues his analysis precisely in order to emphasise the first
distinctive feature of moral goodness - namely, (i), that this goodness is a
goodness of will's reason for action alone, because (b') it is a goodness that only a
will can achieve. This is understandable, given that, although Kant derives the
formula of universal law as an expression of his two distinctive features of moral
goodness, its expression of this goodness in terms of 'universal law' emphasises
only the second such feature - namely, (ii), that moral goodness is good for a will
35 G 403, 405.
36 After discussing the formula of universal law in the first section, Kant writes at G 403 that, with
it, 'I do not yet have insight into what this respect [that is, a reason which can also be willed to be
"a universal law"] is grounded upon (which the philosopher may investigate),. He begins the
second section, 'we have drawn our concept of duty thus far from the common use of our practical
reason' , and, a few pages later, he writes that, without the developments of the second section, it
would be possible 'to determine precisely for speculative judgement the moral [element] of duty in
everying that conforms with duty', but 'impossible to ground moral on their genuine principles
even in merely common and practical use' (G 406, 412).
37 G 392.
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as such, a 'law' for it. For Kant, therefore, the formula of universal law is intended
to express both of the two distinctive features of moral goodness which he
identifies in the first section, but emphasises only one of these features. As we will
see, this formula also provides Kant with a compass as he 'takes a step into
practical philosophy' in pursuit of expressions of moral goodness which emphasise
its other distinctive feature.
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'Stepping out into metaphysics'
I. Practical reason and the second derivation of the formula of universal law
In the second section, Kant introduces a philosophical account of the will
as 'practical reason' in order to provide expressions of moral goodness which
emphasise the first feature which he identifies in the first section, namely, that (i)
moral goodness is a goodness of a will's reason for action alone, since (b') it is a
goodness which only a will can achieve. He first presents what he calls the
'general rules of determination' of the will - that is, an account which is
indifferent to whether a will is a good one. A 'will', he begins, is 'the ability to act
according to the representation of laws, i.e. according to principles'. He continues,
'Since reason is required for the derivation of actions from laws, the will is
nothing other than practical reason'. Kant thus understands willing as action
di . . I 38accor mg to reasons, or pnncip es.
Kant supplies some elaboration of these claims in footnotes. In a footnote
in the third section, he writes that 'reason becomes practical, Le. a will-
determining cause' only by 'tak[ing] an interest in an action', and that this
distinguishes 'a rational being' from 'non-rational creatures', which 'feel only
sensible impulses'. In a footnote to his account in the second section, he maintains
that this 'taking of interest' might concern either a contingent 'inclination'
determined by 'feelings', in which case 'reason supplies [... ] the practical rule as
38 G 412.
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to how to remedy the need of inclination', or 'principles of reason in themselves' .39
For Kant, then, a rational agent acts according to reasons, rather than being
determined by 'impulses', whether she pursues her 'inclinations' or independent
rational requirements.t"
In the text, however, Kant simply states that reasons 'say that to do or to
refrain from something would be good', and so are reasons 'of a will which is
good in some way'. In order to identify a good will's reasons in particular, Kant
first distinguishes two kinds of reasons according to the sense in which a reason
represents an action as 'good': a 'hypothetical' reason represents an action as
contingently good, 'as [a] means to something other that one wills (or [that] it is
possible for one to will)', while a 'categorical' reason represents an action 'as in
itself good, hence as necessary in a will in itself in conformity with reason, as its
principle' .41 Although Kant's expression of the distinction here has led some
commentators to interpret a 'categorical' reason as distinguished by its not being
concerned with an 'end' at all, his following account of the 'end' of such a reason
and his expressions of the distinction elsewhere make clear that he holds both
'hypothetical' and 'categorical' reasons to represent actions as good as 'means' to
an 'end', and distinguishes them according to whether they represent actions, and
so 'ends', as contingently good or as good for a will as such.42
Kant then argues that since a categorical reason represents an action as
good for a will as such, what is required for a reason to be categorical can be
expressed by the formula of universal law. Kant's derivation of the formula of
39 G 460n, 413n.
40 Kant makes these claims in a notably clearer manner in the introduction to MS, at MS 211-4.
41 G 413, 414. On the distinction between hypothetical and categorical reasons, see also G 415-6.
42 For the misinterpretation of Kant's distinction here, see, for example, Paton, The Categorical
Imperative, pp.114-5. Kant expresses the distinction elsewhere at KpV l ln, 19-21, and 58-9, MS
222, and VL 86-7. Even at G 414-6, though, he repeatedly distinguishes categorical reasons by their
not being concerned with 'other' ends, rather then their not being concerned with 'ends' at all.
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universal law in the second section thus mirrors that in the first section. That is,
with this formula, he expresses moral goodness as (b') a goodness which can be
achieved only by a will, so that it is (i) a goodness of a will's reason for action
alone, and as (ii) a goodness which is good for a will as such. He expresses the
former feature - namely, (i) - by providing the derivation in the context of his
account of the will as practical reason, but again the formula, and here even the
derivation, emphasise only the latter feature - namely, (ii). Thus, before providing
the derivation, Kant emphasises that 'law brings with it the concept of an
unconditioned and indeed objective and hence universally valid necessity', and
that a categorical reason 'alone sounds like [als.. .laute] a practical law' because it
'leaves the will no discretion with respect to the opposite'. He then proceeds to
derive the formula of universal law by arguing that 'the mere concept' of a
categorical reason, unlike that of a hypothetical one, thus 'contains' what is
required for a reason to be categorical, namely, that a reason satisfies the
requirement expressed by the formula of universal law." This is so, Kant argues
here, because a categorical reason must be good for a will as such - that is, it must
express 'an unconditioned and indeed objective and hence universally valid
necessity' for a will, or must 'leave the will no discretion'. Kant also puts this as
follows.
If I think of a hypothetical imperative in general, I do not know beforehand what
it will contain: until the condition is given to me. But if I think of a categorical
imperative, I know at once what it contains. For since, except the law, the imperative
contains only the necessity that the maxim be in conformity with this law, but the law
contains no condition to which it would be limited, there remains nothing other than
43 G 416, 420.
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the universality of a law as such with which the maxim should be in conformity, and
the imperative represents this conformity alone as necessary.
The categorical imperative is therefore only singular and [is] actually this: act
only according to that maxim through which you can at the same time will that it
become a universallaw.44
Given that the derivation of the formula of universal law in the second
section corresponds with that provided in the first section, then, it no more suffers
from a 'gap' between a weaker principle and the formula than the deriviation in
the first section, despite the claims of some critics. In particular, like the derivation
in the first section, that in the second section invokes the requirement of
'autonomy' by appealing to conclusion (b'), and the feature of moral goodness
which Kant derives from it, namely, (i). It consequently makes no premature
appeal to such a requirement.f
Having already, in the first section, expressed the goodness of a good will
by the formula of uni versal law, Kant can identify a will acting according to a
categorical reason with a good will. As he writes after deriving and discussing the
formula of universal law in the second section, 'We have therefore demonstrated at
least that, if duty is a concept which should contain meaning and real lawgiving for
our actions, it can be expressed only in categorical imperatives, not at all in
hypothetical [ones]'. This remark and others indicate that, for Kant, the formula of
universal law completes the part of his argument in the second section which is
concerned to 'follow and clearly present the practical ability of reason from its
general rules of determination to where the concept of duty arises from it', as he
44 G 420-1.
45 For references regarding this allegation, see nn.32 and 34 above.
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puts it before beginning to present these 'general rules' of willing" By again
deriving the formula of universal law from the notion of a categorical reason, then,
Kant demonstrates that the concept of duty 'arises from' his account of the will
with this notion in particular.
II. The derivation of the formula of the end in itself
Kant's identification of a will acting according to a categorical reason with
a good will, by means of the formula of universal law, allows him to proceed to
use the notion of a categorical reason to guide his search for expressions of duty,
or moral goodness, which emphasise what the formula of universal law does not.47
This next part of the argument in the second section requires, as Kant notes, that he
'take a step out [... ] into the metaphysics of morals' - that is, that he no longer
consider the 'general rules of determination' of a will, with a view to identifying
the kind of reason according to which a good will acts, but instead consider 'the
relation of a will to itself, insofar as it determines itself merely through reason'.
Kant explains the meaning and necessity of this 'step' in terms of the notion of
'the end' of a will, as that which 'serves the will as [the] objective ground of its
self-determination'. A will's 'end', then, is what a will takes to make an action
'good', either contingently or for a will as such, and to thus provide a reason for
action. For Kant, it is necessary to consider how a will could 'determine itself
merely through reason' because an end, 'if it is given through mere reason, must
hold equally [or identically, gleich] for all rational beings' - that is, it must make
46 G 425, 412. The other remarks which indicate that the formula of universal law plays this role in
the argument of the second section are found at G 413n, 421, and 431.
47 Kant notes that his argument employs this notion as a guide at G 440.
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actions good for a will as such." To identify an end which is 'given through mere
reason' would therefore explain how a will could act according to a categorical
reason, and so be a good will.
In Kant's terms, such an end would provide a synthetic and a priori
'connection' between a will and a categorical reason. For, he writes, acting
according to a categorical reason is 'something that is not contained in' the
concept of a will, and a categorical reason, by representing an action as good for a
will as such, 'connects the deed with the will without a presupposed condition of
some inclination', given contingently and a posteriori.49 It is the latter, a priori
nature of the 'connection' which requires Kant to 'take a step out [... ] into the
metaphysics of morals', since to consider how a will could 'determine itself
merely through reason' is precisely to consider how a will's reason for action
could not concern an inclination given contingently and a posteriori, but rather be
'given' by reason, or the ability to act according to reasons, alone. As Kant writes
as he takes this 'step', if the formula of universal law expresses a valid
requirement, then 'it must already be connected (completely a priori) with the
concept of the will of a rational being as such', and 'if reason for itself alone
determines conduct', then 'everything that has relation to the empirical of itself no
longer applies' .50
However, Kant does not identify the end which would provide a
categorical reason for action simply by identifying an end which holds 'equally [or
identically] for all rational beings'. This would be to appeal only to the feature of
moral goodness which the formula of universal law already emphasises, namely
(ii) that moral goodness is good for a will as such. Rather, Kant identifies the end
48 G 426-7, 427.
49 G 420n. See also G 420, 428-9, 429n, 440, 444-5, and 447.
so G 427. See also G 387-8 and 425-6, and Kant's criticism of Wolff at G 390-1.
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which would provide a categorical reason for action by appealing to both of the
features of moral goodness which he identifies in the first section, just as he
appeals to both of these features in order to derive the formula of universal law. In
other words, he holds that for a will to act according to a categorical reason, and so
be a good will, what it must take to provide its reason for action must not only
'hold equally [or identically] for all rational beings', but also be such that the will
achieves a goodness of its reason for action alone, a goodness which only a will
can achieve. Indeed, in deriving the formulas of the end in itself and autonomy,
Kant is concerned to emphasise this latter feature of moral goodness - that is,
feature (i) - precisely because this feature is not emphasised by the formula of
universal law.
Kant first derives the formula of the end in itself. This derivation is often
interpreted either as an inference of the unconditional goodness of will itself from
a will's capacity to be unconditionally good, or, following Korsgaard, as 'a regress
upon the conditions' of a will's taking its 'ends' to be unconditionally good, such
that a will must take itself to 'confer' this goodness upon its ends by way of its
own unconditional goodness." There is little to support either interpretation in
Kant's text, however, and both attribute to him questionable reasoning: the former
employs a questionable inference from the goodness of x to the goodness of the
capacity for x, and the latter rests upon an implausibly strong claim that a will
takes each of its 'ends', including non-moral ones, to be unconditionally good, and
51 For the former interpretation, see, for example, Cooper, 'The Formula of the End in Itself',
pp.40l-2, Pogge, 'Kant's Theory of Justice', n.6 to p.409, and 'The Categorical Imperative',
pp.l97-9, and O'Neill, 'Universal Laws and Ends-in-Themselves', p.l37. For the latter
interpretation, see, in particular, Korsgaard, 'Kant's Formula of Humanity', pp.lI4-24, 'The Right
to Lie', pp.143-4 and 151-2, 'Aristotle and Kant on the Source of Value', p.241, and 'Motivation,
Metaphysics, and the Value of the Self', pp.53-4, Cummiskey, Kantian Consequentialism, pp.62-
83 and 169-71, and Wood, 'Humanity as End in Itself', pp.173-7, and Kant's Ethical Thought,
pp.l24-32.
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the equally suspect claim that what 'confers' unconditional goodness must itself be
unconditionally good.52 Alternatively, the formula of the end in itself is commonly
supposed to derive from the unconditionality required by the formula of universal
law, on the grounds that for a will to act according to a reason which is good for a
will as such is already for it to adopt the 'end in itself' .53 Such a derivation is also
questionable, however, since the notion of a reason which is good for a will as
such provides, in itself, no indication of what end such a reason must concern.
Nor, finally, is it promising to suppose, as Guyer does, that the formula of the end
in itself is intended to identify, independently, the teleological end which justifies
the unconditionality that the formula of universal law requires." For with regard to
what precedes it, this would mark a profound, and unremarked, discontinuity in
Kant's argument, in contrast with his apparently cumulative intentions.
It is fortunate, then, that Kant in fact derives the formula of the end in itself
by appealing to the two features of moral goodness which he identifies in the first
section, and, in particular, to the feature which the formula of universal law does
not emphasise. That is, his derivation is primarily concerned to identify what a will
must take to provide its reason for action if the will's goodness is to be (i) a
goodness of its reason alone, and therefore (b') a goodness which only a will can
achieve. His conclusion is that a will can be good only by taking 'rational nature'
S2 On the questionable inference, see Jones, Kant's Principle of Personality, p.1S, and Pogge, 'The
Categorical Imperative', n.25 to p.l99. For criticism of Korsgaard' s strong claim regarding 'ends',
see Gaut, 'The Structure of Practical Reason' , Schneewind, 'Korsgaard and the Unconditional in
Morality', pp.43-S, Pippin, 'Kant's Theory of Value', pp.252-5, Kerstein, 'Korsgaard's Kantian
Arguments for the Value of Humanity', pp.2S-9 and 30-3, Hill, 'Personal Values and Setting
Oneself Ends', pp.251 and 258-68, and nn.31 and 71, and Melnick, 'Kant's Formulations of the
Categorical Imperative', pp.291-2 and 305-7. For criticism of Korsgaard's claim regarding what
'confers' unconditional goodness, see Gaut, 'The Structure of Practical Reason' , and Kerstein,
'Korsgaard's Kantian Arguments for the Value of Humanity', pp.33-4.
S3 See, for example, Paton, 'Analysis of the Argument', pp.32-3, and The Categorical Imperative,
pp.167-71 and 175-8, Sullivan, Immanuel Kant's Moral Theory, pp.193-4, and Rotenstreich, 'On
the Formalism of Kant's Ethics', pp.55-6.
S4 See, in particular, Guyer, 'Kant's Morality of Law and Morality of Freedom', pp.13S-47, 'The
Possibility ofthe Categorical Imperative', pp.191-200, and 'Ends of Reason and Ends of Nature' ,
pp.163-4.
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- that is, a will, or the ability to act according to reasons - 'as an end, never
merely as a means' - that is, as providing a reason for action.55 This is so, he
argues, because to take anything else, such as an inclination or something without
the ability to will, as providing a reason for action would be for a will to be good
in a sense which other causes could achieve, and so for the will not to be a good
one. For Kant, therefore, a will's 'end' can be 'given through mere reason' in the
sense that the ability to act according to reasons itself can provide a reason for
action, and only with such an 'end' can a will's goodness be (i) a goodness of its
reason for action alone, and therefore (b') a goodness which only a will can
achieve.
Kant again indicates his derivation in a number of ways, but its grounds are
clearest in his summary at the end of the second section. There, he writes that the
'end' of a good will 'can be nothing other than the subject of all possible ends [that
is, a will, or the ability to act according to reasons] itself, because this is at the
same time the subject of a possible absolutely good will; for this [good will]
cannot without contradiction be subordinated to [or follow, nachsetzen] any other
object' .56 Thus Kant appeals to his claim (b), that a good will is a condition of -
or, as he puts it here, 'cannot be subordinated to [or follow]' - the goodness of any
other good, in order to argue that a will's goodness must consist of its taking a will
itself to provide a reason for action. The implicit intermediary steps in this
argument are those which Kant provides in the first section, where he concludes
from his claim that a good will is a condition of the goodness of any other good
that moral goodness must be (b') a goodness which only a will can achieve, and
therefore (i) a goodness of a will's reason for action alone.
SS G 428-9, 429.
S6 G 437.
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However, it is in the paragraph which follows his 'step out [... ] into the
metaphysics of morals' and his introduction of the notion of a will's 'end' that
Kant provides his fullest, if not his clearest, presentation of his derivation of the
formula of the end in itself. This paragraph begins with his conclusion, that 'the
human being and in general every rational being exists as end in itself, not merely
as means to discretionary uses for this or that will, but must in all his actions,
directed both to himself and also to other rational beings, always be regarded at
the same time as an end'. Kant then argues, first, that, '[a]ll objects of inclinations
have only a conditioned worth', since their worth is conditional on the existence
of the appropriate inclinations. He then states that inclinations themselves, on the
existence of which the worth of their objects is conditional, do not have absolute
worth. He concludes from this that, 'The worth of every object to be acquired
through our action is therefore always conditional'. He then proceeds to consider
'[b]eings the existence of which is based not on our will, but on nature'. He states
of such beings that, 'if they are beings without reason [that is, without the ability
to will], [they] still have only a relative worth, as means', but that 'rational beings
[that is, beings with the ability to will]' are such that 'their nature already
distinguishes them as ends in themselves' .57
Taken in isolation, these claims, and their roles in Kant's derivation, are
obscure. In particular, Kant here fails to explain why he denies that inclinations
themselves have 'absolute worth', why he concludes from this that the worth of
objects 'to be acquired' by action is 'always conditional', why he claims that
beings without the ability to will have 'only a relative worth', and, finally, why he
57 G428.
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holds that the 'nature' of beings with the ability to will 'distinguishes them as ends
in themselves'.
However, a number of Kant's remarks in this paragraph and in other
relevant parts of the section indicate that his derivation here is concerned with
expressing the two features of moral goodness which he identifies in the first
section, and with expressing the first such feature in particular. These indications
thus serve to illuminate the otherwise obscure claims which he makes in this
paragraph. The first indication of his concerns is given at the end of the paragraph,
where Kant re-states his conclusion as follows: 'These [that is, rational beings] are
therefore not merely subjective ends, the existence of which as an effect of our
action has a worth for us; but objective ends, i.e. beings the existence of which is
in itself an end, and indeed one such that [... ] without it nothing of absolute worth
would be found anywhere; but if all worth were conditional, [and] therefore
contingent, then no supreme practical principle would be found anywhere'.
Immediately before presenting his derivation, Kant also states that the 'end' with
which he is concerned is 'something the existence of which in itselfhas an absolute
worth'. Secondly, Kant also indicates the concern of his derivation when, in the
paragraph which presents it, he writes that 'an end in itself' is 'something that may
not be used merely as a means, [and] therefore so far limits all choice [WilikUr]
(and is an object of respect)' .58 He also expresses his conclusion in terms of a
'limiting condition' four times in the rest of the section.i" Finally, in his summary
at the end of the section, Kant refers to an end in itself as an end which 'must be
S8 G 428.
S9 See G 430-1. 431. 436. and 438.
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thought not as an end to be effected, but as an independent [or self-sufficient,
Ib .. d'] d,60se ststan 19 en .
These terms are precisely those which Kant employs in the first section to
refer to the first distinctive feature of moral goodness - namely, (i) - and they
therefore indicate that his derivation of the formula of the end in itself is primarily
concerned with expressing this feature. In the first section, he refers to this feature
in terms of 'absolute' goodness and 'respect', and to the claims from which he
derives it - namely, claims (b) and (b') - in terms of a goodness which is a
'condition' of the goodness of every other good and a goodness other than that
which can be achieved by an action's 'effect' .61 Nonetheless, by referring to moral
goodness as not a 'conditional, [and] therefore contingent' goodness, Kant's re-
statement of his conclusion at the end of the paragraph which presents his
derivation indicates that this derivation is not only concerned with expressing the
first distinctive feature of moral goodness, but is also concerned with expressing
the second such feature, namely, (ii).
These remarks, then, imply that Kant's derivation, as presented in the
paragraph which follows his 'step out [... ] into the metaphysics of morals' and his
introduction of the notion of a will's 'end', should be interpreted as follows. His
ultimate concern in this paragraph is to express what a will must take to provide a
reason for action - that is, what its 'end' must be - if it is to achieve moral
goodness, as distinguished by the two features (i) and (ii) which are identified in
the first section, and, in particular, to emphasise the first such feature. He begins
by denying that the 'end in itself' can be an object of inclination, on the grounds
that the goodness of such an object is conditional on the existence of the
60 G 437.
61 For the notion of 'absolute worth' , see G 394 and 402, and on this notion and the notion of
'respect', see the discussion in the first subsection of this chapter.
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appropriate inclination. This claim might be taken to rest on the second feature of
moral goodness, according to which moral goodness is not 'conditional, [and]
therefore contingent' for a will. However, Kant proceeds to appeal to the first
feature of moral goodness, expressed as the requirement of 'absolute' goodness,
when he denies that an inclination itself, on the existence of which the goodness of
its objects is conditional, could be the 'end in itself', and concludes that no 'object
to be acquired through our action' could be such an end. His claim, then, is that
the goodness of objects of inclination is conditional on the existence of appropriate
inclinations, and that inclinations themselves and, indeed, any 'effect' of an action
can be good only in a sense which causes other than a will can achieve. Such
goodness fails to satisfy his claim (b'), that moral goodness is a goodness which
only a will can achieve.
Kant then proceeds to consider the goodness of beings the existence of
which cannot be the 'effect' of an action. As he puts it here, the existence of such
beings 'is based not on our will, but on nature'. Regarding such beings, he states
first that those which do not have the ability to will cannot be ends at all, but only
means, and then that those which do have the ability to will are 'marked [or
distinguished], by this as ends in themselves. Kant's concern with emphasising the
first distinctive feature of moral goodness implies that, with these statements, he
intends to claim that the goodness of beings without the ability to will is not such
that it can be achieved by a will at all, but that the goodness of beings with the
ability to will is such that it can be so achieved and, crucially, such that it can only
be so achieved. For Kant, then, to take a will itself to provide a reason for action is
for a will to achieve a goodness which only a will can achieve, and therefore a
goodness of its reason for action alone. In other words, Kant holds that a will thus
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achieves a goodness which satisfies his claim (b'), and therefore also satisfies his
first distinctive feature of moral goodness, (i).
III. The derivations of the formulas of autonomy and the realm of ends
Kant, however, also derives another formula which emphasises his claim
that, since (b) a good will is a condition of the goodness of every other good, its
goodness must be such that (b') only a will can achieve it, and so (i) lie in its
reason for action alone, rather than in actions' effects or in reasons for action
insofar as they concern actions' effects. Kant expresses this formula, that of
autonomy, as 'the idea of the will of every rational being as a will giving universal
law'. According to Kant, this idea 'follows' from the formula of universal law and
the formula of the end in itself, a remark which has led some commentators to
claim that the idea is derived simply by combining the preceding two formulas."
But Kant also claims that this idea expresses what the preceding formulas 'only
assumed', namely, 'the renunciation of all interest in willing from duty' as 'the
mark distinguishing categorical from hypothetical imperatives'. This suggests that,
for Kant, neither the notion of the possible willing of a reason as 'a universal law'
nor the notion of taking 'rational nature' as an 'end' makes sufficiently explicit the
features of moral goodness which they are intended to express, and that the
formula of autonomy is intended to remedy these failings. This suggestion is
reinforced by Kant's following discussion, which explains why the formulas of
62 G 431. For this claim regarding the derivation of this formula, see, for example, Paton, 'Analysis
of the Argument', pp.33-4, and The Categorical Imperative, pp.180-1, Korsgaard, 'An Introduction
to the Ethical, Political, and Religious Thought of Kant', p.22, and Wood, Kant's Ethical Thought,
pp.158-9.
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universal law and the end in itself fail to make sufficiently clear even the features
which they are intended to emphasise, rather than merely express. In this
discussion, Kant argues that the notion of 'a will giving universal law through all
of its maxims' - that is, the formula of autonomy - is 'very well suited' to
expressing moral goodness, because 'a will that stands under law may still be
bound to this law by means of an interest'. Kant claims that the notion simply of 'a
will that stands under law' thus fails to make sufficiently explicit that moral
goodness is 'based on no interest', or 'unconditional', and encourages the
misunderstanding that a will's 'conformity with law would be necessitated by
something other' than a will itself.63 Kant thus warns against misinterpreting the
notion of 'law' in the formula of universal law as implying that moral goodness is
a goodness which is contingent for a will as such, and against misinterpreting
either this notion of 'law' or the notion of a will itself 'giving' a reason for action
in the formula of the end in itself as implying that moral goodness is a goodness of
and for something other than a will alone. In other words, Kant warns against
misinterpreting the formula of universal law such that it would not express his
second distinctive feature of moral goodness, (ii), and against misinterpreting
either this formula or the formula of the end in itself such that the formula would
not express the first such feature, (i).
Kant claims that the notion of 'a will giving universal law' avoids these
dangers. As he puts it here, for a will's reason to be categorical is for it to be such
that 'the will is not merely subject to the law, but so subject that it must be viewed
as also giving law to itself [or itself lawgiving, selbstgesetzgebendJ and just
because of this [as] first subject to the law (of which it can regard itself as the
63 G 431, 432, 433.
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author),. Or, as Kant also writes, for a will to act according to a categorical reason,
it must 'have as its object itself as giving universal law' , and its reason must 'arise
from' will itself. It is this quality of a will's reason which Kant calls 'the
autonomy of the will', and which expresses the first feature of moral goodness in
particular, as he makes especially clear slightly later in the section. There he
writes, 'Autonomy is [... ] the ground of the dignity' of a will, its 'dignity'
indicating that its goodness cannot 'be replaced by something other', as its
'equivalent' or 'price' .As Kant also puts it there, after again referring to two of his
examples of moral goodness, 'Nature, as well as art, contains nothing which,
lacking these [that is, lacking instances of moral goodness], it could put in their
place; for their worth does not consist in the effects which arise from them, [... ]
but in [... ] maxims of the will [... ], even if success does not favour them'." For
Kant, therefore, 'the autonomy of the will' is a goodness which only a will can
achieve, and thus has 'dignity', since it is a goodness of a will's reason for action
alone.
By 'autonomy', then, Kant means a goodness of a will's reason for action
such that it is (ii) good for a will as such, and thus 'gives universal law' , and such
that it (i) lies in the will's reason for action alone, and is thus (b') a goodness
which only a will can achieve, or which a will alone 'gives to itself'. Kant's
formula of autonomy therefore emphasises both of the two distinctive features of
moral goodness which he identifies in the first section, and, in doing so, is
intended to warn against misinterpreting his preceding formulas in ways which
would fail to express these distinctive features.
64 G 431, 432, 433, 436, 434, 435. See also G 439-41, 444,447,449,450,453, and 458.
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Kant concludes his analysis of 'common moral rational cognition'
regarding a good will by claiming that the formula of autonomy 'leads to a very
fruitful concept dependent on it, namely that of a realm of ends' .65 Like the
formula of autonomy, this concept is often supposed to be derived simply by
combining the formulas of universal law and the end in itself." However, Kant's
brief discussion of this concept indicates that it is 'dependent' on, or that one is
'led' to it by, the formula of autonomy in the sense that it introduces what is
bracketed by even this most adequate of his preceding formulas - namely, the
plurality of agents. Given a plurality of agents, he insists, the quality of a reason's
being provided by mere will must extend not only to a will or some wills, but to
every will. Kant expresses this by defining 'a realm' as 'a systematic connection
[or association, Verbindung] of various rational beings through common [or
communal, gemeinschaftlich] laws', and 'a realm of ends' as such a 'connection'
insofar as its common laws are 'objective' - that is, insofar as it is governed by the
requirements of moral goodness. Later, he also writes that reasons must
'harmonize into a possible realm of ends, as [if it were] a realm of nature', and
thus constitute 'the allness or totality of the system' of mere wills as ends.
Revealingly, in his summary, he also emphasises that the goodness of this
'complete determination' is not only a goodness of 'universal laws' , as (ii) good
for a will as such, but is also (b') a goodness which only a will can achieve, and
therefore (i) a goodness of its reason for action alone. As he puts it here, 'such a
realm would actually be achieved through maxims whose rule the categorical
imperative prescribes to every rational being, if they were universally followed',
65 G 433.
66 See, for example. Sullivan. Immanuel Kant's Moral Theory, p.212. and O'Neill. 'Universal Laws
and Ends in Themselves', pp.141-4. Others claim that this concept derives simply from the formula
of universal law. See, for instance. Robinson and Harre, 'The Demography of the Kingdom of
Ends'. p.8.
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but neither divine command nor fortunate natural causes could achieve it, since it
can be achieved 'only according to maxims, i.e. self-imposed rules', of a will.67
IV. The equivalence and diversity of Kant's formulas
With the formulas of universal law, the end in itself, autonomy, and the
realm of ends, then, Kant's analysis of 'common moral rational cognition'
regarding a good will achieves the 'determination' of 'the supreme principle of
morality' which he intends his analysis to provide. Indeed, he begins his summary
of the results of his analysis by stating, quite appropriately, that with these
formulas, 'We can at this point end where we started out from at the beginning,
namely the concept of an unconditionally good will' .68 Furthermore, immediately
before making this statement, Kant presents his formulas in a systematic way
which makes their roles in his analysis particularly clear. As a means of
summarising the preceding interpretation of Kant's argument in the first two
sections of the Groundwork, therefore, I will briefly consider this systematic
presentation.
In this presentation, Kant writes of the formulas of universal law, the end in
itself, and the realm of ends that these 'three ways of representing the principle of
morality are fundamentally only so many formulas of the very same law, one of
which of itself unites the other two in it'. However, he then states that 'there is still
a difference in them, which is indeed subjectively rather than objectively practical,
67 G 433, 436, 438. See also G 434, 439, and 462-3. Pogge and Wood also consider the derivation
of the formula of the realm of ends to introduce a notion of system among a plurality of agents. See
Pogge, 'The Categorical Imperative', pp.201-4, and Wood, Kant's Ethical Thought, pp.I66-7.
68 G 437. At G 447, Kant also identifies moral goodness with the maxim of 'an absolutely good
will'.
136
in order namely to bring an idea nearer to intuition (according to a certain analogy)
and thereby to feeling'. The 'subjectively practical' difference between these three
formulas, Kant claims, consists in their referring to the 'form', 'matter', and
'complete determination' of morally good reasons, respectively.f" Thus Kant holds
that the formulas are fundamentally equivalent, but also that each provides a
different 'analogy' of moral goodness, by referring to a different aspect of this
goodness.
This is precisely what the preceding interpretation of Kant's derivations of
formulas would lead one to expect. That is, Kant's formulas are intended to be
equivalent insofar as each of them is intended to express, and to be derived from,
the two distinctive features of moral goodness which are identified in the first
section, namely, (i) and (ii). The later formulas therefore do not express the
'ground' of the formula of universal law, or otherwise make substantial new
claims regarding moral goodness, as some commentators have supposed.i" The
formulas differ, however, because they each emphasise - or, as Kant puts it here,
'bring [... ] nearer to intuition (according to a certain analogy) and thereby to
feeling' - different aspects of the two features of moral goodness. Thus the
formula of universal law emphasises the second feature, and the formula of the end
in itself emphasises the first. The formula of autonomy, on the other hand,
emphasises both features and warns against certain possible misinterpretations of
the preceding formulas, and the formula of the realm of ends introduces a
significant further qualification which is bracketed by the preceding formulas. The
formulas therefore do not differ merely in terms of 'perspective', as has also been
69 G 437, 436. See also his remarks at G 462-3.
70 For examples, see n.54 above. See also the discussion in the second section of ch.6 below.
137
supposed.i' Nor, indeed, is any formula alone quite adequate. As Kant writes
regarding the three formulas to which he refers in his systematic presentation, 'to
provide access to the moral law [... ] it is very useful to lead one and the same
action through the three mentioned concepts and thereby, as far as can be done, to
approach it to intuition,.72 Nonetheless, despite their differences, each formula also
implies the aspects which it fails to emphasise, and thus can be understood to
'unite the other two in it'. In particular, the formula of universal law is concerned
specifically with reasons for action, although it does not emphasise that moral
goodness is a goodness of a will's reason for action alone, while the formula of the
end in itself identifies the end which provides a categorical reason, although it
does not emphasise that moral goodness is good for a will as such, a 'law' for it.
These mutual implications are unsurprising, given the common grounds of the
derivations.
71 O'Neill and Rawls claim that the formula of universal law considers an action from the
perspective of the agent, while the formula of the end in itself considers it from the perspective of
those affected by the action. See O'Neill, 'Universal Laws and Ends in Themselves', pp.141-4, and
Rawls, 'Themes in Kant's Moral Philosophy' , pp.89-90, and Lectures on the History of Moral
Philosophy, pp.183, 191,194-5, and 200.
72G437.
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Kant's method
It is notable that, thus understood, Kant's argument in the first and second
sections of the Groundwork is a continuous one, and one ultimately based upon the
conception of the goodness of a good will which he claims to find in 'common
moral rational cognition'. The argument of the second section is therefore not, as
commentators often maintain, largely independent of, and more substantial than,
that of the first, and intended to be, at most, merely consistent with the broadest,
and supposedly less substantial, results of the first.73 Rather, the second section
completes the argument which the first section begins. Specifically, in the first
section Kant identifies two distinctive features of moral goodness by analysing the
conception of the goodness of a good will expressed in the opening pages. There
he succeeds in providing a formula, the formula of universal law, which
emphasises only the second feature. Then, in the second section he proceeds to
provide formulas which emphasise the second feature of moral goodness, by
introducing a general account of the will as 'practical reason' and employing the
formula of universal law to guide this procedure - in particular, to identify a
reason which this account characterises as 'categorical' with the reason according
to which a good will acts. As he writes in the last paragraph of the second section,
'the metaphysics of morals' with which the second section provides formulas
beyond the formula of universal law 'showed only through the expansion of the
73 For prominent examples, see Korsgaard, 'An Introduction to the Ethical. Political. and Religious
Thought of Kant' , pp.12-4. Reath, 'The Categorical Imperative and Kant's Conception of Practical
Rationality'. pp.391-3 and n.19. Allison. Kant's Theory of Freedom. pp.85-6 and 107-8, and
Wood. Kant's Ethical Thought. pp.17-20 and 48-50. For other examples. see Levin. 'Kant's
Derivation of the Formula of Universal Law as an Ontological Argument', pp.60-1, Baker,
'Counting Categorial Imperatives'. pp.393-4. O'Neill, 'Reason and Autonomy in Grundlegung III',
n.6 to p.54, and Melnick. 'Kant's Formulations of the Categorical Imperative', p.304.
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universally accepted concept of morality: that an autonomy of the will unavoidably
depends on it, or rather lies in its ground' .74 Or, as he concludes after providing
this 'metaphysics', 'We can at this point end where we started out from at the
beginning, namely the concept of an unconditionally good will'.
Kant's method in these two sections is therefore simply to analyse the
conception of the goodness of a good will which he attributes to 'common moral
rational cognition', and not to appeal to further, independent commitments to
justify, modify, or qualify the account of moral goodness which this analysis
reveals. In particular, he does not appeal to an independent conception of
'rationality', deontological constraints, or 'the good'. This conforms precisely to
the 'method' which he proposes for the first and second sections in the preface,
namely, 'to proceed analytically from common cognition to determination of its
supreme principle'. He claims that this method dictates the division and functions
of the sections, such that, as their titles indicate, the first section concerns the
'transition from common moral rational cognition to philosophical', and the
second the 'transition from popular moral philosophy to metaphysics of morals'.
Kant's analysis in the first section is therefore intended to be 'philosophical' in the
sense which he also identifies in the preface, when he writes, 'that which
distinguishes [philosophy] from common rational cognition is that it presents in
isolated [abgesonden] science what the latter comprehends only confusedly' .75
The second section, however, is intended to continue this analysis in a particular
manner, by employing a general account of the will as practical reason to provide a
'metaphysics of morals' - that is, an account of how a will might take its reason
74 G 444-5.
75 G 392, 390. On the relation between 'philosophy' and 'common moral rational cognition', see
also KrV A830-1IBS5S-9, G 403-4,409, and 444-5, KpV 8n and 27, and MS 216, and on Kant's
understanding of 'philosophy', see KrV A712-381B740-66 and AS35-401B863-S, P 255, KU 174,
andEKU 195.
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for action to be provided by a will alone. The 'transition' to this account from
'popular moral philosophy' involves simply excluding what Kant calls the
'disgusting mishmash' of empirical claims and informal techniques which many of
his contemporaries promoted and practised as 'philosophy' .76 Unsurprisingly, Kant
excludes this manner of 'philosophy', and supports his alternative, on the grounds
that only his alternative can account for the two features of moral goodness
identified in the first section."
This method is also followed in the Critique of Practical Reason, which,
Kant writes in the preface to it, 'presupposes the Groundwork of the Metaphysics
of Morals [... ] insofar as this constitutes preliminary acquaintance with the
principle of duty and provides and justifies a determinate formula of it'. This
'formula', he continues in a footnote, does not express 'a new basic principle of
morality [... ] as if [... ] the world had been ignorant of what duty is, or in
thoroughgoing error about it', but might be better considered as corresponding to
the analytical formulas of a 'mathematician"." Thus, in the body of the Critique
Kant makes little reference to a good will, but begins by expressing the two
distinctive features of moral goodness, (i) and (ii), which the first and second
sections of the Groundwork identify." Here and in his following works, he
proceeds to express moral goodness in ways which correspond with the formulas
presented in the Groundwork.80
76 G 409. See also G 410, and, for a helpful account of 'popular' philosophy, see Beiser, The Fate
o{Reason, pp.76 and 165-9.
7 Besides G 404-12, see G 388-90, 419-20, and 424-6, and also KrV Axvii-xviii, Bxxviii, and
Bxxxi-v, P 375-6, R 62-3, and MS 206, 216, and 447.
78 KpV8, 8n.
79 See KpV 19-21, and also KpV36-7, and 45-6. Kant refers to a good will only at KpV62 and 79.
80 Beyond those in the first and second sections of G, I would suggest that Kant's expressions of
moral goodness can be divided into: echoes of the formula of universal law, or the version of it
which draws the analogy with 'laws of nature'; re-expressions of that formula in terms of a
distinction between a reason's 'form' and its 'matter'; echoes of the formula of autonomy; and
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Despite this substantial, and underappreciated, continuity of method,
however, three other argumentative methods that Kant employs should also be
noted. Firstly, in the third section of the Groundwork Kant effectively provides an
independent vindication of the analysis provided in the first and second sections.
As I will show in the seventh chapter, however, his argument is profoundly
unconvincing, and he rescinds it in the Critique of Practical Reason. Secondly,
Kant does not undertake to account for more particular moral propositions by
analysing more particular conceptions of 'common moral rational cognition'.
Rather, as I will show in the following chapter, he attempts to derive such
propositions systematically from one or both of the two distinctive features of
moral goodness, combined with more particular conditions. Finally, Kant provides
independent arguments for claims that he considers to be independent of his
analysis of moral goodness. Most notably, as I will show in the seventh chapter, he
provides three independent arguments for the claim that human choice must be
considered as undetermined by antecedent causes. One of these arguments is that
of the third section of the Groundwork, which thus exhibits a singular combination
of the first and the third of these three argumentative methods, and which is
replaced in the Critique by an equally unconvincing argument intended to depend
on Kant's analysis of moral goodness.
echoes of the formula of the end in itself. However, in many passages he employs, or even
combines, two or more of the first three of these kinds.
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Conclusions
The first and second sections of the Groundwork are, then, intended to
provide an analysis of the two claims regarding the goodness of a good will which
Kant attributes to 'common moral rational cognition' in the opening paragraphs of
the first section. In particular, this analysis issues in a number of formulas, each of
which is intended to express the two distinctive features of moral goodness (i) and
(ii) which Kant draws from these two claims, and to emphasise different aspects of
one or both of them. Thus understood, the argument is not vulnerable to many
objections which are persistently levelled at it, and at the argument of the first
section in particular. By analysing a basic conception of goodness to which
'common moral rational cognition' is supposed to be committed, the argument
also displays an underappreciated method.
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6.
Moral reasons
This chapter is occupied with the interpretation of Kant's formulas and
their place in his conception of moral judgement, and with the evaluation of
Nietzsche's relevant criticisms. The first section considers the formula of universal
law, and argues that, rather than an algorithmic 'test' of reasons for action in
specific circumstances, this formula is intended to emphasise feature (ii) of moral
goodness, and to be employed in Kant's proposed derivation of a system duties of
varying generality from features (i) and (ii), In this light, Nietzsche's criticisms of
this formula are shown to be misplaced. The second section turns to Kant's further
formulas, and argues that their intended meanings as expressions of (i) and (ii) are
not captured by prevailing interpretations, and that they are, again, intended to be
employed in Kant's proposed derivation of a system of duties. With respect to the
formula of autonomy in particular, I also briefly argue that, although Nietzsche
sympathisers often insist that Kant betrays the individual 'autonomy' which
Nietzsche affirms, in fact such 'autonomy' does not, and need not, concern Kant.
The final section considers Kant's conception of moral judgement in the light of
Nietzsche's broader criticisms of the common sense conception of agency,
criticisms which he also directs at Kant. It argues that these criticisms are
somewhat more telling than Nietzsche's other criticisms, but that, nonetheless,
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Kant could accommodate this success without surrendering his conception of
moral judgement and the place of his formulas in it.
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The formula of universal law
Until quite recently, the interpretation, and thus the criticism and defence,
of Kant's account of moral judgement focussed on his formula of universal law,
and supposed that he intends this formula to provide an algorithmic 'test' of
reasons for action in specific circumstances, according to the consequences of a
reason's universal adoption. Even now, when consideration generally admits other
interpretations of the formula and extends to his other formulas, Kant is often
supposed to treat moral judgement as the 'testing' of reasons for action in specific
circumstances, through the bringing of such reasons under his formulas. Although
Nietzsche displays no interest in the mechanics of such 'testing', he exemplifies
the traditional focus on the formula of universal law, and, at least in 'Long live
physics!', also the supposition that this formula is to be applied directly to reasons
for action in specific circumstances, 'testing' them for moral goodness.
In this section, I will first explain the difficulties which, as critics have
endlessly noted, arise from treating the formula of universal law as a 'test'
regarding the consequences of a reason's universal adoption. I will then, in the
second subsection, argue that Kant's claims regarding the formula in the
Groundwork provide little support for this traditional approach, and better accord
with the account of the formula's derivation which I provided in the preceding
chapter. In the third subsection, I will argue for a corresponding conclusion
regarding Kant's employment of the formula in his derivation of a general duty of
beneficence in The Metaphysics of Morals, a derivation which reveals the
formula's place in his considered understanding of moral judgement. Finally, in
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the last subsection I will argue that the preceding claims show Nietzsche's
criticisms of the formula of universal law to be misplaced.
I. The 'emptiness' of the traditional approach
Regarding Kant's formulas, critical attention has traditionally focussed on
the passage of the second section of the Groundwork in which he discusses four
examples in the light of the formula of universal law - or, more specifically, in the
light of a version of this formula which draws an analogy between 'a universal
law' and 'a universal law of nature'. I There he introduces a provisional
distinction between 'perfect' and 'imperfect' duties, or 'strict or narrow
(unremitting)' and 'wide (meritorious)' duties, according to which a duty of the
former kind, unlike one of the latter kind, 'permits no exception for the advantage
of inclination'. He employs this distinction and the distinction between duties to
oneself and to others in dividing his examples, and, crucially, claims that 'perfect'
and 'imperfect' duties are considered differently in the light of the formula of
universal law: he writes that a 'maxim' which contravenes a 'perfect' duty 'cannot
even be thought without contradiction' as a universal law, and therefore cannot be
'willed' as such a law, but that a 'maxim' which contravenes an 'imperfect' duty
can be so thought, but is 'still impossible to will' as a universal law. He makes
similar remarks in his discussion of each example, claiming that particular maxims
of suicide and false promising 'contradict' themselves, or could not 'exist as
1 Kant states that the formula of universal law can be expressed as 'act as if the maxim of your
action were to become through your will a universal law of nature', because, he claims, 'the
existence of things insofar as it is determined according to universal laws [... J constitutes what is
properly called nature in the most general sense' (G 421).
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nature', if considered as universal laws, and that particular maxims of not
cultivating one's natural predispositions and not assisting others in great need
could 'exist' as such laws, but are 'impossible to will', given what 'a rational
being [... ] necessarily wills'.2 These remarks have traditionally been taken to
indicate that Kant intends the formula to provide two different 'tests' for reasons
for action, one for 'perfect' duties and one for 'imperfect' duties, and these two
'tests' have become known as the 'contradiction in conception' and 'contradiction
in the will' tests, respectively. Both 'tests' have traditionally been supposed to
concern the consequences of the universal adoption of a 'maxim' in specific
circumstances, a 'maxim' being commonly understood as a proposition stating
both the intended action and the reason for doing it.
Regarding the supposed 'contradiction in conception' test for 'perfect'
duties, there are three major interpretations. One is found primarily in some of the
less recent literature, and identifies a maxim which contravenes the test either as
one which is inconsistent with, or fails to fulfil, a relevant natural purpose, or as
one which, if it were universally adopted, would undermine a system of purposes.'
However, this interpretation has been unpopular for some time, since it relies on
2 G 421, 421n, 424, 422, 423.
3 Paton endorses this interpretation in the latter version, and Aune attributes the latter version to
Kant's application of the 'formula of the law of nature'. Harrison and Kemp attribute the former
version to Kant's treatment of the maxim of suicide, and Sullivan attributes the former version to
Kant's treatment of the maxim of false promising, while also claiming that the two other major
interpretations are 'equally correct'. Beck suggests both of the two other major kinds of
interpretation as negative tests of the permissibility of maxims, but also endorses both versions of
the teleological interpretation as providing a stronger, positive test. See Paton, 'Analysis of the
Argument', p.30, and The Categorical Imperative, pp.149-S7 and 162-3, Harrison, 'Kant's
Examples of the First Formulation of the Categorical Imperative' , pp.233-4 and 240-1, Kemp,
'Kant's Examples of the Categorical Imperative', pp.249-S0, Beck, A Commentary on Kant's
Critique of Practical Reason, pp.lS9-61, Aune, Kant's Theory of Morals, pp.S9-60, and Sullivan,
Immanuel Kant's Moral Theory, pp.169-70.
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the additional and questionable presupposition of the necessity of relevant natural
purposes and/or a system of purposes."
The two other major interpretations of this test have been more persistently
popular. The first identifies a contravening maxim as one which could not exist if
it were also universally adopted, while the second kind identifies a contravening
maxim as one whose purpose could not be achieved if it were also universally
adopted.' The first seems best suited to maxims whose universal adoption would
undermine a practice which they depend on, such as Kant's example of the maxim
of false promising. However, this interpretation is unable to explain any
'contradiction' concerning a maxim which is not dependent on a practice, such as
a maxim of humiliation or injury. It also excludes maxims whose concern with
modifying or undermining certain practices might seem morally permissible or
laudable, such as a maxim of buying, but not selling, certain things, or Hegel's
example of a maxim of helping the poor."
4 For such criticism, see Harrison, 'Kant's Examples of the First Formulation of the Categorical
Imperative', p.241, O'Neill, Acting on Principle, pp.64-5, Korsgaard, 'Kant's Formula of Universal
Law', pp.87-92, Herman 'Moral Deliberation and the Derivation of Duties', n.5 to p.136, Wood,
Kant's Ethical Thought, n.16 to p.91, and Steinberger, 'The Standard View of the Categorical
Imperative', pp.92-3. Korsgaard argues that this interpretation also presents difficulties for
distinguishing the 'contradiction in conception' test from the 'contradiction in the will' test, since,
on this interpretation, the former seems to ultimately refer to the latter. See Korsgaard, 'Kant's
Formula of Universal Law', p.96.
S For examples of the first of these two kinds of interpretation, see Kemp, 'Kant's Examples of the
Categorical Imperative', pp.2S1-3, Henrich, 'Das Problem der Grundlegung der Ethik bei Kant und
im spekulativen Idealismus', p.(99), Wood, 'Kant on False Promises', pp.615-9, and Hegel's
Ethical Thought, pp.lS6-8, Herman, 'Mutual Aid and Respect for Persons', p.47, and 'Murder and
Mayhem', pp.117-8 and n.5, Timmons, 'Contradictions and the Categorical Imperative', pp.30S-
11, O'Neill, 'Consistency in Action', pp.96-7, and 'Universal Laws and Ends-In-Themselves',
p.132, and Doore, 'Contradiction in the Will', p.l41. For examples of the second kind of
interpretation, see Harrison, 'Kant's Examples of the First Formulation of the Categorical
Imperative', pp.234-6 and 241-2, Singer, Generalization in Ethics, pp.2S1-60 and 275-9, O'Neill,
Acting on Principle, pp.69-71, 72-3, and 78-81, Korsgaard, 'Kant's Formula of Universal Law',
pp.78 and 92-4, 'Kant's Formula of Humanity', pp.126-7, 'The Right to Lie', pp.13S-6, and
'Kant's Analysis of Obligation', pp.63-4, Pogge, 'Kant's Theory of Justice', p.409 and n.S, and
'The Categorical Imperative', pp.I92-3 and 199-200, and Allison, 'On a Presumed Gap in the
Derivation of the Categorical Imperative', pp.149 and 153.
6 On these points, see the discussions in O'Neill, Acting on Principle, pp.67-8, Korsgaard, 'Kant's
Formula of Universal Law', pp.81-5, and Steinberger, 'The Standard View of the Categorical
Imperative' , pp.96-7. See also n.9 below.
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The second popular interpretation of the 'contradiction in conception' test,
according to which a contravening maxim is one whose purpose could not be
achieved if it were also universally adopted, also succeeds in accounting for
'contradictions' between maxims which depend on a practice and their universal
adoption, if such universal adoption would undermine the relevant practice. Unlike
the first popular interpretation, however, the second is also suited to explaining
some cases of 'contradiction' concerning maxims which do not depend on a
practice, such as maxims of humiliation or injury' The explanatory capacity of the
test can also be extended on both interpretations if the possibility of 'contradiction'
is understood to involve not only the agent concerned, but also any other agent,
such that a 'contradiction' arises if a maxim's universal adoption would entail
either that the maxim could not exist for any agent or that the maxim's purpose
could not be achieved by any agent." Nonetheless, the explanatory capacity of the
second interpretation is still limited to those maxims whose purpose would be
undermined by the universal adoption of the maxim, and can explain no
'contradiction' regarding maxims whose purpose would not be so undermined,
such as maxims of humiliation or injury for the purpose of revenge."
7 See Korsgaard, 'Kant's Formula of Universal Law', p.97 and pp.97-100.
8 McNair introduces this extension to both interpretations in his 'Universal Necessity and
Contradictions in Conception', pp.32-6.
9 On this limitation, see Korsgaard, 'Kant's Formula of Universal Law', pp.82-5 and 97-101, and
Herman, 'Murder and Mayhem' , pp.118-9. In his 'Universal Necessity and Contradictions in
Conception', pp.36-40, McNair argues that the first popular interpretation serves to remove the
limitation of the second which Korsgaard identifies, that regarding maxims of killing whose
purpose is not undermined by universal adoption - such as a purpose of revenge or of mercy, as in
Kant's example of the maxim of suicide - and that it removes this limitation while still allowing for
maxims of killing whose purpose is self-defence. The first popular interpretation removes this
limitation simply because killing makes any action by the victim impossible. Furthermore, in her
'Universal Laws and Ends-In-Themselves', pp.132-3, O'Neill argues that any maxim of violent
victimisation serves to 'undercut the agency' of the victims, at least temporarily, and so is excluded
by the first popular interpretation of the formula of universal law. However, neither McNair nor
O'Neill consider cases of maxims which do not depend on practices and which also do not have the
peculiar feature of maxims of violent victimisation, that they 'undercut the agency' of victims.
Indeed, even maxims of non-violent victimisation need not 'undercut the agency' of victims in the
manner of maxims of violent victimisation.
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The explanatory capacity of both interpretations of the supposed
'contradiction in conception' test is also limited by the specificity of the maxim
concerned. Specific purposes or specific time and object conditions, for example,
can ensure that a maxim is not excluded when, without such conditions or with
less specific ones, it would be excluded.!" To respond by proposing that every
maxim 'applicable' to a particular action, or only the 'underlying' maxim, be
tested not only raises the further difficulty of identifying an 'applicable' or
'underlying' maxim, but also fails to solve the original one, for the exclusion of an
'applicable' or 'underlying' maxim will equally vary according to its specificity.i!
Furthermore, if the maxim specifies the condition that an action be performed only
if it is expected to have no adverse consequences for the future existence of actions
or maxims of the same kind or for the purpose of such maxims - as in the case of
secret misdemeanours, for example - then no restriction is imposed on the maxim,
irrespective of its other specifications.f In a similar vein, according to either
interpretation of the supposed test, it excludes intuitively acceptable maxims
concerning the benefits of exploiting certain common kinds of behaviour by
behaving exceptionally. Such maxims include, for example, maxims of buying, but
10 See Hill, 'The Kingdom of Ends', pp.62-3, Herman, 'Murder and Mayhem', p.116, and 'Moral
Deliberation and the Derivation of Duties' , pp.141-3 and 152, and Wood, Hegel's Ethical Thought,
pp,-160-1, and Kant's Ethical Thought, pp.l02-4.
These two responses have been proposed, successively, by O'Neill. For the first, see her Acting
on Principle, pp.41-2 and 71-2, and for the second, see her 'Consistency in Action', pp.84 and 97,
'Between Consenting Adults', n.2 to p.112, and 'Universal Laws and Ends in Themselves', p.129.
For criticism along the lines mentioned, see Herman, 'Moral Deliberation and the Derivation of
Duties', pp.142-3, and 'Leaving Deontology Behind', pp. 219-20, and Wood, Kant's Ethical
Thought, pp.104-5.
12 See Steinberger, 'The Standard View of the Categorical Imperative', pp.97-8, and. for related
remarks, Wood. Kant's Ethical Thought. pp.103-4.
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not selling, certain things and maxims of performing an action - playing tennis,
say - only at times of day when fewer other people do SO.13
Finally, the supposed 'contradiction in conception' test on either
interpretation is a test of the permissibility, and not the requiredness, of maxims. It
is commonly supposed that the test explains requiredness at one remove, by
identifying impermissible maxims, the contradictory of which is therefore
required. However, in many cases it might also be permissible not to adopt any
relevant maxim at all. In these cases, then, the test cannot explain any positive
duty.i"
Regarding the supposed 'contradiction in the will' test for 'imperfect'
duties, interpretations tend to echo the interpretation of the 'contradiction in
conception' test which concerns the achievement of a maxim's purpose. The
interpretation concerned with natural purposes is, for general reasons already
mentioned, now unpopular, and Kant's claim that maxims which contravene
'imperfect' duties can still be 'thought' as universal laws suggests that he does not
consider these maxims to 'contradict' the existence of practices on which they
depend, as the other major interpretation of the 'contradiction in conception' test
maintains. IS However, the supposed 'contradiction in the will' test also cannot be
straightforwardly interpreted in terms of the achievement of the tested maxim's
purpose. For Kant claims of maxims which contravene 'imperfect' duties that
'contradictions' arise in the light of what 'a rational being [... ] necessarily wills'.
13 For this criticism, see O'Neill, Acting on Principle, pp. 76-7, Wood, Hegel's Ethical Thought,
p.157, and Kant's Ethical Thought, pp.105-6 and 108, and Herman, 'Moral Deliberation and the
Derivation of Duties' , pp.138-40.
14 This is noted in Korsgaard, 'The Right to Lie', p.152, and, in particular, Wood, Kant's Ethical
Thought, pp.lOO-l and 164. See also Paton, The Categorical Imperative, pp.141-2.
I~ For examples of the interpretation of the 'contradiction in the will' test, see Harrison, in, 'Kant's
Examples of the First Formulation of the Categorical Imperative' , p.241, Singer, Generalization in
Ethics, pp.260-71 and 275-9, and Korsgaard, 'Kant's Formula of Universal Law', pp.95-7.
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He claims, for example, that a maxim of not cultivating one's natural
predispositions is 'impossible to will' on the grounds that 'a rational being [... ]
necessarily wills that all of the abilities in him be developed, because they are
useful and given to him for all sorts of possible intentions' .16 As is commonly
noted, this suggests that a maxim which contravenes an 'imperfect' duty is to be
identified as a maxim whose universal adoption threatens the achievement of
another, 'necessarily willed' maxim's purpose, rather than the former maxim's
own purpose. However, this raises a profound difficulty for the traditional
approach to the formula of universal law, since this formula does not identify
which maxims are 'necessarily willed' .17 Furthermore, like the supposed
'contradiction in conception' test, the supposed 'contradiction in the will' test
concerns only the permissibility, and not the requiredness, of maxims, and
therefore cannot explain positive duties in cases in which it is permissible not to
adopt any relevant maxim at all.IS
The traditional approach to the formula of universal law, according to
which reasons for action in specific circumstances are to be 'tested' by considering
the consequences of their universal adoption, is therefore decidedly vulnerable to
the charges of 'emptiness' to which it has been persistently subjected. The charge
in its strong form, that the formula excludes no maxims at all, is famously made by
Hegel, and also made by Schopenhauer and Mill.I9 Regarding the supposed
16 G 423.
17 On this difficulty. see Pogge, 'The Categorical Imperative', p.196.
18 For this criticism, see Wood, Kant's Ethical Thought, pp.lOO-2, and for an account vulnerable to
it, see Doore, 'Contradiction in the Will', pp.147-50.
19 See, in particular, Hegel. Uber die Wissenschaftlichen Behandlungsarten des Naturrechts ...•
pp.435-8 and 441, Phiinomenologie des Geistes, paras.429-31 and 437. Grundlinien der
Philosophie des Reclus, para.135 and Zusatr, Enzyklopddie der philosophischen Wissenschaften.
pt.I, para.54 Zusatz, and Vorlesungen uber die Geschichte der Philosophie, (v.S, pp.460-1).
Schopenhauer, Uber das Fundament der Moral. pt.Il, §7. and Mill. Utilitarianism. pp.134 and 188.
Before Hegel, the strong form of the allegation was expressed by Tittel. in his Uber Herr Kants
Moralreform. pp.14-5 and 32-6. and Fichte, in his Das System der Sittenlehre nach den Principien
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'contradiction in conception' test, the charge can be upheld in a weaker form,
insofar as this test does not exclude certain maxims which, intuitively, should be
excluded (so-called 'false positives'j.j" Regarding the supposed 'contradiction in
the will' test, the charge can be upheld in the stronger form, since the supposed test
excludes no maxims at all, and can exclude maxims only by presupposing certain
other, contingently-related maxims. The traditional approach to the formula
therefore makes it 'empty' in the sense that it cannot provide for an adequate
derivation of duties. This approach is also vulnerable to the further charge, which
Hegel also articulates, that the formula excludes certain maxims which, intuitively,
should not be excluded (so-called 'false negatives'), and is thus too restrictive."
II. Kant's claims regarding the formula of universal law in the Groundwork
There is, therefore, good reason to hope that the traditional approach
misinterprets Kant's formula of universal law. In this subsection, I will argue that
in fact the traditional approach derives little support from Kant's claims regarding
the formula in the Groundwork, and that these claims better accord with the
account of the formula's derivation which I provided in the preceding chapter.
Firstly, despite the traditional focus on Kant's presentation and discussion
of his four examples, these passages in fact provide little support for the traditional
approach. Kant first discusses the maxim of false promising in the first section,
der Wissenschaftslehre, p.234 (246). More recently, it has been expressed by, for instance,
MacIntyre, in After Virtue, pp.45-6.
20 For an example of this weaker form of the allegation, see Henrich, 'Das Problem der
Grundlegung der Ethik bei Kant und im spekulativen Idealismus', pp.(lOl-2).
21 See Hegel, Uber die Wissenschaftlichen Behandiungsarten des Naturrechts ... , pp.438-9, and
Yorlesungen uber die Geschichte der Philosophie (v.3, p.460).
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and he writes there that the purpose of his discussion is merely to show that
'common human reason also agrees with [... the formula of universal law] in its
practical judgements and always has this principle before its eyes'. 22 Kant does not
assert this 'agreement' because he holds that common human reason employs, or
should employ, the formula as a 'test' in the manner which is traditionally
supposed. Instead, he writes the following, in the name of common human reason:
'I do not yet have insight into what this respect [for the formula of universal law]
is grounded upon (which the philosopher may investigate), but I at least
understand this much: that it is an estimation of a worth which far outweighs all
worth of what is recommended through inclination, and that the necessity of my
action from pure respect for the practical law is what constitutes duty, to which
every other motive must give way, because it is the condition of a will good in
itself, whose worth surpasses all else' .23 Kant's discussion in the first section,
therefore, is far from suggesting that he intends the formula as a 'test' of reasons
for action in specific circumstances, and, indeed, also far from suggesting that he
intends the formula's primary significance to lie in its referring to the
consequences of a maxim's universal adoption. Rather, it suggests precisely what
his derivation of the formula, as I have presented it, would lead one to expect. That
is, it refers to the formula as an expression of the commitments of COmmon human
reason in its conception of the goodness of a good will, and it indicates that the
formula is intended to emphasise only one of these commitments, namely, that
moral goodness is good for a will as such, 'a worth which surpasses all else'.24
22 G402.
23 G 403.
24 This is also suggested by Kant's discussion of a maxim of safely increasing one's wealth at KpV
27-8. There Kant refers to an expression of moral goodness similar to the formula of universal law,
and writes that 'the most common understanding' acknowledges that, considered alone, acting
according to this maxim is not morally good because 'I cannot cite my inclination [... J as the
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Kant also emphasises the inadequacy of the formula of universal law as he
makes the transition from the first section to the second. As I mentioned in
examining his derivations, he concludes the first section by claiming that 'we have
reached, in the moral cognition of common human reason, its supreme principle',
but that 'common human reason is driven [... ] to go out of its sphere and to take a
step into the field of practical philosophy, in order to obtain on account of it
information and clear instruction regarding the source of its principle and correct
determination of it'. Similarly, Kant begins the second section by noting that 'we
have drawn our concept of duty thus far from the common use of our practical
reason', but, a few pages later, he writes that, without the developments of the
second section, it would be possible 'to determine precisely for speculative'
judgement the moral [element] of duty in everything that conforms with duty', but
'impossible to ground morals on their genuine principles even in merely common
and practical use' .25 Again, then, his remarks hardly suggest that he believes the
formula of universal law to provide a 'test' sufficient to determine the moral
goodness of reasons in specific circumstances, and instead suggest precisely what
his derivation of the formula, as I have presented it, would lead one to expect.
Kant's discussion of the formula and his examples in the second section
admittedly does begin by referring to the possibility that 'all imperatives of duty
can be derived [abgeleitet] from this one imperative [that is, the formula of
universal law] as from their principle'. But he immediately makes clear that he
means by this only that, with this formula, it is possible 'we can at least indicate
what we think through [... the concept of duty] and what this concept wants to
determining ground proper to a universal practical law' . This exclusion of inclination by 'common'
moral judgement is also Kant's concern when he refers to examples at KpV 19, 35-6. 43-4. and 69-
70. and in the latter two of these passages he expresses moral goodness in ways similar to the
formula of universal law.
25 G 406. 412.
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say' _26 With this, I suggest, Kant is simply referring to his argumentative strategy
in the second section, which employs the formula of universal law to connect his
account of the will with his analysis of a good will, by means of the concept of
'duty', in the first section. Kant refers to this strategy again after discussing his
examples, when, in a sentence already quoted above, he writes, 'We have therefore
demonstrated at least that, if duty is a concept which should contain meaning and
real lawgiving for our actions, it can be expressed only in categorical imperatives,
not at all in hypothetical [ones]'.27
Two other remarks in Kant's discussion of the formula of universal law
might be thought to support the traditional approach. One refers to the four
examples: 'These are some of the many actual duties, or at least what we hold to
be such, whose derivation [Ableitung] from the one principle cited above [namely,
the formula of universal law] is clear'. The other remark concludes Kant's
discussion of the formula in the second section: he states that, with this discussion,
'we have [... ] presented clearly and determined for every use the content of the
categorical imperative, which must contain the principle of all duty' .28 However,
in the four editions of the Groundwork, the former remark reads 'Abteilung',
'classification', instead of 'Ableitung', 'derivation', the latter being substituted by
the editors of the Akademie edition (and followed, until very recently, by English
translators). The latter remark is also quite consistent with a concern for 'using'
the formula of universal law simply to 'classify', rather than 'derive', duties.
Furthermore, reading these remarks in this manner corresponds with Kant's other
remarks regarding his discussion of the examples. He claims that with the
26 G 421.
27 G 425. For Kant's other references to this strategy, see the discussion in the second section of
ch.5 above.
28 G 423-4, 425.
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examples he 'will count some duties according to the usual division of them', and
that he 'reserve[s] the division of duties entirely for a future Metaphysics of
Morals, [and] therefore this [division] stands here only at my discretion (in order
to arrange my examples)'. After discussing the examples and explaining how
'perfect' and 'imperfect' duties are treated differently, he also claims simply that
'thus all duties, regarding the kind of obligation (not the object of their actions)
have been through these examples set out completely in their dependence on the
single principle' _29 At most, then, these remarks suggest that Kant intends the
formula to provide for a provisional classification of given duties as 'perfect' or
'imperfect', according to the different kinds of consequences of the universal
adoption of contravening maxims.
Finally, Kant is often supposed to endorse the traditional approach to the
formula of universal law when, after deriving his further formulas, he writes, 'one
does better if one always proceeds in moral judgement by the strict method and
places at its ground the universal formula of the categorical imperative: Act
according to the maxim which can at the same time make itself a universal law' .30
This 'universal formula' is commonly identified with the formula of universal
law.3! But the reference to a maxim's 'making itself a universal law' differs from
that formula's reference to maxims which 'could also be willed as a universal
law', and the 'universal formula' might equally be identified with the formula of
29 G 421, 421n, 424. At G 432n, Kant also refers to his four examples as intended merely for the
'elucidation [Erliiuterung]' of his formulas, and when he returns to the first example at G 429, he
writes that he 'must here pass over a closer determination that would avoid any misunderstanding
[... ]; that belongs to morality proper'. Regarding the 'division' of duties, in the preface to KpVhe
again emphasises that 'the division of all practical sciences to completion was not enclosed' in G
(KpV8).
30 G 436-7.
31 See, for example, Paton, The Categorical Imperative, p.130, O'Neill, 'Universal Laws and Ends
in Themselves', p.127, Hill, 'A Kantian Perspective on Moral Rules', p.36, and 'Hypothetical
Consent in Kantian Constructivism', pp.74 and 76, Guyer, 'The Possibility of the Categorical
Imperative', p.17S, and Melnick, 'Kant's Formulations of the Categorical Imperative', pp.304 and
307.
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autonomy, which Kant proceeds to express as 'the fitness of maxims [... ] to make
themselves into universal law,.32 The formula of autonomy would also be a
preferable candidate on my account of Kant's derivations, since, on this account,
the formula of autonomy is intended to emphasise both distinctive features of
moral goodness, while the formulas of universal law and the end in itself are not.
Furthermore, even if the 'universal formula' is identified with the formula of
universal law, Kant merely claims that it is 'better' to place this formula at the
'ground' of moral judgement, and not that it provides an adequate 'test' of any
reason in specific circumstances.
The context of Kant's claim regarding the 'universal formula' also agrees
better with my account of his derivations than with the traditional approach. This
context is his systematic presentation of the formulas of universal law, the end in
itself, and the realm of ends. As already noted, he states there that these formulas
are fundamentally equivalent, but that 'there is still a difference in them, which is
indeed subjectively rather than objectively practical, in order namely to bring an
idea nearer to intuition (according to a certain analogy) and thereby to feeling'. He
proceeds to refer to this 'subjectively practical' difference as a way of providing
'access to the moral law', which he distinguishes from the practice of 'moral
judgement', for which he recommends the 'universal formula' as a 'ground'. To
provide 'access', he writes, 'it is very useful to lead one and the same action
through the three named concepts', namely, the formulas of universal law, the end
32 G 444. In the third section, Kant proceeds to employ the terms of the formula of autonomy to
express moral goodness, and at G 447 he calls this formula 'the formula of the categorical
imperative', although not the 'universal' such formula. See also G 449 and 458. That the 'universal
formula' is not the formula of universal law is also suggested by a paragraph at G 434 in which
Kant expresses moral goodness in a manner similar to the 'universal law' - as requiring 'that the
will through its maxim could regard itself as at the same time giving universal law' - in the
context of references to the formulas of autonomy and the realm of ends, rather than the formula of
universal law. See also Wood's comments in support of identifying 'the universal formula' with the
formula of autonomy, in his Kant's Ethical Thought, pp.187-9.
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in itself, and the realm of ends?3 Once again, then, Kant's remarks indicate that, in
spite the traditional approach, he does not intend the formula of universal law to
provide a comprehensive expression of the nature of moral goodness, and, indeed,
that in attempting to express this goodness, or provide 'access' to it, with a series
of formulas in the Groundwork, he is not also concerned to propose how 'moral
judgement' ought to proceed.
III. An example of Kant's considered position: Beneficence in The Metaphysics of
Morals
I mentioned at the end of the preceding chapter that the diverse expressions
of moral goodness provided in the Groundwork are echoed throughout Kant's later
texts. These texts also offer no suggestion that the formula of universal law is
intended to be the basic such expression, let alone a sufficient guide for making
moral judgements in specific circumstances. Furthermore, if in the Groundwork
Kant suggests that the formula might provide for a provisional classification of
given duties as 'perfect' or 'imperfect', he makes no mention of this again,
including in The Metaphysics of Morals, with which, indeed, he also revises his
distinction between 'perfect' and 'imperfect' duties. His discussion in the
Groundwork can therefore hardly be treated as offering his considered view even
of the classification of duties.
Instead, Kant's considered position regarding the place of the formula of
universal law in moral judgement is best determined by turning to The
33 G 437,436. Kant makes similar remarks at G 462-3.
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Metaphysics of Morals, as his late and most extensive derivation and classification
of duties. A general duty of beneficence is the only duty that he there
unambiguously derives from an expression of moral goodness corresponding to
the formula of universal law. He classifies this duty as an 'ethical' one, since it
concerns an agent's reasons for action, and as an ethical duty of 'virtue' in
particular, since it is a duty to have an end." In this case, the duty is also a duty of
'love', since the end required is a morally permitted, inclination-based end of
another agent which is necessary to her 'happiness', a coherent whole of such
ends, and which the benefactor agrees to be SO.35 Kant distinguishes this duty of
beneficence from other duties of 'love', however, by specifying it as a duty to
assist others in need, if one has the appropriate means."
Kant's derivation of this general duty of beneficence is concisely stated in
a single, short paragraph. At first glance, furthermore, it appears to argue precisely
as the traditional approach would expect - that is, from the consequences of a
maxim's universal adoption - and, indeed, by elimination of the opposite maxim
and on the further grounds of self-interest. For Kant writes that if an agent adopts
the opposite maxim and 'makes this a universal permissive law: then everyone
would likewise deny him assistance when he himself is in need[,] or at least be
authorised to deny it'. From this Kant concludes that 'the self-interested maxim
would conflict with itself if it were made a universal law' , and that 'consequently'
the general duty of beneficence holds" Apparently, then, Kant derives the general
duty of beneficence by arguing that the consequences of universal beneficence are
preferable, on the grounds of each agent's self-interest, to those of universal
34 On the nature of an 'ethical' duty and an ethical duty of 'virtue', see MS 214,218-21. 375-6,
379-83,384-5, 388-9, 394-6,406-7, and 410.
3S See MS 387-8, 393,401-2. and 448-50, and also E 337-9.
36 See MS 450-3.
37 MS453.
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indifference. Such a derivation would, of course, raise most of the profound
difficulties that I mentioned in the first subsection of this chapter. It would also
raise controversial questions about the rational self-interest of a policy of
beneficence, questions that would threaten the duty's intended universal scope at
the very least.
However, in the last part of the paragraph's last sentence Kant strongly
suggests that his derivation ought to be read differently. Firstly, he refers to the
general duty of beneficence not as another maxim of 'self-interest', now
enlightened as to the consequences of universal indifference, but rather as 'the
common interest of beneficence towards the needy'. Secondly, he then writes that
the general duty of beneficence holds 'because [... all human beings] are to be
considered fellow human beings, i.e. needy rational beings, united by nature in one
dwelling place for reciprocal help' .38 Rather than the claim that universal
beneficence is in every human agent's self-interest, then, Kant's premise is simply
a purported fact that every human agent has ends which can be satisfied only with
the assistance of other human agents.
By referring to 'common interest' and 'rational beings' in particular, these
remarks suggest that Kant's derivation of this duty turns on what is good for a will
as such, rather than on an agent's contingent self-interest. They thus suggest what
his derivation of the formula of universal law in the Groundwork would confirm,
namely, that the formula is intended to emphasise the distinguishing feature of
moral goodness (ii). Furthermore, that Kant's premise concerns specifically
'human' rational beings, characterised by their 'needy' nature and their vicinity,
indicates that his derivation asks what is good for a specifically human will as
38 MS453.
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such, and thus admits the pertinence of conditions characteristic of a human will as
such. Thus his objection to the maxim of indifference is not that it could be
adopted only on the grounds of an insufficiently enlightened self-interest, but that
it could be adopted only on grounds that are contingent for a human will as such.
Only because these grounds are 'self-interested' in the latter sense, therefore, is the
maxim supposed to 'conflict with itself' as a universal law. Equally, the maxim of
beneficence suffers the same failing insofar as it is adopted on such grounds -
grounds which include, notably, enlightened self-interest. However, Kant's
premise about the 'needy' nature and vicinity of human wills explains how the
maxim of beneficence could instead be adopted on grounds which are good for a
human will as such. It thus explains how the maxim is a duty.39
This derivation not only avoids the difficulties that the traditional approach
raises. It also exhibits an important feature of Kant's conception of moral
judgement in general. That is, it indicates that he conceives of moral judgement as
judgement according to a system of duties, rather than by direct application of his
formulas to specific circumstances. Each duty in this system is to be derived from
the two distinctive features of moral goodness (i) and (ii) by admitting certain
contingent conditions of wills, and presumably each derivation, and thus each
duty, is also to be constrained by those which admit conditions of higher
generality. In this regard, it is significant that Kant restricts his derivations in The
Metaphysics of Morals to those which admit conditions that are common to all
human wills, and thus of the highest human generality. As he writes in the
introduction, to provide 'a metaphysics of morals', 'we must often take the
particular nature of human beings, which can be cognised only by experience, as
39 Also compare Kant's derivation of duties of 'love' in general at Kp V 34-5, and MS 393 and 451.
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our object, in order to show universal moral principles' conclusions for it'. After
having thus completed this 'metaphysics of morals', he adds that further duties
would be derived by admitting further 'difference of subjects', such as 'difference
of rank, age, sex, state of health, prosperity or poverty and so on' .40 Unlike his
examples in the Groundwork and elsewhere, therefore, the duties derived in The
Metaphysics of Morals are of the highest human generality, and are not intended to
constitute a complete system of duties, or to sufficiently justify any moral
judgement in specific circumstances.
IV. Nietzsche's criticisms of the formula of universal law
Nietzsche exemplifies the traditional focus on the formula of universal law
and, at least in 'Long live physics!', its direct application of the formula to reasons
for action in specific circumstances. However, unlike the traditional critics,
Nietzsche does not concern himself with the formula's success in distinguishing
intuitively moral maxims from immoral ones, according to the consequences of a
maxim's universal adoption. Indeed, Nietzsche does not even refer to the
mechanics of such 'testing' of maxims. Rather, in 'Long live physics!' he objects
that it is 'selfish' to hold, of reasons for action in specific circumstances, that every
agent should do or refrain from a type of action in a type of circumstance. He thus
echoes another of Schopenhauer's criticisms, which alleges that, under the formula
of universal law, an agent is to judge maxims by the consequences of their
40 MS 218, 468. See also MS 217 and 469.
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universal adoption for her selfish concerns." In his discussion in The Antichrist,
on the other hand, Nietzsche alleges that to make a judgement on 'universal'
grounds, or to obey such a judgement, is, particularly in its exclusion of 'pleasure',
self-destructive, characteristic of 'ascetic ideals', and fails to satisfy his particular
evaluative concern for 'humanity'.
However, although these criticisms of the formula of universal law are
somewhat different from the traditional ones, it is difficult to make a persuasive
case for them. Firstly, in 'Long live physics!' Nietzsche simply misrepresents the
formula. For, as I argued in the preceding chapter, the formula is not intended to
express, and nor does its derivation succeed in justifying, only the weak
requirement that every agent should do or refrain from a type of action in a type of
circumstance.f Rather, the derivation justifies the formula as it is intended,
namely, as an expression of the two distinctive features of moral goodness (i) and
(ii) which emphasises the latter feature, namely, that moral goodness is good for a
will as such. Furthermore, Kant does not intend the formula to be applied directly
to reasons for action in specific circumstances, as Nietzsche implies in 'Long live
physics!'. I have argued in the preceding subsections that there is no indication of
such an intention in Kant's remarks regarding the formula in the Groundwork, and
that Kant's considered position, expressed by his employment of the formula in
The Metaphysics of Morals, treats moral judgement as made according to a certain
system of duties, derived from features (i) and (ii).
Secondly, and more importantly, the 'selfishness' criticism made in 'Long
live physics!' is misplaced. Even if Nietzsche's interpretation of the formula is
41 See Schopenhauer, Uber das Fundament der Moral, pt.II, §7, and Die Welt als Wille und
Vorstellung, App ..
42 This inaccuracy of Nietzsche's discussion at FW335 is noted in Du Plessis, 'Nietzsche's Use and
Abuse of Kant's Philosophy', and Kerckhove, 'Nietzsche's Critique of Kantian Moral Autonomy',
pp.26 and 28.
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accepted, a judgement that every agent should do or refrain from a type of action
in a type of circumstance need not be made on selfish grounds. Equally, if the
traditional interpretation of the formula as a 'test' is adopted, maxims' purposes
need not be restricted to selfish ones, insofar as purposes are pertinent at all. Thus
Schopenhauer's 'selfishness' criticism is equally misplaced. Furthermore,
understood rightly, the formula emphasises feature (ii), that moral goodness is
good for a will as such, and thus precludes any ultimate appeal to self-interest as
contingent for a will. Contingent conditions of a will are morally pertinent, I
suggested above, only as premises in systematic derivations from features (i) and
(ii), and, once again, there is no reason to restrict these conditions to selfish ones.
Given this, Nietzsche's apparent further claim in 'Long live physics!' that it is
selfish to obey, rather than simply to make, a Kantian moral judgement is equally
implausible. For again, whether the formula is interpreted in Nietzsche's terms,
Schopenhauer's terms of the traditional 'test', or rightly as an expression
emphasising (ii), the motivation to obey a judgement made according to it need not
be restricted to selfish ones.
Still, Nietzsche's later discussion in The Antichrist notably displays a better
appreciation of the formula's emphasis on feature (ii), by expressing a Kantian
moral judgement as one made according to the "'good in itself', good with the
character of impersonality and universality'. This could explain why there
Nietzsche also does not restate the 'selfishness' criticism. The discussion in The
Antichrist is also notable for its failure to present the formula as intended to be
applied directly to reasons for action in specific circumstances. In this later
discussion, then, Nietzsche avoids the misinterpretations and the misplaced
criticism that are expressed in 'Long live physics!'. One might speculate that these
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improvements reflect Nietzsche's reading of Kant in the library at Chur, in the
preceding year.
Despite these improvements in his interpretation of the formula, however,
Nietzsche's criticism of it in the The Antichrist is unconvincing. It alleges that,
with respect to the making or obeying of a judgement according to the formula of
universal law, Kant 'understands pleasure as [an] objection', and thus requires an
agent 'to work, to think, to feel without inner necessity, without a deep personal
choice, without pleasure'. This is unconvincing for three reasons. Firstly, it makes
the mistake of critics since Schiller, by supposing that Kant conceives of acting
'from duty' as doing what is morally good in the presence of countervailing
inclinations. As I showed in the preceding chapter, the Schillerian supposition
misrepresents the relevant passage of the first section of the Groundwork, since
there Kant insists only that to act 'from duty' is to do what is morally good
because it is morally good, and thus irrespective of whether it also coincides with
the satisfaction of inclination. This applies equally to achieving 'a virtue merely
from a feeling of respect for the concept "virtue'", as Nietzsche expresses Kantian
moral motivation in The Antichrist.
Furthermore, Kant conceives of 'pleasure' as extending beyond the
satisfaction of inclination, to the achievement of moral goodness. Indeed, he states
that human willing 'is always connected with pleasure or displeasure', and
distinguishes simply between (dis)pleasure at the (dis)satisfaction of an inclination
and (dis)pleasure at the (lack of) achievement of moral goodness.f This position is
given consistent expression from the Critique of Judgement onwards, and contrasts
with Kant's earlier restriction of (dis)pleasure to the (dis)satisfaction of
43 MS 211. See also KU 178-9, and 207-9. TP 283-4. and MS 212-3.378. and 399-400.
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inclination." Thus his considered position is not simply that, contra the Schillerian
supposition, the achievement of moral goodness might coincide with the 'pleasure'
of satisfying coincident inclinations, but also that it is necessarily accompanied by
the 'pleasure' of achieving moral goodness.
Finally, in the determination of what moral goodness requires, Kant's
formula of universal law does not preclude what provides 'pleasure'. He conceives
of judgement according to this formula as the judgement of what is (ii) good for a
will as such, and as therefore ultimately unconcerned with the satisfaction of any
inclination. But he does not deny that what is (ii) good for a will as such might
nonetheless coincide with what satisfies an inclination, and thus provides
'pleasure', and, furthermore, he insists on the pertinence of such satisfactions,
insofar as he includes them among the contingent conditions of a will that can be
admitted as premises in systematic derivations from (i) and (ii).
If, therefore, Kant does not consider 'pleasure as [an] objection' to the
making or obeying of a judgement according to the formula of universal law, then
Nietzsche's presentation of such judgement as 'ascetic' is also difficult to sustain.
According to the 'revaluation' provided in the third essay of the Genealogy,
'ascetic ideals' deny necessary features of human life for the sake of another
'existence', supposed to lie beyond these features, and are obeyed from a
'ressentiment' at the 'suffering' of much human life. In his discussion of Kant in
The Antichrist, I argued, Nietzsche invokes this 'revaluation' by alleging Kant's
'anti-naturalness'. But if Kant's formula of universal law does not preclude the
satisfaction of inclinations from either the achievement or the determination of
moral goodness, it is implausible to describe either this achievement or this
44 For Kant's earlier, restrictive position, see, for instance, KpV 9n, 21-2, and 57-62. But note that
even at G 396 and 401 n, and Kp V 38-9, he refers to a certain feeling at the achievement of moral
goodness.
168
determination as 'ascetic'. This, in tum, threatens Nietzsche's negative
'revaluation' of professed obedience to Kantian moral reasons according to his
particular concern for 'humanity', assuming, as seems plausible, that the formula
of universal law's supposed 'asceticism' underlies this negative 'revaluation'.
However, although Kantian moral goodness does not preclude 'pleasure' in
the 'ascetic' manner that Nietzsche alleges, it also does not attend to it in the
manner that Nietzsche proposes. That is, unlike Nietzsche, Kant does not restrict
normative authority to reasons relative to an agent's particular concerns, since, on
the grounds of his commitment to (ii), he extends it to unconditional and
overriding reasons. Indeed, in the immediately following section of The Antichrist,
Nietzsche objects precisely to this extension of normative authority, albeit again
on the unconvincing grounds that it is 'ascetic'. I proposed in my examination of
the fifth part of Beyond Good and Evil, however, that this objection is better
understood as deriving from Nietzsche's denial of practical reason, on the grounds
that reasons must be relative to an agent's concerns, and that these concerns are
particular because the noncognitive motivating states which determine them are
particular. If Kant is vulnerable to Nietzsche's denial of practical reason, therefore,
his commitment to (ii) is also vulnerable. I will consider this matter in the third
section of this chapter.
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Kant's further formulas
In this section I complete my account of the intended meaning of Kant's
formulas by considering his formulas of the end in itself, autonomy, and the realm
of ends. I first argue that my account of the derivation of these formulas implies
that certain common treatments of them ought to be treated with some suspicion, if
not rejected outright. I then consider another of Kant's derivations of general
human duties in The Metaphysics of Morals, as an example of his considered
position regarding his further formulas which also exemplifies the distinctive
conception of 'community' that he associates with them. Although Nietzsche's
explicit criticisms of Kant do not refer to formulas other than the formula of
universal law, in the final subsection I briefly suggest that, given the preceding,
Kant ought to be unmoved by Nietzsche's affirmations of individual 'autonomy',
and, in particular, by Nietzsche commentators' allegations that Kant betrays such
'autonomy' .
I. Kant'sfurther formulas
Commentators often treat Kant's further formulas as expressing moral
considerations which are not expressed by the formula of universal law, and recent
commentators, who generally admit that problems of 'emptiness' attach to the
traditional approach to the formula of universal law, also often suppose these
further moral considerations to be more substantial than those expressed by the
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formula of universal Iaw.f Nonetheless, although Kant again discusses or refers to
his four examples in the light of two of his further formulas, commentators rarely
consider these further formulas to provide a thorough 'test' of reasons for action in
specific circumstances. Instead, these formulas are usually treated as merely
expressing certain general moral considerations which, although general, provide
further and perhaps more substantial guidance to moral judgement than those
expressed by the formula of universal law.
The formula of the end in itself is often considered to be the most salient
in this regard, since its reference to 'rational nature' as a supreme moral
consideration has traditionally been treated as an exemplary principle of 'respect
for persons'. Such 'respect' has an important place in moral common sense and in
much moral philosophy, and Kant's formula has been interpreted relatively
broadly in this manner - that is, as requiring not only the 'consent' of those
affected by one's actions, but also, for instance, the preservation, exercise, and
improvement of agency generally, the appeal to reason in attempts to persuade
others, the non-interference in and even beneficent support of others' morally
permissible choices, and the avoidance of actions which dishonour or degrade
oneself or others." However, commentators' supposition that Kant's further
formulas express more substantial moral considerations than the formula of
universal law has often instead issued in treatments of these formulas as together
45 Among recent commentators, for instance, Korsgaard presents the formula of universal law as
weaker than the later formulas, Pogge presents each further formula as providing further
specifications of 'the categorical imperative', Hill has claimed that the formula of universal law is
primarily negative, while the later formulas provide further positive content, and Wood maintains
that the later formulas substantiate the otherwise 'empty' formula of universal law. See Korsgaard,
'The Right to Lie', pp.135-44 and 151-4, Pogge, 'The Categorical Imperative', pp.189, and 198-
204, Hill, 'Reasonable Self-Interest', pp.155-7, and Wood, Kant's Ethical Thought, pp.l07-110.
164-166, and 182-190.
46 For such broad interpretations of the formula, see, in particular. Hill, 'Humanity as an End in
Itself', pp.93-7, and Wood, 'Humanity as End in Itself, pp.l77-84, and Kant's Ethical Thought,
pp.141-2 and 147-55.
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expressing a notion of the rational, procedural 'construction' of moral rules. In this
manner, commentators often interpret the formula of the end in itself as requiring
agents' possible or hypothetical 'consent' to moral rules under certain constraints
of rationality which the other formulas express, and Kant's further formulas as
thus substantiating the formula of universal law by identifying substantial
constraints on what 'could also be willed as a universal law' .47
Besides these two common interpretative approaches, some recent
treatments of Kant's further formulas have been informed by doubts about the
traditional classification of his moral philosophy as an exemplary 'deontological'
one. Kant's further formulas have traditionally been supposed to demonstrate
particularly clearly that he identifies moral requirements as constraints on the
pursuit of goods, such that the moral 'right' must take precedence over the non-
moral 'good'. His moral philosophy is thus supposed to be fundamentally distinct
from 'teleological' moral philosophies, which treat moral requirements as
requiring the pursuit of distinctively moral goods, such as general 'utility' or
human 'flourishing' .48 Recently, however, some commentators have taken issue
with this classification of Kant's moral philosophy, by arguing that his further
formulas identify a substantial moral good as the further 'ground' of his moral
philosophy. In particular, Guyer maintains that Kant's further formulas identify a
good as the teleological 'end' to which the formula of universal law expresses the
'means', and Wood holds that these further formulas identify a good as the source
47 For Rawls's influential statement of such an interpretation, see, in particular, his 'Kantian
Constructivism in Moral Theory', and also his 'Themes in Kant's Moral Philosophy', pp.82-90,
and Lectures on the History of Moral Philosophy, esp. pp.I64-76 and 237-52. O'Neill is another
important example. See, for example, her 'Constructivisms in Ethics', esp, pp.212-8.
48 For this distinction between 'deontological' and 'teleological' moral theories, see, for example,
Frankena, Ethics, pp.14-17.
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of the goodness of moral 'ends' and laws." Others, notably Herman, insist that
Kant's further formulas express a substantial good of rational agency itself, and
thus justify a commitment to the formula of universal law.i"
For themselves, such positions regarding Kant's further formulas present
fewer difficulties than the traditional approach to the formula of universal law. For
instance, insofar as a principle of 'respect for persons' is not considered to provide
an algorithmic 'test' of reasons for action in specific circumstances, it avoids
problems in determining the specific reason to 'test', and insofar as it is not
considered to provide a complete or even supreme expression of moral goodness,
it avoids the implausible exclusion of other pertinent considerationa" However, as
interpretations of Kant's further formulas, the prevailing positions fail to capture
the implications of his derivations, as I have presented these derivations in the
preceding chapter. Most broadly, these derivations imply that Kant's further
formulas are not intended to express moral considerations which are not already
expressed by the formula of universal, let alone moral considerations which are
more substantial or which identify an otherwise absent 'ground'. Indeed, Kant
intends no formula to express moral considerations which are not also expressed
by any other formula. More specifically, Kant's derivations also imply that his
further formulas are intended to express the two distinctive features of moral
goodness (i) and (ii), and to emphasise different aspects of these features. Thus he
does not intend any formula to be interpreted only in its own terms - for example,
by simply interpreting the notions of 'rational nature', or 'humanity', and of 'ends'
49 See Guyer, 'Kant's Morality of Law and Morality of Freedom', pp.145-6, 151-4, and 159-61,
'The Possibility of the Categorical Imperative', pp.182-3 and 191-200, and 'Ends of Reason and
Ends of Nature', pp.162-4, and Wood, 'Humanity as End in Itself', p.166, Kant's Ethical Thought,
pp.111-4, 156-9, 163, and 183-6, and 'The Final Form of Kant's Practical Philosophy', pp.12, 13,
and 16.
50 See Herman, 'Leaving Deontology Behind', esp. pp.224-30.
51 On the latter point, see the discussion in Hill, 'Donagan's Kant'.
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and 'means' that the formula of the end in itself employs. And although (i) and (ii)
might be consistent with certain understandings of 'respect for persons' or the
rational, procedural 'construction' of moral rules, they are not exhausted by them.
With regard to each particular further formula, the implications of Kant's
derivations are as follows, I would suggest. Firstly, the formula of the end in itself
is intended to emphasise feature (i), that moral goodness is a goodness of a will's
reason for action alone, because it is (b') a goodness which only a will can
achieve. It emphasises this by expressing moral goodness in terms of what a will
takes to provide a reason for action, and, in particular, as the goodness of a will's
taking a will itself to provide a reason for action. The formula of the end in itself is
therefore not intended to express a conception of 'respect for persons' or the
rational 'construction' of rules, or, indeed, intended to be interpreted on its own
terms. Rather, it is simply intended to express (i) and (ii), and to emphasise (i), in
the manner that Kant's derivation indicates. This is not to deny that a will's taking
a will itself to provide a reason for action might coincide with its 'respect for
persons', insofar as 'persons' might be conceived as 'wills', or with its acting
according to rationally 'constructed' rules, insofar as wills might be conceived as
providing reasons for action precisely by such rational 'construction'. But the
meaning of 'a will's taking a will itself to provide a reason for action' need not be
restricted to such 'respect for persons' or rational 'construction', or to any other
principle that coincides with it, and is to be determined only with reference to (i)
and (ii) and Kant's derivation according to them.
This understanding of the formula of the end in itself, as implied by my
interpretation of the formula's derivation, also finds support in Kant's discussion
of his four examples in the light of this formula in the Groundwork. As with the
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formula of universal law, Kant suggests that the formula of the end in itself might
treat examples in two different ways, but again provides no indication that he
intends this to be anything more than a provisional classification. Here his
suggestion is that some kinds of contravening actions are such as to 'conflict' with
'rational being' as an 'end', while others are such as to merely fail to 'harmonize'
with this 'end' .52 In discussing the example of a false promise as an example of the
former kind, he claims that the promisee 'cannot possibly agree' to the false
promisor's action. This claim might suggest a narrow concern for possible or
hypothetical 'consent', and thus a narrow principle of 'respect for persons' or a
notion of the rational 'construction' of moral rules. However, Kant also treats the
impossibility of the promisee's 'agreement' as such that the promisee cannot
'contain' the action's 'end', and, in discussing the example of suicide as another
action which 'conflicts' with 'rational being' as an 'end', he also claims that the
suicide's action cannot 'exist together with' taking 'rational being' as an 'end'. In
discussing the examples concerning beneficence and the development of natural
predispositions as examples of actions which merely fail to 'harmonize' with
'rational being' as an 'end', Kant also writes that such actions cannot be
'consistent [... ] with the promotion' of this 'end', and that they are not consistent
with this end's having 'its full effect in me' .53 These terms are consistent with a
broader principle of 'respect for persons' and also might accommodate a notion of
the rational 'construction' of moral rules. However, it is significant that Kant's
discussion of each example focuses on whether 'rational being' is a will's 'end',
rather than on whether an action independently preserves or enhances 'person'-
hood or could be 'legislated' under certain constraints of rationality. This suggests
52 G 430. Here Kant also states the distinction in terms of whether the 'agreement' between an
action and 'rational being' as an 'end' is 'negative' or 'positive'.
53 G 429, 430.
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that Kant is concerned to express something other than 'respect for persons' or the
rational 'construction' of moral rules, and implies that the formula of the end in
itself can accommodate such 'respect' and 'construction' only insofar as they are
conceived in terms of a will's 'end'. Furthermore, Kant's focus on a will's 'end' is
better explained by his concern with emphasising (i), that moral goodness is a
goodness of a will's reason for action alone, because it is (b') a goodness which
only a will can achieve, than by a concern with expressing a principle of 'respect
for persons' or a notion of rational 'construction'.
Similar conclusions should be drawn regarding the formulas of autonomy
and the realm of ends. According to the account of its derivation which I have
presented, the formula of autonomy is intended to emphasise both (i) and (ii) and,
in doing so, to warn against misinterpreting the preceding formulas in ways which
would fail to appreciate these two distinctive features of moral goodness. The
formula of the realm of ends, on the other hand, is intended to note a further
qualification which is bracketed by the other formulas. Like the formula of the end
in itself, therefore, neither the formula of autonomy nor the formula of the realm of
ends is intended to express a notion of the rational 'construction' of moral rules,
although either formula might coincide with such 'construction', insofar as it
might be conceived precisely in terms of a will's 'giving universal law', or the
provision of 'common laws'. However, once again, the meanings of these
formulas need not be restricted to such 'construction', and are to be determined
only with reference to (i) and (ii).54 Although he does not again discuss his four
examples, Kant's remarks regarding these formulas support these conclusions,
S4 Hill, for instance, has presented the formula of the realm of ends as combining the other formulas
in a notion of the perspective from which rational 'construction' ought to proceed. See his 'The
Kingdom of Ends', pp.59-62, 'A Kantian Perspective on Moral Rules', pp.35-51, 'A Kantian
Perspective on Political Violence', pp.223-30, and 'Hypothetical Consent in Kantian
Constructivism', pp.73-6.
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insofar as they reveal no concern with identifying a procedure of rational
'construction', but rather again emphasise, besides the concerns of his derivations,
the will's taking 'rational beings' as 'ends'. 55
Finally, my account of the derivations of Kant's formulas supports recent
suspicion of the traditional 'deontological' classification of his moral philosophy,
but does not suggest that he intends to 'ground' his moral philosophy in a
substantial moral good. As I have presented his derivations, Kant's formulas are
intended to express the goodness of a good will, as he finds this conceived by
'common moral rational cognition' and as he analyses it in the first section of the
Groundwork. By presenting moral requirements as the requirements of this
goodness, therefore, he does not present them as 'deontological' constraints on the
pursuit of goods. However, he distinguishes this moral goodness from other goods
by means of its formal features - namely, (i) and (ii) - rather than in substantial
terms. In particular, while Kant would deny the 'moral' status of general 'utility',
human 'flourishing', or other supposed moral goods, he would not do so by
invoking a competing substantial moral good. Despite the positive proposals of
recent sceptics of the 'deontological' classification, then, Kant intends to express
no substantial moral good, either in his further formulas or elsewhere.
II. Vulnerabilities of agency: Political obligation in The Metaphysics of Morals
Like that of the formula of universal law, the intended place of Kant's
further formulas in moral judgement is best determined by turning to The
ss See G 433.
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Metaphysics of Morals. However, in presenting the formula of the realm of ends in
the Groundwork, Kant makes a notable remark that anticipates his later, more
extensive derivation of duties. This remark concerns what he calls a 'sovereign
[Oberhaupt]' in a realm of ends, the function of which is not explicitly stated, but
is presumably to judge moral goodness among a plurality of agents.i" To fulfil a
sovereign's function, Kant claims that an agent must be 'not subject to the will of
any other', in the sense that the agent must be 'a completely independent being[,]
without need and limitation of abilities adequate to the will'. 57 The significance of
this claim lies not so much in its implications for a sovereign, but rather in its
implication that other agents are not necessarily 'independent beings' in the sense
defined, and its suggestion that the lack of such independence is pertinent to
determining the requirements of moral goodness among them. Furthermore, given
that, with the formula of the realm of ends, Kant emphasises that moral goodness
consists of extending to every will the provision of reasons by mere will, the lack
of such independence must be a matter of an agent's will being 'subject to' another
agent's will - rather than, say, the achievement of an agent's desires, needs, or
other particular goods being 'subject to' the achievement of another's. In other
words, Kant's claim about a sovereign suggests that what is pertinent to
determining the requirements of moral goodness among a plurality of agents - and
thus, indeed, what constitutes them as a 'realm' at all - is only and precisely the
mutual vulnerabilities of their wills. Finally, however, Kant's claim also identifies
'need' and 'limitation of abilities' as sources of such vulnerabilities. Thus he
56 This function is suggested by G 439, where Kant refers to a sovereign as a 'lawgiver' who
'judges the worth of rational beings'. See also R 95-100, and compare the usages, with which Kant
was acquainted, in Leibniz, Discours de Metaphysique, §36, Principes de la nature et de la grace
fondes en raison, §15, and Principes de la philosophie ou monadologie, §§85-90, and particularly
Rousseau, Du Contrat Social, bk.l, chs.6-7.
57 G 433, 434.
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allows that factors other than wills as such, and therefore not morally pertinent in
themselves, can be morally pertinent insofar as they are sources of mutual
vulnerabilities of wills. Furthermore, since Kant consistently refers to human
agents in general as having 'needs' and being limited in their practical abilities, his
claim also implies that the requirements of moral goodness among human agents
generall y must be determined precisely according to the general mutual
vulnerabilities of their wills.58
This, I propose, is precisely what Kant undertakes in The Metaphysics of
Morals. That is, with the exception of the general duty of beneficence, Kant
derives general other-regarding duties among human agents from his further
formulas - that is, those which emphasise feature (i) of moral goodness - along
with premises regarding the general mutual vulnerabilities of human wills. This is
well demonstrated by his derivation of the most substantial of the basic political
obligations which he derives in The Metaphysics of Morals, those regarding the
original acquisition of material things. This derivation is somewhat more complex
than that of the general duty of beneficence, and is obscured by textual
corruption." Nonetheless, the following - arguably, highly distinctive - argument
can be discerned.
A few preliminary points should first be noted. Firstly, Kant considers an
agent's political obligations to be obligations which other agents can coerce the
agent to fulfil, and therefore obligations merely to do or refrain from certain kinds
of actions, rather than, like 'ethical' obligations, obligations to do so for certain
58 On human 'needs' and limited abilities, see, for instance, G 413n and 414. Of course, that human
agents in general have 'needs' and limited abilities also problematises their possible fulfilment of a
sovereign's function. But Kant does not emphasise this implication, or take it up elsewhere, and he
apparently introduces the 'sovereign' here only to illuminate, by contrast, an aspect of his
conception of the 'realm of ends' .
59 Regarding the textual issues here, I follow Ludwig's reconstruction of the text, as defended in his
Kants Rechtslehre, pt.l.
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kinds of reasonsP" Nonetheless, he also insists that an 'indirect' ethical obligation
corresponds to each political obligation, the former being the obligation to fulfil
the latter for the certain kinds of reasons." Secondly, Kant maintains that the basic
principle of political obligations is the 'Universal Principle of Right [Recht]': 'Any
action is right if it[,] or according to its maxim[,] the freedom of choice [Willkur]
of each can exist together with everyone's freedom according to a universal law'. 62
The nature and grounds of this principle are subject to much scholarly controversy.
It is variously claimed, for instance, that Kant's principle expresses a voluntaristic,
'social contract' theory, a non-voluntaristic, 'natural law' theory, an independent
analysis of the concept of 'right', or a commitment to a substantive moral good
presented by the formula of the end in itself." However, I will argue that the place
of the principle in Kant's derivation of the most substantial of our basic political
obligations better supports an alternative interpretation - namely, that he intends
this principle to express, with regard to coercible obligations, precisely the
conception of a 'realm' of mutually vulnerable wills which he briefly expresses in
the Groundwork'" Finally, the object of this derivation is the original acquisition
of material things. Notably, Kant conceives of possession in general as an agent's
right to use an external object - either a material thing or another's agency - as she
60 See MS 214, 218-21, 231, 239, 375, and 382, and also R 95-6.
61 See MS 219-220.
62 MS 230. See also R 98, TP 290, and MS 231, 375, 382, and 396.
63 For examples of each of these interpretative claims, see, respectively, Murphy, Kant, esp. ch.4,
and Rosen, Kant's Theory of Justice; Mulholland, Kant's System of Rights, esp. chs.7-10, and
Kersting, Wohlgeordnete Freiheit, both of which also flirt with 'social contract' interpretations;
Willaschek, 'Why the Doctrine of Right Does Not Belong in the Metaphysics of Morals', and
'Which Imperatives for Right?', pp.67-9 and 75-85, Pogge, 'Is Kant's Rechtslehre a
"Comprehensive Liberalism"?', pp.136-46. and Wood, 'The Final Form of Kant's Practical
Philosophy', pp.5-10, and Kant's Ethical Thought, pp.321-3; and Guyer, 'Kant's Deductions of the
Principles of Right', esp. pp.23-7.
64 This interpretation is also supported, I would suggest, by Kant's presentation of his Universal
Principle at MS 230, 232-3, and 237-8, but I will not consider these passages here.
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pleases, and irrespective of whether she is physically 'holding' the object.65 He
also argues that the possibility of such a right follows from the Universal Principle
of Right because this principle concerns mere will and willing requires the
physical ability to use its objects."
However, Kant provides a more complex argument regarding the
possibility of originally acquiring a material thing, and it is with this argument that
he appeals to, and illuminates, his conception of a 'realm' of mutually vulnerable
wills. This argument proceeds from the Universal Principle and willing's
requirement of the physical ability to use its objects, along with a crucial further
claim about the possession of a material thing - namely, that a movable material
thing 'is to be regarded [normatively... ] as [an] inherence' in its 'place', the
habitable ground on which it rests. From these premises, Kant first argues that
'damage is done' to an agent's 'freedom' not by another's taking of an un-'held'
material thing as such, but only insofar as this taking of the thing upsets its 'place'.
He claims that the possibility of originally acquiring a 'place', and so the material
thing which rests on it, 'is thus based on' willing's requirement of the physical
ability to use its objects." Presumably, then, Kant's argument here is that,
although the physical ability to use a material thing is not upset by another agent's
taking the thing as such, it is upset by the thing's thus not having a consistent
'place', and therefore, since willing requires the physical ability to use its objects,
the Universal Principle requires the possibility of originally acquiring a material
thing along with the 'place' on which it rests.
65 MS 246. See also MS 247-9.
66 See MS 246 and 257. See also MS 247. 249-50. and 255. Kant refers to the latter requirement of
willing throughout his texts. See. for instance, his distinction of choice from mere 'wish' at G 394
and 435. MAM 122. KU 177n. MS 213. 230.246.356-7. and 451-2. ApH 251. and EKU 230n ..
67 MS 261. 262. Kant also appeals to this requirement in this regard at MS 263 and 267. and states
his conclusion at MS 261.263. and 269-70.
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Kant proceeds to further explain this possibility, and to argue for a
significant constraint on it. Specifically, he argues that a human agent can
originally acquire a material thing 'only through the united choice of all who
possess it in common'. This is so, he maintains, 'on account of the unity of all
places on the earth's surface as spherical surface: because, if it were an unending
plane, human beings could be so dispersed on it that they would not come into any
community with each other, [and] this [community] therefore would not be a
necessary result of their existence on the earth'. He concludes that each 'place' on
the earth must be considered to be, prior to any acquisition, possessed in common
by human beings, and that the original acquisition of a material thing, along with
its 'place', is therefore both made possible and constrained by 'the uniting of the
choice of all who can come into a practical relation with each other'. 68 Although
far from unambiguous, these remarks can be taken to indicate the following, I
suggest. Firstly, for Kant, it is the finitude of 'places' on the earth's surface which
ensures that human beings' wills are vulnerable to each other's taking of material
things, in the sense that such taking upsets the consistency of things' 'places'
which the use of objects requires. Secondly, Kant takes this vulnerability to entail
not only the possibility of originally acquiring a material thing, but also a
substantial constraint on this possibility - namely, that an agent's original
acquisition of a material thing not upset the required consistency of thing's
'places'. In Kant's terms, it is as if, precisely because they are vulnerable in this
way, human agents constitute a 'community' which first possesses each 'place' in
common and which can grant the private acquisition of a 'place', and thus the
private acquisition of any material thing which rests on it, to a specific agent only
68 MS 262, 263. See also MS 264 and 267-8.
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if this ensures, rather than upsets, the required consistency of things' 'places'.
Furthermore, Kant holds that human agents' basic political obligations then follow
from the possibility of possessing external things and originally acquiring material
things, on the grounds that a civil condition is required to secure possession and to
further determine the original acquisition of material things."
The precise meaning and ultimate success of Kant's derivation of these
basic political obligations are, of course, far from obvious. In particular, the
meaning of a material thing's 'place' and its intended role in the argument requires
substantial further examination and support. However, I hope to have
demonstrated only that this derivation appeals precisely to the conception of
'realm', or, better, 'community', which Kant briefly presents in the Groundwork
and to which he again refers in introducing his Universal Principle of Right in The
Metaphysics of Morals - namely, the conception according to which other-
regarding obligations among a plurality of agents must be determined precisely
according to the mutual vulnerabilities of their wills. I would also suggest that,
besides confirming the brief intimations of the Groundwork, Kant's derivation
makes explicit that, according to this conception, a 'community' is constituted
only and precisely according to a specific mutual vulnerability of wills, and
therefore extends only and precisely as far as this vulnerability extends. With
regard to our basic political obligations, Kant considers a vulnerability, and thus a
'community', which concerns the consistency of material things' 'places', and
which, given the 'finitude' of 'places' on the earth's surface, therefore extends
across the earth's surface. He explicitly denies, however, that human willing is
69 See MS 255-7 and 264-7. The premise regarding the earth's surface is similarly emphasised by
Flikschuh and Thomson, although both mistakenly extend it to Kant's argument for the mere
possibility of possession in general. See Flikschuh, Kant and Modern Political Philosophy, chs.d-S,
and Thomson, 'Kant's Transcendental Deduction of Political Authority'.
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generally vulnerable to agents' taking of un- 'held' material things as such, and
thus effectively denies that any other material constraint - such as material scarcity
or material inequality - is pertinent to the determination of our basic political
obligations, or equivalently, the general human 'community'.
Kant's derivation also has three broader implications. Firstly, although it
appeals to formulas of moral goodness which emphasise (i), this derivation would
be clumsily interpreted in terms of a notion of 'respect for persons' or the rational
'construction' of moral rules. To this extent, it confirms the strong suspicions of
such interpretations of Kant's further formulas which I raised in the preceding
subsection. Secondly, like the derivation of a general duty of beneficence, this
derivation does not proceed by applying the formulas to reasons for action in
specific circumstances, but rather by considering a certain general condition of
human wills under features (i) and (ii) of moral goodness. It thus contributes to the
system of duties that Kant proposes to derive. Thirdly, in employing his distinctive
conception of 'community', this derivation exemplifies every other derivation of a
general other-regarding duty in The Metaphysics of Morals, with the exception of
the general duty of beneficence, and thus also reveals the salience of this
conception as an expression of moral goodness, for Kant.
III. Kant and Nietzsche on autonomy
As I demonstrated in the first part of the thesis, Nietzsche's explicit
criticisms of Kant's moral philosophy do not refer to Kant's further formulas, but
Nietzsche does propose an unspecified individualist conception of 'autonomy' in
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opposition to Kant. In the literature on the relationship between Kant's and
Nietzsche's moral philosophies, this proposal is often emphasised and, further,
transformed into an allegation that Kant betrays 'autonomy'. The 'autonomy'
concerned is generally conceived a little more specifically than Nietzsche does, as
an individual's choice of, or according to, her particularity or singularity, defined
in terms of the individual's drives or desires and supposed to be created,
discovered, selected, or organised by the individual herself.
For Kant, such 'autonomy' is of unlikely moral value. In particular, he
conceives of moral goodness as a goodness (i) of a will's reason for action alone
that is (ii) good for a will as such, and considers his own formula of autonomy to
emphasise both of these distinctive features. Admittedly, these features might
coincide with 'autonomy' as Nietzsche and his commentators conceive of it - just
as, for instance, the formula of the end in itself might coincide with some common
notions of 'respect for persons'. But, as such, to choose one's particularity or
singularity, or to choose according to it, is a goodness neither (i) of a will's reason
for action alone nor (ii) for a will as such, and is thus denied basic moral goodness
on Kant's terms.
However, to claim not simply that Kant denies moral value to individual
'autonomy' - which is, I think, all that Nietzsche's remarks suggest - but that Kant
betrays 'autonomy' is to suppose that he wrongly obscures, neglects, or
contravenes a shared commitment to individual 'autonomy'. This, admittedly,
would introduce critical bite into Nietzsche's affirmations of individual
'autonomy' against Kant. But there is nothing in Kant's conception of moral
goodness to indicate any such shared commitment. He certainly identifies moral
goodness with a will's 'giving itself laws' or taking will itself as an 'end', and,
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indeed, with (b') a goodness that only a will can achieve, and thus shares some
expressions and terminology with conceptions of individual 'autonomy'. But, on
closer inspection, the goodness identified abstracts precisely from any agent's
particularity or singularity, on the grounds of (i) and (ii) mentioned above. Kantian
'autonomy', then, is simply something other than the individual 'autonomy' to
which Nietzsche's remarks refer, some of his commentators enthusiastically
appeal, and, indeed, much contemporary discussion of 'autonomy' is directed.I"
70 The divide between Kantian 'autonomy' and contemporary, individualist conceptions has often
been emphasised by O'Neill. For a recent polemic, see her 'Autonomy', esp. pp.1-6.
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The object of moral judgement
Thus far, I have argued that Nietzsche's specific criticisms of Kant, and
Nietzsche's often emphasised affirmations of individual 'autonomy', do not
trouble Kant's conception of the moral agent, rightly understood. In this, final
section of the chapter, I will argue that Nietzsche's critical treatment of the
common sense conception of agency, which he implicitly directs at Kant, is more
telling. I begin with Nietzsche's criticism of practical reason and how Kant's
conception of moral judgement might accommodate it. I then consider Kant's
definition of 'choice', and argue that, although it would allow Kant to
accommodate Nietzsche's criticism of practical reason, it is also vulnerable to
Nietzsche's criticism of the common sense claim regarding choice. Nonetheless, I
also argue that accommodating neither criticism would threaten Kant's conception
of moral goodness. Finally, I argue that, given Kant's methodological commitment
to common sense, he ought to be unmoved by Nietzsche's proposed project of
'revaluing' given obedience to reasons according to his own particular concern for
'humanity', or by the project, often mistakenly attributed to both Kant and
Nietzsche, of criticising moral common sense on independent and objective
grounds.
187
I.Reasons' underdetennination of actions
In 'Long live physics!', Nietzsche addresses his broad criticism of practical
reason to Kant's conception of moral judgement in particular. To recall,
Nietzsche's argument in this passage is that a reason prescriptively
underdetermines action because it prescribes a general type of action in a general
type of circumstances, while an action and its circumstances are singular. He
concludes that reasons could not motivate actions, and that judgements about
reasons for action - such as Kantian judgements of 'moral worth' - are therefore
inappropriate. Here as elsewhere, he also consistently accounts for actions as
motivated not by reasons, but by noncognitive states informed by reasons, a
tendency which, I suggested, implies an argument by elimination: if actions are not
motivated by reasons, then they are motivated by noncognitive states informed by
reasons. In considering his criticism of practical reason, I also suggested that - on
pain of not admitting any causal description of action at all, and his own
descriptions in terms of noncognitive states in particular - Nietzsche ought to
insist merely on the particularity, rather than the singularity, of actions and their
circumstances. Thus his criticism would tum on the relative generality of reasons'
prescriptions, noncognitive states, and actions and circumstances. But, even thus
modified, Nietzsche's criticism presents a significant challenge to Kant's
conception of moral judgement.
This kind of challenge is rarely considered in the Kant literature, although
the sceptical implications of the indeterminacy of principles have been emphasised
in contemporary moral philosophy more broadly. Nonetheless, as Onora O'Neill
has emphasised in recent work, Kant himself responds to a challenge of this kind
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by, firstly, admitting that the description of motivating reasons is unfeasible
because reasons prescriptively underdetermine actions, and, secondly, insisting
that the prescription of action according to reasons can nonetheless proceed."
Kant offers the first, conciliatory element of his response most clearly at
the beginning of the second section of the Groundwork. There he claims that any
pattern of observed actions underdetermines the reasons according to which the
actions were performed. In particular, he develops his claim in the first section that
it is 'difficult to notice' whether an agent does what is morally good 'from duty' or
from an 'immediately' related, coincident inclination, and that action 'from duty'
therefore 'shines forth all the more brightly' in the presence of countervailing
inclinations. At the beginning of the second section, Kant admits that the problem
runs deeper: he states that, even if an agent does what is morally good in the
apparent absence of coincident inclinations, 'it cannot be inferred with certainty
that no secret impulse of self-love [... ] was not actually the real determining cause
of the will, for [... ] in fact we can never, even by the strictest examination, get
entirely behind the secret incentives, because, when moral worth is in question,
what matters is not actions, which one sees, but those inner principles of them
which one does not see'. Indeed, as 'a cold-blooded observer', Kant's hyperbolical
doubt is 'whether any true virtue is to be found in the world,.72Kant's claim can,
of course, be extended to non-moral actions and reasons, and his terminology of
'inference', 'examination', 'sight', and 'observation' implies that he is concerned
not so much for the introspection of motivating reasons as for the ascription of
motivating reasons on the evidence of observed actions. Furthermore, if no pattern
of actions could confirm or disconfirm a motivating reason, this is because no
71 For O'Neill's account, see 'Consistency in Action', pp.83-5, 'Universal Laws and Ends in
Themselves', pp.130 and 141, 'Kant's Virtues', pp.89-97, and 'Instituting Principles', pp.331-43.
72 G407.
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reason's prescription is sufficiently determinate. In this sense, then, Kant
anticipates Nietzsche's claim in 'Long live physics!' that, in 'looking back upon'
actions as evidence of motivating reasons, actions are 'impenetrable' or
'unknowable' because a reason underdetermines action.73
However, Kant insists that, while this problem makes the descriptive
ascription of motivating reasons to agents unfeasible, it does not also threaten the
prescription of action according to reasons - what Nietzsche refers to as 'looking
forward to' an action according to reasons. Having denied any certain 'inference'
from observed actions to their motivating reasons, Kant insists that, nonetheless,
'what matters here is not whether this or that happened, but [that] reason for itself
and independently of all appearances [that is, all retrospective ascriptions]
commands what should happen'. Therefore, he concludes, 'e.g. pure honesty in
friendship can be no less required [even] if until now there may have been no
honest friend' .74 That is, Kant insists that, although reasons underdetermine
actions, reasons prescribe nonetheless, and this function is not threatened by the
uncertainty of descriptively ascribing motivating reasons to agents." Furthermore,
as he makes clear in The Metaphysics of Morals, Kant conceives of moral
judgement such as to reduce the indeterminacy of prescription. I have shown in the
preceding sections that he conceives of moral judgement as judgement according
to a system of duties of varying generality, which are to be derived by considering
wills' contingent conditions, of varying generality, in the light of the features of
moral goodness (i) and (ii). More importantly for the determinacy of prescription,
Kant conceives of moral judgement as the mutual constraining of these multiple
73 Nietzsche also refers to Kant's doubt regarding the discovery of any certain example of moral
r,oodness at KGW VIII: I 7 [62] (End 1886-Spring 1887), and arguably also at M V 3.
4 G 408.
7S The points made at G 407-8 are also made at R 20 and 95-6, TP 284-5 and 287, E 329-30, and
MS 392-3, 441, 446-7, and 474.
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duties, such that, for instance, the general duty of beneficence mutually constrains
the general duty to obey the state, and each mutually constrains more specific
duties.i" This, he maintains, serves to reduce the indeterminacy of prescription to a
tolerable level. Thus, in the introduction to the 'Doctrine of Virtue' in The
Metaphysics of Morals, he writes that every 'ethical' duty 'can command only the
maxim of actions, not actions themselves, [and] this is a sign that [.. .it] could not
indicate precisely how and how much should be done by the action'. However, he
insists, this 'is not to be understood as a permission to make exceptions to the
maxim of actions, but only as a permission to limit one maxim of duty by
another'." Again, of course, Kant's claim extends to non-moral reasons as well.
Kant thus demonstrates that reasons' underdetermination of action need not
undermine the prescriptive judgement of actions according to reasons, as it
undermines the description of motivating reasons according to observed actions.
However, much as it anticipates Nietzsche's challenge in 'Long live physics!',
Kant's argument does not quite do justice to it. For in 'Long live physics!'
Nietzsche concludes from a reason's underdetermination of action not only that
observed actions could not confirm or disconfirm a motivating reason, but also that
an action could not be motivated by reasons at all, and that any judgement
according to reasons is therefore inappropriate. He also consistently offers causal
descriptions of actions as instead motivated by noncognitive states, and he insists
that these states should therefore replace reasons as the objects of judgement. As I
proposed to interpret his position, Nietzsche thus holds that a reason's prescription
is not sufficiently determinate, or particular, for its acknowledgement to motivate a
76 Recent commentators other than O'Neill broadly appreciate this aspect of Kant's conception of
moral judgement. I discuss the examples of Hill, Baron, and O'Neill in the third part of my
'Common Sense. Right, and Moral Judgement'.
77 MS 390. On the 'latitude' of 'ethical' duties, see also MS 392-3 and 410-11.
191
particular action in particular circumstances, but that (at least some) noncognitive
states informed by reasons are of sufficient determinacy, or particularity, to do so.
Although Kant does not consider this particular challenge, his account of
judgement as the mutual constraining of multiple reasons allows him to
accommodate it without denying its plausibility. For Nietzsche fails to appreciate
that such mutual constraining yields prescriptions that are significantly more
determinate, or particular, than any single reason's prescription. Insofar as an
action is considered at a level of particularity no higher than that of these
prescriptions, then, it could be considered as motivated by an acknowledgement of
a prescription. This level of particularity need not be sufficient for observed
actions to confirm or disconfirm a motivating reason. But it is presumably
sufficient for actions to be generally considered as motivated by the
acknowledgement of reasons' prescriptions. For example, mutually constrained
reasons might prescribe that, all things considered, in certain circumstances an
agent should donate a certain fraction of her income to charity. This prescription is
presumably of sufficient determinacy, or particularity, for its acknowledgement to
be considered as motivating her obedience to it, if not necessarily for this
obedience to conclusively confirm or disconfirm such motivation. Nonetheless,
considered at a higher level of particularity, Kant could admit that actions might be
considered as not motivated by reasons, that their motivation might be captured by
noncognitive states, and even that such motivation might be sufficiently
determinate, or particular, for observed actions to confirm or disconfirm it. For
instance, the all-things-considered prescription to donate to charity need not be of
sufficient determinacy, or particularity, for its acknowledgement to be considered
as motivating an agent's particular manner of obeying the prescription - her
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sending the donation in a red envelope, rather than a blue one, say. At this level of
particularity, her noncognitive state - her strong passion for red, say - might be
considered to motivate, and, if it is sufficiently particular, such motivation might
even be confirmed or disconfirmed by her observed actions. Importantly, this does
not preclude her donation's also being considered as motivated by her
acknowledgement of the prescription, since, at the lower level of particularity, her
action can be so considered. That is, Nietzsche's challenge does not preclude
practical reason, as he insists. It therefore also does not preclude prescriptive
judgement according to reasons or make incoherent the notion of an unconditional
and overriding reason, as he also maintains.
Nietzsche's challenge thus provides plausible grounds for supplementing
Kant's conception of moral judgement with an appreciation of noncognitive
motivations for obedience to reasons. Notably, such a supplementation would not
threaten Kant's conception of moral goodness, since a goodness that is (i) a
goodness of a will's reason for action alone and (ii) good for a will as such might
be achieved equally by a will whose obedience to reasons is, above a certain level
of particularity, considered as motivated by something other than them. Moreover,
as I will show in the following subsection, such a supplementation can be
accommodated by Kant's definition of 'choice'.
II. Kant's definition of 'choice'
Although Kant insists that moral judgement must regard choice as made for
reasons, he does not insist that choice is made for reasons by definition Of always
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in fact. Insofar as he admits that choice need not be made for reasons, then, he
does not propound the common sense claim regarding reasons to which Nietzsche
objects, and might admit the supplementation that, I have suggested, Nietzsche's
criticism of this claim provides grounds for.
This can be appreciated by attending first to a series of definitions that
Kant provides in a section of the introduction to The Metaphysics of Morals.
There, as elsewhere, he defines 'the ability of desire', or 'life', as 'the ability to be,
through its representations, the cause of the objects of these representations'. He
proceeds to insist that such an ability constitutes 'choice [Willkiir]' on two
conditions: firstly, this causation must be determined 'in' this ability itself, rather
than 'in' its objects, making it what Kant calls 'an ability to do or to refrain as it
pleases'; and, secondly, it must be accompanied by a consciousness of its ability to
produce its objects, and therefore not be a mere 'wish' for them." I take these two
conditions to mean simply that 'choice' is a particular instance of the ability to
cause objects as consciously intended ('through representations'), which is
distinguished, firstly, by being motivated, so that the action's 'pleasing' the agent
is causally significant, and, secondly, by being constrained by the agent's
theoretical beliefs regarding circumstances. Crucially, however, Kant presents
'practical reason', or 'will', as a particular instance of 'choice' which is motivated
by reasons. He writes, 'The ability of desire whose inner determining ground,
hence what pleases it[,] is to be found in the subject's reason is called the will
[Wille)'. 'The will', he continues, 'insofar as it can determine choice, is practical
78 MS 211. 213. For related remarks on 'the ability of desire'. see MAN 544. KpV9n. KrVB ix-x,
KU 177n. MS 356-7. 381. and 384-5. ApH 251. and EKU 206 and 230n.
194
reason itself' .79 Thus Kant does not equate 'choice' with choice made for reasons,
but rather considers the latter a particular case of the former.
Kant here proceeds to equate 'human' choice with choice motivated by
reasons, and to define it as 'free' in the sense that, insofar as it is motivated by
reasons, it is 'affected, but not determined, by impulses'. This distinguishes
'human' from 'animal' choice, which is 'determinable only by inclination
(sensible impulse, stimulus), .80 However, Kant does not insist that every instance
of human choice is 'human', rather than 'animal', in this sense. As he emphasises
in the introduction to the 'Doctrine of Virtue' and elsewhere, he admits that human
rationality can be suspended or obstructed by passing feelings such as anger, fear,
or hope, and that certain persistent inclinations, such as hatred or lust for power,
can eclipse other inclinations and concerns in rational reflection" I suggest that,
although not developed by Kant, these admissions might be exploited to
supplement his conception of moral judgement in the manner which I proposed in
the preceding subsection - that is, to consider obedience to reasons as, above a
certain level of particularity, motivated by noncognitive states.
However, while Kant's definition of 'choice' might be exploited to
accommodate Nietzsche's criticism of the common sense claim regarding reasons,
this definition also reveals that Kant endorses the common sense claim regarding
choice to which Nietzsche objects. That is, it reveals that Kant considers choice,
the agent's conscious, motivated, and sincere intention, as the sufficient cause of
her action. Most clearly, it refers to choice as 'the' cause of an action. Nietzsche's
objection to this claim, which he implicitly directs at Kant under the allegation
79MS213.
80 MS213.
81 Kant refers to the former as 'affects' and the latter as 'passions', defines them at R 29n, MS 407-
8, and ApH 251-3 and 267, and discusses various instances at ApH 253-75. See also KU 380 and
EKU 196.
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concerning 'free will', is that it offers an unavailable causal 'explanation' of
chosen action, or at least an inadequate causal 'description' of it. I will show in the
following chapter that Kant, like Nietzsche, denies the experience of necessitating
causal powers, and therefore could not offer a causal 'explanation' of the kind to
which Nietzsche objects. As I will also show in the following chapter, elsewhere in
his works Kant also refers to choice as 'the' cause of an action, but offers only
one, unconvincing argument that would establish that, at least in what he calls the
'intelligible' respect, choice ought to be considered as causally sufficient for
action. Therefore, Kant is vulnerable to Nietzsche's demand that he admit better
causal 'descriptions' of choice, and, in particular, better causal 'descriptions'
which, as Nietzsche suspects, would identify salient causes of actions other than
choice.
Once again, however, admitting this demand need not threaten Kant's
conception of moral goodness. A will might achieve a goodness that is (i) a
goodness of a will's reason for action alone and (ii) good for a will as such,
although its choice is not causally sufficient for action.
m. The 'revaluation' of common sense
It remains to consider Nietzsche's allegation that, although Kant pursues an
unconditional and overriding rational 'ground' of judgement, he succeeds only in
articulating certain moral conceptions which prevailed in his own particular
environment, and which ought to be subjected to further 'revaluation'. I have
demonstrated that Kant conceives of moral goodness as lying in unconditional and
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overriding reasons for action, and proposes to derive a system of duties from his
conception of moral goodness. But, as I emphasised in the preceding chapter, his
method of arriving at this conception is to analyse a basic commitment of moral
common sense, rather than to identify a 'ground' beyond it. Kant thus does
intentionally precisely what Nietzsche alleges that he does unintentionally. Still,
Nietzsche's allegation is that, in doing so, Kant provides merely an analysis of
moral common sense, in that his analysis is, firstly, not comprehensive of other
common sense moral conceptions, and, secondly, not subjected to 'revaluation' on
grounds independent of common sense.
With regard to the first element of this allegation, Kant admittedly displays
no interest in analysing other basic commitments of common sense or more
concrete common sense conceptions. However, he also does not deny or preclude
such analyses. Nor does he deny or preclude the possibility that his own analysis
and his derivation of duties from it might not comprehend the results of such
further analyses. He thus might share Nietzsche's suspicion that the moral
conceptions which prevail in different environments need not be mutually
comprehensible. Given Kant's exclusive concern for a basic, abstract commitment
and the implications that can be systematically drawn from it, one might speculate
that he would admit mutual incomprehensibility only between such commitments
and implications, on the grounds of the priority of these commitments over other
moral conceptions within common sense. Still, that his method is to analyse moral
common sense suggests a liberal attitude to any further analyses and to any mutual
incomprehensibilities that they might reveal.
Kant would reject the second element of Nietzsche's allegation as
philosophically extravagant, however. I have argued that Nietzsche provides
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plausible grounds for supplementing Kant's conception of moral judgement with
an appreciation of one aspect of Nietzsche's 'revaluation of values' - namely, the
identification of kinds of noncognitive states which motivate obedience to kinds of
reasons. But Nietzsche also undertakes to evaluate this obedience according to his
particular concern for 'humanity', which he considers to be determined by his own
particular noncognitive motivating states. Indeed, both Kant and Nietzsche are
often supposed to invoke normative standards that hold independently of both
common sense and any agent's particular concerns. With respect to Nietzsche, in
the third chapter I mentioned some of the common candidates for such an
'objective' standard, and argued that his critical treatment of the common sense
conception of agency invokes no such standard. In the fourth chapter, I argued for
the same conclusion regarding his criticisms of Kant.
With respect to Kant's attitude towards appealing to such an 'objective'
standard, the evidence is admittedly mixed. In the third section of the Groundwork,
he raises the question of whether the conception of moral goodness which he
derives in the preceding sections, by analysis of the commitment of 'common
moral rational cognition' to the goodness of a good will, might be vindicated on
grounds independent of 'common moral rational cognition'. In particular, he
wonders how a moral judgement - that is, a judgement that a will has a morally
good reason to do or refrain from an action - could be justified, given that having a
morally good reason is neither conceptually included in having a will as such, nor
derivable from any other reasons which a will might have, since the latter reasons
would lack the unconditional character required by (ii), or, equivalently, be given a
posteriori. In Kant's terms, he wonders how a moral judgement could be both
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synthetic and a priori.82 Crucially, here he denies that this question can be
answered simply by the commitment of 'common moral rational cognition' to such
judgement. For all that the preceding analytical 'expansion of the universally
accepted concept of morality' has shown, he writes at the end of the second
section, this concept might be 'a chimerical idea without truth', a 'fantasy' .83 To
vindicate this concept, and thus the possibility of justifying a moral judgement,
Kant insists on finding independent grounds for it. Thus he describes his 'method'
in the Groundwork as follows: 'to proceed analytically from common cognition to
determination of its supreme principle and in turn synthetically back from the
examination of this principle and its sources to common cognition, in which its use
is found' .84 The first and second sections achieve the intended 'determination' of
moral goodness, and thus 'proceed analytically from common cognition' of moral
goodness. But only if Kant can identify other 'sources' of this moral goodness, and
so 'proceed [... ] synthetically back from' the analysis of moral goodness to its
'use' in a moral judgement, can he answer his question about the possibility of
justifying a moral judgement.
In the third section of the Groundwork, therefore, Kant considers his
analysis of moral common sense to require vindication on independent grounds,
just as Nietzsche demands that prevailing moral conceptions be 'revalued'
according to his particular concern for 'humanity', or as commentators often
demand, in Kant's or Nietzsche's name, that such conceptions be criticised
according to a normative standard that holds independently of common sense and
any agent's particular concerns. However, as I will show in the following chapter,
82 On the synthetic and a priori character of a mora) judgement, see G 420. G 420n. 440. and 444-
5. KpV 31. and R 26-8 and 26n.
83 G 444-5. See also G 420, 428-9, 429n. 431, and 440.
84 G 392.
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Kant's attempt to provide such independent grounds in the third section of the
Groundwork is unconvincing, and from the Critique of Practical Reason onwards
he insists that his question about the possibility of justifying a moral judgement
can be answered by the common sense commitment itself. That is, his considered
position is that no independent vindication need be provided for the conception of
moral goodness that he draws analytically from a basic common sense
commitment.
In this light, Kant would consider the 'revaluation' of this basic
commitment to be a philosophical extravagance, whether it be undertaken
according to particular grounds such as Nietzsche's concern for 'humanity' or
according to 'objective' grounds such as those often attributed to both Kant and
Nietzsche. The difference between Kant and Nietzsche on this matter therefore
remains an undecidable one.
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Conclusions
In this chapter, I defended an interpretation of Kant's formulas and their
place in his conception of moral judgement, on the basis of Kant's derivations and
employment of the formulas and his further claims about the nature of moral
judgement. In particular, I first demonstrated that Kant's formula of universal law
is not intended as a 'test' of reasons for action in specific circumstances, according
to the consequences of their universal adoption. Rather, the formula is intended as
an expression of moral goodness which emphasises that this goodness is (ii) good
for a will as such, and which, along with his other formulas, Kant proposes to
employ in deriving a system of duties from (i) and (ii) and claims regarding wills'
contingent conditions. Given this, I demonstrated that Nietzsche's criticisms of the
formula of universal law are misplaced. I then argued that prevailing
interpretations fail to capture the meanings of Kant's further formulas, and that he
employs a distinctive conception of 'community' in his derivations of duties from
them. With reference to the formula of autonomy in particular, I also briefly
argued that Kant does not, and need not, share Nietzsche's concern for individual
'autonomy', much as Nietzsche commentators often allege that Kant betrays it. In
the final section, I demonstrated that Nietzsche's criticisms of the common sense
conception of agency are somewhat more telling as criticisms of Kant, since they
draw certain significant accommodations from Kant's conception of moral
judgement. There I also argued that, given Kant's ultimate methodological appeal
to common sense, the success of Nietzsche's demand for further critical grounds is
undecidable.
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7.
Spontaneity in choice
In this chapter, I examine Kant's persistent claim that human choice must
be considered as undetermined by antecedent causes. In the first section, I outline
his attempt to accommodate this claim by means of his account of cognitive
judgement, and his restriction of the scope of the principle of causal determinism
in particular. This outline is, I argue, sufficient to demonstrate that Nietzsche's
allegations of the incoherence of 'free will' and the untenability of scepticism are
misplaced when applied to Kant. Nonetheless, much as Nietzsche might present it
as an undefended conviction, Kant offers four arguments for his claim. In the three
following sections, I consider these arguments in tum, and argue that each is
unconvincing, irrespective of Nietzsche's critical concerns and of the tenability of
Kant's attempt to accommodate his conclusion. Although I consider along with the
fourth argument Nietzsche's accusation that Kant propounds an over-inflated sense
of responsibility, I reserve mentioning the other, minor ways in which Kant's
arguments relate to Nietzsche's critical concerns until the final section.
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Intelligible and empirical choice
Kant's commitment to the principle of causal determinism constitutes part
of his account of cognitive judgement, which he presents at most length in the
Transcendental Analytic of the Critique of Pure Reason. In outline, this account
holds, firstly, that a human rational being can make a cognitive judgement only by
bringing a sensible intuition of an object under a concept, and can have a sensible
intuition of an object only by presupposing, a priori, intuitions of space and time.
Kant insists that the necessity of these presuppositions for a cognitive judgement
entails that the possible objects of such a judgement, which he terms
'appearances', must be distinguished from what these objects may be 'in
themselves', independently of the presuppositions made in their sensible intuition.I
Secondly, Kant holds that in order to bring an object under a concept in a cognitive
judgement, certain conceptual presuppositions regarding an 'object' in general
must be made." In particular, he argues that a cognitive judgement must
presuppose that its objects are 'substances' in which observable properties inhere
and that these objects are subject to causality. Furthermore, on the grounds of the
presupposition of time in sensible intuition, he argues that these substances must
be presupposed to persist over time and this causality to be governed by the
principle of causal determinism. This is so, he argues, on pain of not distinguishing
cognitive representations from their objects, for without presupposing temporally
persisting 'substances' and their subjection to the principle of causal determinism,
basic cognitive distinctions regarding succession and coexistence could not be
I See KrV A19-49/B33-73, and also P 287-94.
2 See KrV A50-130/B74-168, and also P 294-326.
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made.' With regard to the principle of causal determinism in particular, Kant thus
admits the 'Humean' claim that our experience extends not to causal powers which
necessitate succeeding events, but only to regular correlations between events of
the same types. But, by arguing that a cognitive judgement must presuppose its
object's subjection to the principle of causal determinism, Kant argues that this
principle itself is secured against such 'Humean' scepticism."
As I will demonstrate in the following sections, Kant offers four different
arguments for his consistent claim that human choice must be exempt from the
principle of causal determinism. Nonetheless, his attempts to accommodate this
claim all rest upon the account of cognitive judgement which he presents in the
Transcendental Analytic of the Critique, in the manner of the conclusions
regarding choice which he draws in his discussion of the third 'antinomy' in the
Transcendental Dialectic. There Kant applies to choice a broad implication of his
account of cognitive judgement, namely, that independently of the presuppositions
made in its sensible intuition - that is, 'in itself' - a possible object of a cognitive
judgement need not be subject to the principle of causal determinism.' Given this,
he maintains, one may distinguish the 'intelligible' from the 'empirical' choice of
any particular action, each being sufficient to account causally for the action, but
only the latter being a possible object of a cognitive judgement and therefore
subject to the principle of causal determinism. Thus he writes that, as a possible
object of a cognitive judgement, a human agent's 'choice has an empirical
character, which is the (empirical) cause of all his actions', and that 'not one of
[... the] conditions which determine human beings according to this character [... ]
3 See KrV AI82-2111B224-256.
4 See, for instance, KrV AI95-61B240-1. At KU 179-86 and EKU211-6, Kant proceeds to argue, on
further grounds, that a certain system among causal universals must also be presupposed.
5 For this implication, see KrV A532-581B560-86, and also P 312-3 and 343-7.
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would not be contained in the series of natural effects and obey the laws of nature'.
One can also investigate the further causal 'sources' of this 'empirical character',
and thus, again, 'one proceeds as [one does] generally in investigation of the series
of determining causes of a given natural effect'. Kant writes that 'intelligible'
choice, on the other hand, 'as unconditioned condition of every voluntary action,
[... ] allows of no condition preceding it in time, while its effect begins in the series
of appearances, but can never constitute an absolutely first beginning in this
series'." 'Intelligible' choice is therefore not a possible object of a cognitive
judgement, and, indeed, is singular, timeless, and not itself subject to explanation.i
This distinction between 'intelligible' and 'empirical' choice has been
persistently criticised for, among other things, having choice or its effects
contravene the principle of causal determinism, making choice causally
superfluous, considering any particular action to have two distinct but sufficient
causes, and reducing choice to a single, originary instance." The interpretation of
the distinction also remains highly controversial, particularly in the light of such
criticisms. Some interpreters, for instance, treat the distinction as an ontological
one, according to which the agent makes at least one causally significant choice
which is undetermined by antecedent causes," Others hold that Kant simply
considers choice under two epistemological 'aspects', that of the presuppositions
of cognitive judgement and that independent of these presuppositions, and admits
6 KrV A5521B580, A5541B582. See also KrV A550-81B578-86.
7 See KrV A551-71B579-85.
8 For relatively recent examples, see Bennett, Kant's Dialectic, pp.199-204, Walker, Kant, pp.147-
50, Beck, 'Five Concepts of Freedom in Kant', pp.42-3, Wolff, 'Remarks on the Relation of the
Critique of Pure Reason to Kant's Ethical Theory', pp.142-9, and Sullivan, Immanuel Kant's
Moral Theory, pp.283-6.
9 See, for instance, Wood. 'Kant's Compatibilism', and Barbone. 'Compatibilism in the First
Critique'.
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that spontaneity may be attributed to choice under the latter 'aspect' .10 Still other
interpreters maintain that Kant anticipates contemporary nonreductive materialism
by accounting for choice as merely a non-causal and irreducible kind of
description of events, events which are causal only under another, physical kind of
description. I I
Nietzsche's allegations regarding Kant's commitment to 'free will' bear
some similarity to these persistent critical concerns. To recall, Nietzsche's explicit
criticism of Kant with regard to choice is that, by endorsing 'free will', Kant
conceives of choice incoherently, as both a cause and the effect of that cause. Kant
is indeed vulnerable to this criticism, insofar as he either, as at the beginning of his
discussion in the Transcendental Dialectic, refers to spontaneity as self-causation
or, as in the body of his discussion, describes 'intelligible' choice as the cause of
'empirical' choice.V However, in his discussion Kant also denies that 'intelligible'
choice causes itself, and, particularly in concluding his discussion, he presents
'intelligible' choice and 'empirical' choice as each the sufficient cause of any
particular action." Nor need Nietzsche's criticism be ultimately more telling if
understood to echo persistent critical concerns regarding the coherence, given the
principle of causal determinism, of considering an action's cause as itself
uncaused. For Kant does not intend 'intelligible' choice to contravene this
10 See, in particular, Allison, Kant's Transcendental Idealism, esp. chs.l-Z, Kant's Theory of
Freedom, chs.I-4 and 7, 'Kant on Freedom', pp.l09-14 and 118-28, and 'Autonomy and
Spontaneity in Kant's Conception of the Self, pp.130-34. Comparable accounts are offered in
Beck, 'Five Concepts of Freedom in Kant', pp.43-6, Korsgaard, 'Morality as Freedom', pp.I71-6,
and O'Neill, 'Autonomy and Anthropology in Kant's Groundwork', pp.75-7. .
II See, in particular, Meerbote, 'Kant on the Nondeterminate Character of Human Actions' , and
Hudson, Kant's Compatibilism, chs.2 and 3.
12 For causal spontaneity as self-causation, see KrV A533-41B561-2, and for 'intelligible' choice as
the cause of 'empirical' choice, see KrV A5341B562, A5371B565, A5381B567, A5411B569, A544-
618572-4, A5491B577, and A551-21B579-80.
13 For the denial of self-causation, see KrV A5411B569, and for the equal causal sufficiency of
'intelligible' and 'empirical' choice, see KrV A5361B564, A5381B566, A5391B567, and A553-
618581-4.
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principle, in either the explanation or the conception of events: actions are also to
be sufficiently explained by 'empirical' choice, and this in tum by other preceding
causes, and 'causation' is to be conceived meaningfully without restricting it those
instances of it that are subject to the principle of causal determinism.l"
Nietzsche also objects, however, to the distinction between 'appearances'
and 'things in themselves' on which Kant's distinction between 'intelligible' and
'empirical' choice rests. Nietzsche's objection is that the former distinction
expresses a scepticism according to which knowledge claims which satisfy
ordinary standards of justification might nonetheless be false, and that this
scepticism relies on a notion of the 'true world' - for which, read 'things in
themselves' - which is epistemologically insignificant, mischaracterises the 'true',
and suspiciously serves certain practical interests, and therefore ought to be
dismissed. However, although I will not consider this objection in depth, it is again
not clear that it tells against Kant. For Kant does not conceive of 'things in
themselves' as the possible objects of genuinely 'true' knowledge claims, which, if
known, could falsify knowledge claims regarding 'appearances'. Rather, he
conceives of 'things in themselves' as objects considered independently of the
presuppositions under which they can be objects of a knowledge claim, or
cognitive judgement, at all. 'Things in themselves' therefore do not populate a
'true world' which, although of epistemological and practical significance, is
unfortunately epistemologically inaccessible to ordinary standards of justification.
They rather mark the absence of any knowledge claim, or cognitive judgment, at
all. If this is so, then the three concerns which Nietzsche extends from his
engagement with the sceptical position to his criticism of Kant's are misplaced.
14 Kant emphasises the latter point at Kp V 5-6, for instance.
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Nietzsche's criticisms of Kant's distinction between 'intelligible' and
'empirical' choice are, therefore, not convincing. Nonetheless, in the following
sections, I will argue that equally unconvincing are Kant's four arguments for the
claim that this distinction is designed to accommodate - namely, the claim that
human choice must be considered as undetermined by antecedent causes.
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An argument from rational choice
Kant's first argument for attributing spontaneity to choice is presented
alongside his account of the distinction between 'intelligible' and 'empirical'
choice in his discussion of the third 'antinomy' in the Transcendental Dialectic of
the Critique of Pure Reason. The argument is presented in terms of a 'practical'
sense of freedom which Kant here defines as 'the independence of choice from
necessitation by impulses of sensibility', and which he here, as elsewhere, insists
on attributing to human choice, while claiming that human choice is nonetheless
also 'affected' by such impulses." However, the argument's basic concern is with
the rational character of choice, to which, Kant maintains, 'practical' freedom
corresponds. He makes this correspondence explicit only later in the Critique,
when, in the Transcendental Doctrine of Method, he writes that if choice is 'free'
in the 'practical' sense, then it is determined 'by motives which are represented
only by reason', and is therefore subject to 'laws' which 'say what should
happen, even if it perhaps never happens' .16 In other words, Kant considers the
'practical' freedom of choice to correspond to the making of choice according to
reasons - that is, the sense of rational choice that he introduces with his account of
'practical reason' in the second section of the Groundwork.i'
In the passage from the Transcendental Doctrine of Method, Kant also
writes that human choice's 'practical' freedom and corresponding rational
character 'can be proved by experience', since, with regard to what 'determines
15 KrV A5341B562.
16 KrV ASOI-2IBS29-30.
17 Kant also intimates the correspondence between 'practical' freedom and rational choice when he
defines 'practical reason' at G 460n, and MS 211-4.
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human choice', 'we have an ability to overcome the impressions on our sensible
ability of desire [that is, our immediate inclinations] through representations of
that which is useful or harmful in a more remote way', and these representations
are 'based on reason' .18 However, he emphasises that such a 'proof' suffices only
in the context of the ordinary practice of practical judgement, since in this context
the question of whether choice is determined by antecedent causes does not arise."
As his discussion in the Transcendental Dialectic makes clear, he considers this
question to arise in a theoretical context, and, indeed, to provide 'the true moment
of the difficulties' of the 'practical' freedom of choice itself.2o This is so, Kant
argues, because to propose 'what should happen' according to reasons, as one does
in addressing human choice, is to presuppose that the choice addressed is not
determined by antecedent causes. He expresses this argument most clearly in the
following paragraph.
[A... ] 'should' expresses a possible action, the ground of which is nothing
other than a mere concept [that is, a reason for action ... ]. Now the action certainly
must be possible under natural conditions if the should is directed to it; but these
natural conditions do not concern the determination of choice itself, but only the
effect and its outcome in appearance. However many natural grounds. even sensible
stimuli, there may be which drive me to will, they cannot produce the should, but
only a still far from necessary, but always conditioned willing, against which the
should that reason pronounces sets measure and goal, indeed prohibition and
standing. It may be an object of mere sensibility (the agreeable) or even of pure
reason (the good): reason does not give [this object] according to those grounds
18 KrV A8021B830.
19 See KrV A8031B831.
20 KrV A5331B561.
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which are given empirically, and does not follow the order of things as they are
presented in appearance, but with complete spontaneity it makes its own order
according to ideas, in which it fits the empirical conditions, and according to which it
even declares actions to be necessary which still have not happened and perhaps
will not happen, but presupposing of all of them that reason could have causality in
relation to them; for, without that, it would not expect its ideas to have effects in
experience."
Despite its reference to 'ideas' - which, as I will explain in the following
section, has a very specific sense for Kant - the argument here is quite
straightforward. It argues simply that to propose, according to reasons, that an
action 'should' happen is to presuppose that 'reason could have causality in
relation to' the action, and thus that, although 'natural conditions' might constrain
the available options and consequences, antecedent conditions do not causally
determine the 'choice'. In other words, it is to presuppose that the choice
addressed is not determined by antecedent causes, because it is determined by
reasons. On these grounds, then, Kant claims that the 'freedom' of choice in the
'practical' sense requires that choice is also 'free' in the sense that it is not
determined by antecedent causes. As he expresses it, 'the practical concept [of
freedom] is grounded on [... the] transcendental idea of freedom' .22
This supposed requirement of 'transcendental' freedom presents 'the true
moment of the difficulties' of the 'practical' freedom of choice, of course, when it
is confronted with a commitment to the principle of causal determinism, and Kant
attempts to resolve these difficulties by appeal to the distinction between
'intelligible' and 'empirical' choice. Thus he writes, for instance, that, as
21 KrV A547-81B575-6. See also KrV A4481B476, A5341B562, and A5471B57S.
22 KrV A5331B561.
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'intelligible' choice, 'reason in its causality is subject to no conditions of
appearance and its temporal course'. 23 He endorses the argument again in his
immediately following Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics, his review of
Johann Schultz's Versuch einer Anleitung zur Sittenlehre for aile Menschen, and
the latter pages of the third section of the Groundwork, and, indeed, he did not
modify the relevant chapter of the Transcendental Dialectic when he prepared a
second edition of the Critique/"
This argument is also popular among contemporary commentators, who
often extend it to Kant's other texts and, in pursuit of metaphysical modesty,
combine it with a non-ontological interpretation of the distinction between
'intelligible' and 'empirical' choice. Henry Allison provides a particularly
extensive defence of such a position, according to which Kant's distinction as a
distinction between two epistemological 'aspects' of choice and a commitment to,
and identification with, motivations is an ineliminable moment of spontaneity in
rational choice, which can be admitted only under choice's 'intelligible' aspect.
The approach has also been taken up by others, notably Korsgaard, as a
commitment to two irreducible 'standpoints' on choice.f
However, it is far from clear that rational choice presupposes
'transcendental' freedom, as Kant's argument requires. Kant reasonably denies
that any mere 'experience' of rational choice, or of practical judgement, could
establish an agent's 'transcendental' freedom.i" Nor would a mere conviction of
23 KrV A5561B584. See also KrV A548-571B576-85.
24 See P 344-7, RS 13-4, G 455-7, and also, perhaps, MS 381-2 and 384-5.
25 For references to Allison, Korsgaard, and other examples of this approach, see n.1 0 above.
26 Kant thus anticipates Ameriks's objection to Allison, in his 'Kant and Hegel on Freedom',
pp.226-8.
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such freedom be adequate.v' Kant also reasonably admits that choice can be
conceived as rational without also conceiving of it as spontaneous: in his
discussion in the Transcendental Dialectic, for instance, he writes that an agent's
'empirical' choice 'displays a rule, according to which one can derive the rational
grounds and the actions themselves according to their kind and their degree, and
judge the subjective principles of his choice' .28 Given this, it is not clear why Kant,
or anyone else, should insist on a further moment of spontaneity in rational choice.
27 For discussion of this point, see Guevara, 'Two Standpoints on the Will', pp.88-91. and Ameriks,
Kant and the Fate of Autonomy, p.73.
28 KrV A5491B577. Kant thus anticipates compatibilist objections, such as that of Brink in his
'Kantian Rationalism', pp.266ff.
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Doubt regarding autonomy: ambitious and modest responses
As I mentioned in the preceding section, Kant republished his argument
from rational choice in the second edition of the Critique of Pure Reason and
meanwhile he endorsed it in, among other texts, the third section of the
Groundwork. However, the latter text also provides a different, and more
extensive, argument, which, furthermore, Kant dismissed and replaced in the
Critique of Practical Reason. In the following two subsections, I consider this
argument and its replacement in tum, and argue, in particular, that both are
hamstrung by a puzzling confusion.
I. The ambitious argument of the Groundwork, section III
I noted in the previous chapter that Kant's concern in the third section of
the Groundwork is to explain the possible justification of a moral judgement. In
particular, he is concerned to explain, independently of 'common moral rational
cognition', how a will could be judged to have a morally good reason to do or
refrain from an action, given that such a reason is neither conceptually included in
having a will as such, nor derivable from any other reasons which a will might
have, since the latter reasons would lack the requisite unconditional character. This
is a comprehensible concern. However, the particular doubt about moral
judgement that Kant identifies at the beginning of the section, and the argument
with which he then attempts to dispel it, are profoundly unconvincing. Indeed, I
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will argue that this is so despite the fact that Kant's argument is often dismissed on
a variety of other, inappropriate grounds.
Kant begins the section by arguing that if a will is 'free' in a 'negative'
sense, then, 'through mere analysis of its concept', it must also have 'autonomy',
the property which, as the first and second sections demonstrate, a moral
judgement must attribute to a will. He writes here that a 'will is a kind of causality
of living beings insofar as they are rational', and that a will which is 'free' in the
'negative' sense is a will which, unlike 'natural necessity', has the 'property [... ]
that it can be effective independently of alien causes determining it'. That is, for
Kant, to have a will is to be able to act according to reasons, and to have a
negatively free will is to be able to so act undetermined by antecedent causes, and
thus undetermined by something other than this ability. The 'negative' sense of
freedom, then, includes the 'transcendental' sense with which Kant is occupied in
the Critique of Pure Reason and elsewhere. Here he argues that negative freedom
entails autonomy - which he here refers to as 'the will's property of being a law to
itself' and as a will's 'freedom' in a 'positive' sense - because willing must be
determined - in Kant's terms, its causality cannot be 'lawless'. That is, he argues
that if willing must be determined but is not determined by antecedent causes and
thus by something other than will itself, then, by elimination, it must be
determined by will itself_29Thus Kant concludes that, by analysis, a will's negative
freedom entails its autonomy.
However, Kant's doubt about moral judgement rests on the opposite
entailment, namely, that. by analysis, a will's autonomy entails its negative
29 G 446, 447. See also KpV29, 31, and 93-4, and MS 222,223, and 239. Allison provides a similar
interpretation of Kant's argument here, although he treat it in terms of the formula of universal law ,
rather than the formula of autonomy to which Kant refers, and holds that the argument is made
clear only at KpV29. See Allison, Kant's Theory of Freedom, pp.204-13, and 'Autonomy and
Spontaneity in Kant's Conception ofthe Self, pp.134-42.
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freedom. He affirms both entailments when he writes, slightly later in the section,
that autonomy and negative freedom 'are both autonomy, [and] hence reciprocal
concepts'. But he provides an argument from autonomy to negative freedom only
in the Critique of Practical Reason. There he argues that the 'determining ground'
of a will which has autonomy 'can be represented merely by reason', and is
therefore 'distinguished from every determining ground of events in nature
according to the law of causality, because in these the determining grounds must
themselves be appearances'. From this Kant concludes that a will which has
autonomy 'must be thought as completely independent of the natural law of
appearances in their relations to one another, namely[,] the law of causality' .30
That is, Kant argues that since a will which has autonomy acts according to a
reason which is 'given' by will itself, it cannot be determined to act by something
other than itself, as the possible objects of a cognitive judgement are in their
subjection to the principle of causal determinism, and it is therefore negatively
free.
These arguments for the two 'reciprocal' entailments are deeply puzzling.
For autonomy is a quality of the reasons according to which an agent acts, while
negative freedom regards the causal determination of her choice itself. Neither is
pertinent to the other. Thus Kant's arguments apparently confuse the 'self-
determination' of an agent's acting according to a reason concerning mere will,
rather than inclination, with the 'self-determination' of an agent's choice being
self-caused, rather than caused by antecedent causes.
30 G 450, KpV28-9, 29. Note that although at KpV28-9 Kant expresses moral goodness as 'the
mere lawgiving form of maxims alone [being] the sufficient determining ground of a will', and
refers only to the 'transcendental' sense of freedom, at KpV 29 and 33 he equates the former with
'autonomy', or the 'positive' sense of freedom, and the latter with the 'negative' sense of freedom.
For other statements of this argument, see KpV33-4, 38-9, 42, 44, 50, 55, 93-4, and 105, RV 455-7,
and MS 223 and 225.
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Furthermore, if this argument is confused, then the doubt that Kant
identifies on the basis of it is misplaced. He first refers to the synthetic character of
a moral judgement, by stating that 'such a synthetic proposition is possible only by
this, that the two cognitions [of which it consists, namely, a will and its having a
morally good reason to do or refrain from an action] are bound together through
their connection with a third, in which they are both to be found' .31 He then writes,
'The positive concept of freedom creates this third [cognition], which cannot be[,]
as in physical causes[,] the nature of the sensible world (in the concept of which
the concepts of something as cause in relation to something other as effect come
together),. Thus, Kant claims, the 'third' cognition to which a moral judgement
must refer is a cognition 'to which freedom points us and of which we have an
idea a priori'.32 That is, Kant maintains that since a moral judgement attributes
autonomy ('positive' freedom) to a will, it also attributes to it a freedom which is
not compatible with the principle of causal determinism, namely, negative
freedom. Given Kant's claim that a possible object of a cognitive judgement is
subject to the principle of causal determinism, a moral judgement thus 'points us'
towards regarding willing as not such a possible object, or not part of 'the sensible
world'. The doubt with which Kant is occupied in the third section, then, rests
upon his puzzling affirmation of autonomy's entailment of negative freedom: he is
concerned that the autonomy which a moral judgement attributes to a will cannot
justifiably be attributed to it, because the willing such a judgement requires could
31 G 447. Note, however, that here Kant presents his concern in the third section as that of
defending the possibility of the 'principle' of morality itself, which, he claims, cannot be
established 'through analysis of the concept of an absolutely good will', and is therefore 'a
synthetic proposition'. This claim confuses the derivation of the 'principle' of morality from the
concept of a good will with the character of the judgement that a will has a morally good reason to
do or refrain from an action, in the sense identified by the 'principle' of morality. As he indicates at
G 392,420, 42On, 428-9, 429n, 431, 440, 444-5, and 454, Kant's considered position is that the
former is analytic, a priori, and provided in the first and second sections, while the latter is
synthetic, a priori, and considered in the third section.
31 G447.
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not be a possible object of a cognitive judgement, subject to the principle of causal
d .. 33eterrmrusm.
In attempting to dispel this doubt in the rest of the section, however, Kant
appeals to the equally puzzling opposite entailment for which he argues at the
beginning of the section, namely, that a will's negative freedom entails its
autonomy. That is, he undertakes to dispel his doubt about autonomy by arguing
that, despite its incompatibility with the principle of causal determinism, negative
freedom can and must be attributed to a will, and that therefore, by analysis,
autonomy can and must also be attributed to it. Indeed, as I mentioned in the
preceding chapter and as Kant emphasises later in the section, such an argument
would, if successful, also vindicate the account of moral goodness provided in the
first and second sections, by providing grounds for it other than those of 'common
moral rational cognition'. In the terms of the 'method' he outlines in the preface,
such an argument would identify 'sources' of this account other than 'common
moral rational cognition'.
As 'preparation' for this argument, Kant first identifies three significant
constraints which the doubt places upon any such attempt to dispel it. In short,
these constraints are the following: firstly, the argument should demonstrate that
negative freedom must be attributed to a will as such, rather than to a will only on
further, contingent grounds, since a moral judgement attributes autonomy to a will
on equally unconditional grounds; secondly, since a will's negative freedom is not
a possible object of a cognitive judgement, the argument cannot demonstrate this
freedom as such an object, but rather only as a necessary presupposition regarding
a will; and, thirdly, the argument must not rest on grounds which might presuppose
33 Later in the section, at G 456, Kant refers to this doubt as that on which 'the fatalist can build and
chase all morality from its supposed propertyj.] possessed without title'.
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the possibility of making a moral judgement, since the argument is intended to
demonstrate precisely that possibility.l"
Kant identifies the third constraint by considering, as a mere assertion, a
claim which would satisfy the first and second constraints. Of this claim he writes
the following.
Now I assert: that to every rational being that has a will we must necessarily lend
also the idea of freedom, under which alone he acts. For in such a being we think of a
reason which is practical, Le. has causality in view of its objects. Now[,] one cannot
possibly think of a reason which[,] with its own consciousness [and] in view of its
judgements[,] receives a direction from elsewhere, for then the subject would ascribe
the determination of the power of judgement not to his reason, but to an impulse. It
must regard itself as originator of its principles, independently of alien influences,
[and] consequently as practical reason, or as the will of a rational being[,] it must be
regarded of itself as free; i.e. the will of such a being can be its own only under the
idea of freedom and must therefore in a practical respect be attributed to every
rational being."
The claim which Kant presents as a mere assertion here is that made in the
third, penultimate sentence: that the making of a rational judgement - that is, a
judgement according to reasons - is necessarily negatively free. Given this claim
as a premise, Kant argues that a will as such must be presupposed to be negatively
free, because, as action according to reasons, willing is an instance of rational
judging. The asserted claim would thus dispel his doubt about autonomy, and
would do so without appealing to grounds which are contingent to a will, or
34 For the first two constraints, see G 447-9, and for the third, see G 448-50 and 453.
35 G 448.
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considering a will's negative freedom as an object of a cognitive judgement. Since
the asserted claim has this happy implication, however, Kant suspects that it might
merely presuppose the possibility of attributing autonomy to a will in moral
judgement. Thus he claims that 'a kind of circle shows itself here': 'We take
ourselves as free in the order of efficient causes, in order to think ourselves in the
order of ends under moral laws, and we afterwards think ourselves as subject to
these laws, because we have ascribed to ourselves freedom of will' .36 Kant
therefore concludes his 'preparation' by noting that, thus far, he has only extended
the analysis of moral goodness which the first and second sections provide, by
demonstrating that since moral goodness consists of the autonomy of a will, it also
consists of the will's negative freedom."
In the rest of the third section, Kant attempts to justify the claim which he
considers as a mere assertion in his 'preparation', namely, that rational judging is
necessarily negatively free. Although not ultimately convincing, his argument is
simpler and more plausible than the variety of accounts in the literature would
suggest. Its grounds lie in the account of cognitive judgement which he presents in
his Critique of Pure Reason. In the Groundwork he presents this account in a brief
and simplified form, emphasising particularly the distinction between
'appearances' and 'what they may be in themselves'. He also mentions here that
36 G 448, 450. See also G 449-50 and 453. Commentators have offered a variety of other
interpretations of the 'circle', however. For instance, in his Kant's Theory of Mind, pp.203-6,
Ameriks maintains that the 'circle' refers to the inadequacy of claim that rational judging is
negatively free for justifying the attribution of autonomy, rather than only negative freedom, to a
will. This is unconvincing, given that Kant begins the third section by arguing precisely that, by
analysis, a negatively free will also has autonomy. Equally unconvincing is Korsgaard's claim, in
her 'Morality as Freedom', p.167, that the 'circle' refers to Kant's failure to yet demonstrate our
motivational 'interest' in moral goodness. For Kant attempts to demonstrate what she understands
as our motivational 'interest' in moral goodness only after having claimed to remove the suspicion
of a 'circle', and then only as a consequence of his particular solution to it. Also unconvincing, if
more understandable, is Allison's claim, in his Kant's Theory of Freedom, pp.217-21, that the
'circle' refers to Kant's suspicion of the claim that a rational being has a will at all. Although some
of Kant's remarks in the third section might suggest such a suspicion, he also regularly refers to the
having of a will as a basic premise of his argument, and nowhere attempts to demonstrate it.
37 See G 449-50.
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the bringing of an object under a concept in a cognitive judgement manifests the
judging being's 'self-activity', in contrast to the passivity of its being affected by
sensible intuitions." This presumably refers not only to the conceptual
presuppositions regarding an 'object' in general which, Kant holds, are required to
bring an object under a concept in a cognitive judgement, but also to another claim
made in the Critique of Pure Reason, that this bringing of an object under a
concept requires a certain spontaneity of 'apperception' .39
However, in attempting to justify the claim that rational judging is
necessarily negatively free, Kant emphasises a further, 'pure self-activity'. This
particular 'self-activity', he claims, is manifested by the very distinguishing of the
possible objects of a cognitive judgement from 'what they may be in themselves',
and also by what he calls 'ideas'. For Kant, as he makes clear at the beginning of
the Transcendental Dialectic of the Critique of Pure Reason, an 'idea' identifies an
unconditioned totality of conditions, and there is thus an 'idea' corresponding to
each kind of condition under which the possible objects of a cognitive judgement
stand. Since an 'idea' proceeds beyond these conditions to their unconditioned
totality, Kant holds that it identifies an object which cannot be an object of a
cognitive judgement and, as he emphasises in the Groundwork, that it thus
manifests a 'self-activity' which is negatively free. Thus in the Groundwork he
writes of this 'self-activity', along with that of distinguishing of 'appearances'
from 'things in themselves', 'reason shows under the name of ideas a spontaneity
so pure that through this it goes far beyond everything that sensibility can supply it
and proves its most noble occupation in distinguishing the world of sense and the
world of understanding from each other, [... and] thereby marking out for the
38 G 452.
39 For the latter claim, see KrV AI03-10 and B131-6.
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understanding itself its limits'. On these grounds, Kant claims that a human
rational being must regard itself not only as a possible object of a cognitive
judgement, and so subject to the principle of causal determinism, but also as a
'thing in itself' and, crucially, as negatively free in this regard. In Kant's terms, a
human rational being not only 'must count himself in the world of sense', but also
'in view of what may be in him of pure activity [... ] must count himself in the
intellectual world, which however he does not cognise further' .40
By appealing to the spontaneity manifested in 'ideas' and in the distinction
between 'appearances' and 'things in themselves', then, Kant claims to justify the
claim that rational judging is necessarily negatively free. He intends this
justification to satisfy his third constraint by not presupposing the possibility of
making a moral judgement, and he argues from the claim in the manner which he
proposes in his 'preparation', a manner which satisfies his first and second
constraints. That is, given the claim that rational judging is necessarily negatively
free, he argues that autonomy must be attributed to a will, because willing is an
instance of rational judging and, and, by analysis, a will's negative freedom entails
its autonomy. Given the nature of his justification of the claim regarding rational
judging, of course, he restricts this conclusion to a will insofar as it is not regarded
as a possible object of a cognitive judgement. Thus he concludes that a human
rational being 'has two standpoints from which he can regard himself and cognise
laws for the use of his powers, [and] consequently for all his actions, first, insofar
as he belongs to the world of sense, under laws of nature (heteronomy), [and]
second, as belonging to the intelligible world, under laws which, independent of
nature, are not empirical, but grounded merely in reason [that is, as baving
40 G 452, 451. On the nature of 'ideas', see also G 455 and 463, and KrV A310-381B366-96, P 327-
65, KU 341-4 and 351, and MS 371.
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autonomy]' .41 Furthermore, Kant claims, the latter standpoint constitutes a human
rational being's 'true self', from which she must be regarded in a practical
judgement, because 'the world of understanding contains the ground of the world
of sense, hence also of its laws' - that is, apparently, because even from the former
standpoint, a certain 'self-activity' is presupposed."
Kant claims to thus successfully defend the possibility of a moral
judgement against his doubt that it is not possible to attribute to a will the
autonomy which such a judgement must attribute to it. As he puts it here, the
'categorical ought [of a moral judgement] represents a synthetic proposition a
priori, through which to my will affected by sensible desires is added the idea of
the same will, but belonging to the world of the understanding[,] pure, [and] for
itself practical, [the idea] which contains the supreme condition of the former
according to reason' .43
Kant's argument in these pages of the third section of the Groundwork is
often unfairly dismissed, even by sympathetic commentators. There is a broad
consensus that the argument is intended to demonstrate the negative freedom of a
will by appealing to the spontaneity which, Kant claims, is manifested by 'ideas'
and by the distinction between 'appearances' and 'things in themselves'." But,
beyond this, commentators disagree widely over the nature of the argument's
obscurity or failure. Karl Ameriks, for instance, dismisses Kant's argument as
profoundly obscure, on the grounds that Kant simply assumes that negative
freedom must be attributed to a will; that only later in the section does he
41 G 452. See also G 453. and KrV A5471B575.
42 G 457. 453. See also G 454. 457-8, and 461.
43 G 454.
44 See, for instance. Henrich, 'Die Deduktion des Sittengesetzes', pp.(317-38), Ameriks, Kant's
Theory of Mind. pp.203-9 and 211-6. Allison, Kant's Theory of Freedom. pp.217. 221-8. 237. and
242. and Korsgaard, 'Morality as Freedom' •pp.161 and 170. and 'Creating the Kingdom of Ends' •
p.201 and n.21.
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emphasise the element of his argument which, according to Ameriks, is intended
to demonstrate a will's autonomy, namely, our membership of the 'intelligible
world'; and that it is unclear precisely which kind of spontaneity Kant's argument
refers to.45 Allison takes another approach, criticising Kant's argument for
demonstrating only that a rational being is something beyond the conditions of
sensibility, and can therefore have a will, but not that it has a will which is
autonomous or governed by moral laws.t" Such criticisms profoundly misrepresent
Kant's concerns and argument - most unconvincingly, perhaps, by failing to
appreciate that if Kant had assumed or demonstrated a will's negative freedom,
then he would also have demonstrated its autonomy, since he maintains that one
analytically entails the other.47 Other commentators, however, simply marginalise
Kant's account of cognitive judgement and 'ideas', with the intention of thus
revealing a more defensible line of argument. Michael McCarthy, for instance,
claims that Kant's primary argument proceeds from his bare assertion of the
necessary negative freedom of rational judging to the claim that a will must
therefore be regarded as subject to the laws of the 'intelligible world' .48 Thomas
Hill similarly focuses on a supposed argument from a simple assertion that the will
of a rational being is negatively free, or, at most, from what he calls 'a thought
experiment' regarding willing. However, as Hill, if not McCarthy, rightly notes,
Kant's third constraint implies that he would consider such a premise to risk
merely reflecting a contingency of human nature."
45 See Ameriks, Kant's Theory of Mind, pp.203-9 and 211-6. See also his later account, in Kant and
the Fate of Autonomy, pp.70-1 and 74, and Sullivan, Immanuel Kant's Moral Theory, pp.84-8.
46 See Allison, Kant's Theory of Freedom. pp.217, 221-8,237, and 242.
47 See also n.36 above, on Ameriks's and Allison's misinterpretations of the 'circle' referred to at G
450.
48 See McCarthy, 'Kant's Rejection of the Argument of Groundwork III',pp.175-80.
49 See Hill. 'Kant's Argument for the Rationality of Mora! Conduct', pp.263-7, and n.6 to p.252.
Wood provides a similar interpretation, if somewhat hesitantly, in his Kant's Ethical Thought,
pp.171-82, and 00.28, 29. and 30.
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Nonetheless, even rightly understood, Kant's argument is flawed. There are
three flaws in particular. Firstly, as Ameriks observes, although the intended object
of 'ideas' or other judgements may not be determined by possible objects of a
cognitive judgement and their conditions, nothing follows from this regarding how
its intending, in judgement, is to be explained. In particular, it does not follow that
its intending is not so determined. 50 Secondly, as Kant himself notes in the preface,
he does not demonstrate 'the unity [... ] in a common principle' of a 'critique of
pure practical reason' with his critique of 'speculative', or theoretical, reason. This
unity is nonetheless presupposed by his extension to rational judgement in general,
and to willing in particular, of the spontaneity supposedly revealed by 'ideas' and
by the distinguishing of 'appearances' from 'things in themselves' .51 Finally, in
arguing from a will's negative freedom to its autonomy, Kant again invokes the
puzzling entailment that he affirms at the beginning of the section.
Having completed his supposed defence of the possible justification of a
moral judgement, Kant concludes the section by clarifying its nature and
implications.V In particular, he emphasises, firstly, that this defence belongs to
'speculative philosophy', rather than 'practical philosophy'; secondly, that it not
only dispels the doubt about autonomy, but also provides a 'speculative'
vindication of his analysis of moral goodness in the preceding sections; and,
thirdly, that 'speculative philosophy' can do no more for 'practical philosophy'
than provide this defence and vindication, and, in particular, cannot 'explain' a
will's autonomy in terms of antecedent causes.53 Kant does not, however, attend to
50 See Ameriks, Kant's Theory of Mind, pp.207 and 213-6.
51 G 391. This seems to be Korsgaard's objection, in her 'Morality and Freedom'. p.170, and
'Creating the Kingdom of Ends'. n.21.
52 In doing so. he also provides brief restatements of his argument. See G 454-5. 455-7. 458. 459.
and 461. and also the earlier restatement of it at G 453.
53 See. respectively. G 455-7. 457-8. and 458-63.
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the confusion which underpins not only his doubt about autonomy, but also his
attempt to dispel it, and, indeed, the latter three clarifications. That is, he does not
explain the pertinence of a will's negative freedom, a quality of its causal
determination, to its autonomy, the quality of its reasons which a moral judgement
attributes to it.
II. The modest argument of the Critique of Practical Reason
In the Critique of Practical Reason, Kant denies that a 'speculative'
argument for the necessity of attributing negative freedom to a will can be
provided, because such an argument would require a non-sensible intuition of this
freedom, and a human rational being does not have such intuitions. In one passage,
he also admits that he is not yet able to demonstrate the required 'unity' of
speculative and practical reason. Kant insists that 'speculative philosophy' can
demonstrate only the possibility of negative freedom, by distinguishing the
possible objects of a cognitive judgement, subject to the principle of causal
determinism, from what they are 'in themselves' .54 Indeed, he considers the
demonstration of this possibility to be sufficient to dispel the doubt about
autonomy.55 In the Critique, then, Kant's response to the doubt is decidedly less
ambitious than in the Groundwork.
Furthermore, given that the doubt is thus dispelled, Kant claims that the
common presupposition that a judgement according to (i) and (ii) can be made, a
54 See KpV 5-7, 6n, 29, 31,42-56, 93-9, and 103-6, and also KrV Bxxiv-xxx and Bxxvi n. For
Kant's admission regarding the 'unity' of speculative and practical reason, see KpV90-1.
ss Kant refers to the doubt at KpV 7-8, 15-6, 30,44-5,54-6, 89-90, and 94-103, and KrV Bxxviii-
xxx.
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presupposition which he here calls a 'fact of reason', can itself serve to
demonstrate the necessity of attributing negative freedom, along with autonomy, to
a will 'in itself'. He makes this claim simply on the grounds that, by analysis, a
will's autonomy entails its negative freedom, and that, in attributing autonomy to a
will, a moral judgement therefore also attributes negative freedom to it. In the
Groundwork, this entailment gives rise to the doubt about autonomy, in response
to which a 'speculative' demonstration of the possibility and necessity of
attributing negative freedom to a will is provided. In the Critique, however, the
doubt is supposed to be dispelled merely by the 'speculative' demonstration of the
possibility of such freedom, and the entailment instead serves a 'practical'
demonstration of the necessity of attributing negative freedom, along with
autonomy, to a will 'in itself' .56 Kant also upholds this more modest position in his
later texts.S7 With this retreat, then, Kant no longer offers a 'speculative'
demonstration of a will's negative freedom and autonomy, and consequently also
no longer offers a 'speculative' vindication of the account of moral goodness
which, in the Critique of Practical Reason as in the Groundwork, he attributes to
'common moral rational cognition'. In effect, he abandons the pursuit of
independent vindication for this account." Notably, this is so despite the fact that
56 For this argument, see KpV 3-5, 4n, 6, 15-6,29-32,35,42-50,54-7,89-94,98-100, and 103-6.
Unsurprisingly, Kant continues to insist on the impossibility of explaining a will's autonomy in
terms of natural causes. See KpV7, 30, 43,46,49,94-5, and 99, and also TP 285 and 285n, RV
453-4 and 459-60, MS 221, 226, 320n, 378, 380n, and 483, and SF 83-4. Note also that, for Kant,
the 'practical' argument for a will's negative freedom is significant for the 'system' of reason, in
that it demonstrates what 'speculative philosophy' not only shows is possible, but also shows is
necessary to avoid the 'antinomy' raised by objects' subjection to natural causality, and provides
'practical' grounds for the other 'ideas' of God and immortality. See KpV 3-7, 10, 12,30,48-9, and
103-6, and KrVBxxvii-xxx.
57 See KrVBxxi-xxii, Bxxiv-xxx, and Bxxvi n, RV 453-4 and 458-60, KV 343, 403, and 468, R
26n, 41, 49-50, 5On, 62, and 138, TP 284-5, 285n, and 287-8, MS 221,225,226,239,252,273,
28On, 380, 38On, 383, 396,404-5. and 418, ApH 324, and VE 27: 506-7.
58 The differences between the arguments in G and KpVpresumably explain why in G Kant insists
that he provides a 'critique of pure practical reason' - that is, a consideration of the ultimate
justification of a moral judgement - and in Kp V he insists only on a 'critique of practical reason' -
that is, a consideration of the ultimate justification of any practical judgement. See G 391-2. 447.
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he offers two other arguments for attributing spontaneity to choice, arguments
which he does not withdraw and which, if cogent and given spontaneity's
entailment of autonomy, would provide such vindication.i"
The broad differences between the Groundwork and the Critique of
Practical Reason in this regard are generally well recognised, although they are
sometimes disputed.?" Commentators tend to explain Kant's change of strategy as
reflecting his belated acknowledgement of the particular weakness which they
identify in the Groundwork argument. This has some plausibility in the case of
Ameriks's persuasive criticism of the latter argument, given Kant's reference in
the Critique of Practical Reason to the unavailability of a non-sensible intuition of
negative freedom." However, although Kant offers a more modest solution to his
doubt regarding autonomy, with both doubt and solution he continues to insist on
the puzzling entailment of a will's negative freedom by its autonomy. In this, basic
respect, the argument of the Critique of Practical Reason fails to improve on that
of the third section of the Groundwork.
454, and 463, and KpV 3 and 15-6, and, of course, the titles of the third section of G and of KpV
themselves.
59 Kant even notes this at Kp V 93-4, immediately before presenting one of these two arguments.
60 For the consensus, see, for example, Ameriks, Kant's Theory of Mind, pp.191-2, 209-11, and
226-7, and Kant and the Fate of Autonomy, pp.62-75, Korsgaard, 'Morality as Freedom', pp.161
and 170, and Allison, Kant's Theory of Freedom, pp.201 and 230-43, and 'Autonomy and
Spontaneity in Kant's Conception of the Self, pp.138-42. Among the dissenters, Beck, for
instance, argues that Kant provides a 'speculative' demonstration of a will's negative freedom in
both texts, while Paton, Henrich, and, more recently, Voeller claim that no such demonstration is
provided in either text. See Paton, The Categorical Imperative, pp.199-278, Beck, A Commentary
on Kant's Critique of Practical Reason, pp.166-75, Henrich, 'Die Deduktion des Sittengesetzes' ,
pp.(322-335), and Voeller, The Metaphysics of the Moral Law, esp. chs.2 and 3. See also
McCarthy, 'Kant's Rejection of the Argument of Groundwork III', pp.180-90, Sullivan, Immanuel
Kant's Moral Theory, pp.88-90 and n.15, and O'Neill, 'Reason and Autonomy in Grundlegung III',
EP.64-5.
1 See Ameriks, Kant's Theory of Mind, pp.211-20, and, for a less plausible example of this
tendency, Allison, Kant's Theory of Freedom, pp.227-9, 237, and 242.
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An argument from responsibility
Later in the Critique of Practical Reason, in the 'Critical Elucidation' of its
Analytic, Kant offers a fourth argument for attributing spontaneity to 'intelligible'
choice. This argument is a standard incompatibilist argument from responsibility,
premised on the claim that an agent is responsible only for what is 'within her
control' in the sense that she could do otherwise. Given this premise, Kant's
argument is a persuasive one. However, the premise begs the question of the
falsity of a standard alternative sense of responsibility, which Kant dismisses in the
course of the argument.
Kant's argument is, in short, that since the principle of causal determinism
entails that any action is sufficiently determined by antecedent causes, and these
causes are outside an agent's control at the moment that she acts, the principle
precludes responsibility. To reply that these antecedent causes themselves might
have been within an agent's control, Kant implies, is merely to precipitate a
regress, for the further causes of those causes must, given the principle of
determinism, have been sufficiently determined by antecedent causes in tum.
Since the principle also excludes a first, undetermined cause, the agent's action or
its causes must ultimately be sufficiently determined by causes outside her control.
Thus Kant writes, 'at every point of time I still stand under the necessity of being
determined to action by what is not within my control, and the a parte priori
endless series of events which I always only continue according to an already
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predetermined order would nowhere begin of itself, [... and] therefore my causality
would never be freedom' .62
Kant proceeds to dismiss the standard compatibilist reply. This reply
affirms an alternative sense of responsibility, according to which an agent is
responsible only for what is 'within her control' in the sense of not
circumstantially or psychologically constrained. As Kant expresses it, this reply
holds that an agent is responsible for an action only if the action is 'not driven
from outside', but rather 'necessary through determining grounds which lie in the
subject' in the sense that they are 'thought with reason' or determine action
'through representations' .63 This is a distinct sense of responsibility, although it
might be expressed in terms of what is 'within the control' of the agent, and also
might, psychologically-speaking, encourage belief in responsibility in Kant's
sense. However, Kant dismisses the compatibilist alternative out of hand, as 'a
wretched substitute', 'a little quibbling about words'i'" Simply restating his
argument from his own sense of responsibility, he insists that, even if an agent's
action is determined in the manner required by the compatibilist sense of
responsibility, it is still ultimately and sufficiently determined by antecedent
causes which are not in her control. In Kant's well-known words, it is still 'nothing
better than the freedom of a turnspit'. Against the compatibilist conclusion that the
principle of causal determinism is compatible with responsibility, then, Kant
merely opposes his own: that without 'transcendentalfreedom', 'no moral law, no
imputation according to it is possible' .65 To accommodate such 'freedom', of
62 KpV95. See also KpV94.
63 KpV96.
64 KpV96.
6S KpV97. See also KpV96.
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course, he once again invokes his distinction between 'intelligible' and 'empirical'
choice."
Kant's argument from responsibility therefore begs the question of the
falsity of the compatibilist's alternative sense of responsibility. I argued in the first
part of the thesis that, on the evidence of his criticism of the common sense
conception of agency, Nietzsche does not deny responsibility as such, and in the
third part, I will argue that he endorses the compatibilist's sense of responsibility,
and distinguishes it from the sense that Kant endorses. Given this, Kant's
argument ought not to persuade Nietzsche, and Nietzsche's own concern for
restricting responsibility to what is 'within the control' of the agent ought to be
understood in compatibilist, rather than incompatibilist, terms.
With regard to Kant's argument from responsibility, there is also some
warrant to Nietzsche's allegation that Kant exploits 'free will' to promote what
Nietzsche considers an over-inflated sense of responsibility. This is unsurprising,
since the argument is that responsibility requires not only causally undetermined
choice, but also choice which is ultimately causally sufficient for action. Thus, in
presenting his argument from rational choice, as I mentioned, Kant emphasises
that 'natural conditions' constrain possible actions, and in attempting to dispel his
doubt regarding autonomy in the Groundwork and the Critique of Practical
Reason, he also provides no indication that he denies the pertinence of such
constraints. Immediately after presenting his argument from responsibility in the
Critique of Practical Reason, however, Kant claims that the 'intelligible' choice
required is such that no such constraints can ultimately be pertinent. Most clearly,
perhaps, in considering the judgement of a bad action, he represents 'intelligible'
66 See KpV 95,97-100. This argument is also expressed in RV 455-60, and, perhaps, at R 21, and
MS 223. In KpVKant proceeds to consider a corresponding problem regarding the divine
determination of 'intelligible' choice. See KpV 100-3.
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choice as the 'prosecutor' and 'empirical' choice as the 'advocate', and insists that
'the advocate [... ] can in no way silence the prosecutor, if only [... the agent] is
aware that at the time he committed this wrong that he was in his senses, i.e. had
the use of his freedom' .67 This is so, Kant argues, because responsibility requires a
choice which is ultimately causally sufficient for action, and thus has no place for
constraints.l"
Nietzsche need not accept this conclusion, since he does not endorse the
sense of responsibility on which it is premised. On the other hand, given Kant's
sense of responsibility, his conclusion is a persuasive one, and he could dismiss
Nietzsche's allegation of its over-inflation for its own misconception of
responsibility. In this respect, therefore, Nietzsche's allegation is ultimately
inconclusive.
67 KpV98.
68 See KpV98-100. and also KrV A554-51B582-3.
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Choice and reasons
With the exception of Kant's endorsement, through his argument from
responsibility, of what Nietzsche would consider an over-inflated sense of
responsibility, Kant's four arguments for attributing spontaneity to choice lie at
some distance from Nietzsche's critical concerns. However, in the process of
providing these arguments, Kant occasionally makes the claims regarding choice
and reasons that Nietzsche criticises. I argued in the previous chapter that Kant's
conception of moral judgement can accommodate Nietzsche's criticisms of these
claims, and here I will argue that, however unconvincing Kant's four arguments
for the spontaneity of choice, Nietzsche's criticisms can be similarly
accommodated by the first three arguments and are not pertinent to the fourth.
Firstly, Kant's argument from rational choice is presented in terms of the
'practical' freedom of acting according to reasons, and therefore being 'affected',
but not 'necessitated', by 'impulses'. He insists that this freedom 'can be proved
by experience' of what 'determines human choice' - that is, he insists that we have
'experience' of rational choice as a sufficient cause of an action. This corresponds
closely to the common sense conception of agency to which Nietzsche objects. Of
this conception, to recall, Nietzsche suspects that better causal 'descriptions'
would identify salient causes of actions other than choice, and causes of choice
other than reasons. For the purposes of his argument from rational choice,
however, Kant might admit such suspicions. For, firstly, this argument is supposed
to demonstrate the necessity of presupposing spontaneity of choice, and neither
requires nor entails that choice is also a sufficient cause of an action. I suggested in
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the previous chapter that, although Kant defines 'choice' as the sufficient cause of
an action, his conception of moral judgement could accommodate a weaker claim.
Secondly, Kant's argument requires only that some human choices are made
according to reasons, and not that every human choice is of this kind. Indeed, with
his affirmation of the 'experience' of rational choice he does not claim that every
choice is made according to reasons, but insists merely that 'we have an ability' to
act by rational choice. This corresponds with the definition of 'choice' that I
considered in the previous chapter, and is consistent with the accommodation of
Nietzsche's criticism of practical reason that I proposed there.
Unlike the argument from rational choice, Kant's attempts to dispel his
doubt about autonomy in the Groundwork and the Critique of Practical Reason are
presented without affirmations of the causal sufficiency of choice, although these
arguments are, of course, concerned with establishing choice's causally
undetermined character. Still, like the argument from rational choice, Kant's
ambitious and modest attempts to dispel his doubt about autonomy are occupied
with rational choice. As he writes with regard to 'every rational being that has a
will' in the 'preparation' for his argument in the third section of the Groundwork,
'in such a being we think of a reason which is practical, Le. has causality in view
of its objects'. It is this claim, along with the presupposed 'unity' of 'practical' and
'speculative' reason, which licenses Kant to extend the negative freedom of
'speculative' reason to 'practical' reason. The 'practical' demonstration of
spontaneity in the Critique of Practical Reason, on the other hand, concerns the
implications of a moral judgement's attribution of autonomy to rational choice.
However, although both arguments are thus occupied with rational choice, neither
argument requires that choice be identified with rational choice, or, indeed, be
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considered as causally sufficient for action. Nietzsche's criticisms therefore could
be accommodated by these arguments, as they could be accommodated by the
argument from rational choice.
Kant's attempts to dispel his doubt about autonomy touch upon Nietzsche's
critical concerns only insofar as Kant expresses 'negative' freedom as self-
causation at the beginning of the third section of the Groundwork, an expression
which Nietzsche would, given his objection to 'free will', consider incoherent. I
suggested that Kant's puzzling affirmation of the mutual entailment of a will's
autonomy and its 'negative' freedom might derive from a confusion of the 'self-
determination' of self-causation with that of autonomy. Still, Kant does not persist
in this expression, and elsewhere in these arguments he conforms with his general
practice of conceiving of the 'freedom' that he wishes to establish as simply the
absence of determination by antecedent causes. To this conception, I suggested in
the first section, Nietzsche offers no further objection.
Finally, besides warranting Nietzsche's allegation that Kant endorses an
over-inflated sense of responsibility, Kant's argument from responsibility provides
grounds for considering 'intelligible' choice to be causally sufficient for action.
That is, it purports to show that choice is responsible only if it is an undetermined,
ultimate, and sufficient cause of action. However, while this is clearly an instance
of the claim regarding choice which Nietzsche criticises, his criticism with
reference to other salient causes revealed by better causal 'descriptions' is not
pertinent. For the argument is occupied with the antecedent determination of
choice, rather than its causal sufficiency, and Kant's conclusion is not extended
from 'intelligible' choice to 'empirical' choice, or choice as it would be subject to
causal 'descriptions'. Nonetheless, since the argument is ultimately inconclusive
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on its own terms, it need not obstruct the accommodation of Nietzsche's criticism
that I proposed in the preceding chapter - that is, the admittance of the causal
insufficiency of choice for action.
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Conclusions
I have argued for two broad conclusions in this chapter. In the first section,
I argued that Nietzsche's criticisms of 'free will' and scepticism are misplaced as
criticisms of Kant's distinction between 'intelligible' and 'empirical' choice, his
particular attempt to show how choice might be coherently considered as
undetermined by antecedent causes. However, in the three following sections, I
argued that Kant's four arguments for his claim that choice must be considered as
undetermined by antecedent causes are also unconvincing, for reasons independent
of Nietzsche's critical concerns and the tenability of Kant's distinction between
'intelligible' and 'empirical' choice. Considering the arguments in the light of
Nietzsche's critical concerns, I noted that on the basis of his fourth argument Kant
endorses a sense of responsibility that Nietzsche would dismiss as over-inflated,
and that in presenting his arguments Kant occasionally makes claims to which
Nietzsche objects. However, I argued that the arguments themselves nonetheless
do not provide grounds for withdrawing the accommodations that I proposed on
Kant's behalf in the previous chapter.
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8.
Moral anthropology
This short chapter is occupied with Kant's 'moral anthropology', his
project of identifying the obstacles and assistances which 'human nature' offers to
the fulfilment of moral requirements. In particular, this chapter undertakes, firstly,
to explain the intended theoretical status of Kant's affirmations of human progress,
and, secondl y, to present the basic objects and means of this progress as he
conceives it. The chapter thus argues that, in spite of Nietzsche's dismissive
remark in The Antichrist regarding Kant's opinion of the French Revolution, Kant
neither claims that there is evidence of human progress nor conceives of human
progress in moral terms.
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I. Speculative, not explanatory
Kant's 'moral anthropology' is intended to identify the obstacles and
assistances which 'human nature' offers to the fulfilment of moral requirements.'
In its basic elements, it provides a familiar modem account of humanity's moral
failings - that is, it accounts for these failings in terms of the general, and
empirically observable, lack of coincidence between moral requirements and the
requirements of human inclinations, combined with the general imperfection of
human rationality. Regarding human inclinations, Kant conceives of human
beings' social life as, at least in part, constituted by individuals' natural
inclinations to engage in self-interested competition over scarce or essentially
relative goods, such as possessions, power, and honour. Kant refers to these
inclinations as humanity's 'unsociable sociability', and, unsurprisingly, identifies
them as a source of humanity's moral failings.i However, he could not hold that
immoral inclinations alone suffice to explain any of humanity's moral failings,
because, according to his conception of moral goodness, a rational agent always
has better reason to do what is morally required. Thus Kant consistently insists that
human rationality is imperfect in the sense that, even when acting according to
reasons, human beings do not necessarily do what they have best reason to do, or
1 However, although Kant pursues this project consistently, his earlier texts describe 'moral
anthropology', or 'practical anthropology', as the application of supreme moral requirements to
human conditions, while his later texts merely consider this application to refer to 'anthropology',
and describe 'moral anthropology', or 'pragmatic anthropology', as the identification of the
obstacles and assistances of 'human nature' to the fulfilment of moral requirements. Compare G
387-8 with MS 216-7 andApH 119-20, for example.
2 Kant's most extensive account of humanity's 'unsociable sociability' is at 119-21, but he also
refers to it at 122, TP 310, EF 345,360-1, and 365-6, and MS 471-2. He explicitly refers to it as a
source of humanity'S moral failings at MAM 119 and EF 355.
239
at least do not necessarily do it for the best reason.' As I mentioned in the sixth
chapter, he also accepts that human rationality can be momentarily suspended or
obstructed by passing feelings such as anger, fear, or hope, and that certain
persistent inclinations, such as hatred or lust for power, can eclipse other
inclinations and concerns in rational reflection.
However, Kant's conception of these two familiar sources of humanity's
moral failings is also informed and constrained by his teleological conception of
human history, and in this respect, his anthropology is more distinctive. That is,
while other modem philosophers tend to treat our immoral inclinations and
imperfect rationality simply as contingent, unfortunate constraints to be
acknowledged in determining moral requirements, Kant holds that there are also
grounds for treating them historically and teleologically, as if they were intended
to promote a certain end. As he indicates in his lengthy presentation of them in the
second part of his Critique of Judgement, these grounds lie ultimately in his claim
that, beyond a certain point, the theoretical investigation of certain natural beings -
such as trees, for example - can proceed only on the principle that their parts are
intentionally organised according to certain internal ends - such as growth, for
instance. One must thus consider organisms as if their parts were intentionally
organised by a rational agent, according to certain reasons, rather than as simply
the effects of preceding causes, Kant claims. In tum, he argues, this requires that
organisms also be considered as collectively organised in an equally intentional
manner. Undertaking to determine the end, or reason, according to which
organisms should be considered as collectively organised, he firstly denies that it
could be one of these organisms' internal ends, because the relations between these
3 See, in particular, G 412-4, KpV 20 and 32, and MS 213-4, 221-2, and 379-80, and also 123, and
G 389, 400n, 421n, and 449. For some discussion, see Hill, 'The Hypothetical Imperative', pp.18-9
and 26-7, and 'Kant's Theory of Practical Reason', pp.124 and 127-8.
240
organisms and ends are not sufficiently organised for this to be plausible. For
example, he argues that it is not clear whether plants should be considered as
means to the internal ends of herbivores, and herbivores in tum as means to the
internal ends of carnivores, or vice versa. Kant then argues that an end other than
organisms' internal ones can be given only by human beings, since they are the
only organisms which are rational - that is, they themselves act according to ends,
or reasons."
Finally, then, Kant considers the two ends, or reasons, which human beings
necessarily and ultimately, if imperfectly, act according to. The first is happiness,
but Kant excludes this as incoherent, given individuals' varying and insatiable
conceptions of it, and as unlikely, given the suffering which nature persistently
imposes on human beings. The second is moral goodness. However, according to
Kant's account of moral goodness, it (b') can be achieved only by a will. Thus
appealing to his analysis of moral goodness in the Groundwork - indeed, he here
also refers to its grounds in the conception of 'a good will' - Kant denies that the
end, or reason, according to which organisms should be considered as collectively
organised can be moral goodness as such. Nonetheless, he argues that this end
must be the development of rationality, since this serves the end of moral goodness
and also satisfies every other condition which his argument identifies. That is, the
development of rationality not only is not an internal end of any organism,
including human beings, but is also given by human beings as rational agents, and
is coherent, likely, and achievable by nature. Kant calls the development of
rationality 'culture', and divides it into two developments: firstly, the development
of the general ability to achieve ends which he calls 'skill' and, secondly, the
4 See KY 359-429.
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weakening of immoral inclinations and the cultivation of inclinations which
coincide with, rather than oppose, moral requirements.'
By means of this argument, then, Kant attempts to demonstrate that our
theoretical investigation of natural organisms requires that we consider them as
collectively organised according to a certain end - namely, the perfection of
human 'skill' and the coincidence of human inclinations with moral requirements.
In his various attempts to fill out this conception of human progress in the Critique
and his essays, he presents human progress as driven by the 'unsociable
sociability' and imperfect rationality which are otherwise simply unfortunate
contingencies. These attempts are, therefore, mere speculations, made from the
broad and otherwise indeterminate perspective of his conclusion regarding the
collective, teleological organisation of organisms, and applied to his broad
empirical claim about human beings' 'unsociable sociability' and his insistence on
their imperfect rationality. Indeed, the speculative status of these attempts is
consistently underlined by Kant. That is, he consistently emphasises that his
attempts are not intended to be based upon empirical evidence of human progress,
but are nonetheless also not intended as mere fictions, since they are guided by his
teleological constraints and his broad claims regarding human 'unsociable
sociability' and imperfect rationality."
5 See KU 429-445. Related remarks are made at TP 308 and 310, EF 360-2, and ApH 324 and 327-
~O, and on the incoherence of happiness, see, for instance, G 395-6 and 417-9, and KpV25-6.
See 129-31, MAM 107-10, TP 311-2, and EF 368, for example.
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II. Skills and inclinations
A notable example of Kant's speculations on human progress is provided
by his essay, 'Conjectural Beginning of Human History'. There he speculates, by
means of an unorthodox interpretation of the biblical story of the Fall, on the initial
consequences of humanity's gaining rationality. His basic claim is that, through
experiment, rationality extends humanity's inclinations beyond, and even against,
its instincts, and thus gives humanity the freedom to choose while simultaneously
denying it the guidance of instinct. In the light of this basic claim, Kant then offers
two speculations. Firstly, he proposes that the effect of rationality on the sexual
instinct was profound, since rationality allows this instinct to be creatively
prolonged and complicated, particularly by the withdrawal of its object and thus
the postponement of its satisfaction. This suggests a broader speculation, Kant
claims: namely, that such creativity with inclinations, particularly by concealment,
is the source of social customs, and thus the source of humanity's sociability and
the 'unsociable', competitive nature of this sociability," Importantly, this reflects
his persistent view of rationality as developing socially, by experiment, practice,
and instruction across individuals and generations, and thus, ultimately, in the
species as a whole, rather than in individuals.8 Similarly implicit, if not elaborated
upon here or elsewhere, is his view of the development of inclinations as, for the
most part, equally social. 9
Secondly, Kant speculates that, by denying free choice the guidance of
instinct and also by enabling human beings to anticipate the future, rationality
introduced enormous anxiety into human life - in particular, anxieties about how
7 See MAM 112-3.
8 See I 18-9 and 22, and MAM 114-5.
9 Kant emphasises the social and species level of development generally at TP 310 and 312.
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to choose, about the burdens and uncertainty of the future, and about death. Kant
suggests that such anxieties of rationality, along with inevitable dissatisfaction
with society's created pleasures, drive human beings to pursue an imagined
'paradise' of rest and peace in which the anxious exercise of rationality would not
be much required. The tragedy of this pursuit, however, is that it is precisely their
rationality which denies them such a 'paradise' and which they must exercise even
in trying to avoid doing SO.IO
Thus Kant speculates that humanity's 'unsociable sociability', and also
certain other driving anxieties, can be traced to its rationality, a possession which,
once gained, cannot be lost. Unsurprisingly, he claims that rationality also
introduces moral requirements, but that the rationality which humanity gains is
imperfect and that the inclinations which it gains do not all coincide with moral
requirements. Thus he concludes that, besides introducing many new pains,
sociability and the anxieties of rationality also introduce many moral failings. I I
However, the distinctive, teleological character of Kant's speculations is reflected
by his further claim, made in 'Conjectural Beginning' as elsewhere, that human
beings' imperfectly rational pursuit of their inclinations - and particularly their
immoral ones - serves to develop the rationality of the species as a whole. In
particular, regarding human 'skill', he speculates that the 'unsociable', competitive
nature of humanity's sociability stimulates human beings to develop skills by
experiment, practice, and mstruction.V Regarding inclinations, he suggests that
conformity to social customs can coincide with moral requirements and weaken
immoral inclinations, and is supported by the modem pursuit of arts and sciences,
despite the evils which, for Kant as for Rousseau, these pursuits also presuppose
10 See MAM 110-5 and 122-33. See also 119-20 and ApH 324.
11 See, for example, MAM 116-8.
12 See 120-2. MAM 114-5. KU 433. TP 312. and ApH 321-5.
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and produce.l" In general, then, Kant's anthropological speculations confirm his
remark in 'What is Enlightenment?', regarding the constraints necessary to
develop freedom of thought, that 'a strange, unexpected course is shown in human
affairs [... ] if one considers it in the large, in which almost everything is
paradoxical' .14
However, Kant's most extensive speculations concern the political realm.
He considers this realm to be characterised by human beings' competition over
possessions, and, unsurprisingly, he holds that human beings' immoral inclinations
and imperfect rationality tend to ensure that this competition collapses into 'war',
the exercise or mere threat of violence. However, Kant speculates that this
competition and violence also might stimulate the development of human skills in
two ways. Firstly, he speculates that this violent competition disperses human
beings, and thus forces them to develop the skills necessary to live in less habitable
regions of the earth. IS Secondly, he speculates that this violent competition gives
each human being a strong inclination to unite with others in a community which
can provide him or her with security, and that this inclination, along with the
countervailing inclination to resist constraints for the sake of competitive
inclinations, stimulates human beings to pursue the perfect balance between
security and freedom from constraint.16 For Kant, a community can provide
security only by the public administration of justice, in however rudimentary a
form - that is, only by a civil condition - and only when there is also a certain
13 See, in particular. KU 432-4. and also 119-21, MAM 110-5 and 121-6, and ApH 324-5.
14 WA 41.
IS See MAM 118-9 and EF 363-4. In these passages. Kant also speculates that human beings'
competition over possessions originated in the differing requirements of pastoral and agricultural
means of subsistence. when these means had emerged from uncompetitive hunting and gathering.
16 See 122-6. MAM 119. KU 432-3. TP 310 and 312. EF 363-4 and 365-7, and ApH327-8.
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'civil' relation between states.17 Furthermore, he considers the pursuit of security
in such communities as the development of a skill, and therefore as a pursuit which
must proceed by experiment, practice, and instruction. IS He also considers this
skill crucial because its consequences broadly coincide with general political
obligations, and because the establishment of a perfect constitution is also a
necessary condition for the development of other skills.l" As he concisely
expresses the 'problem' in Toward Perpetual Peace, 'The problem of establishing
a state [...] is soluble even for a nation of devils (if only they have understanding)
and goes like this: "Given a multitude of rational beings all of whom desire
universal laws for their preservation but each of whom is inclined covertly to
exempt himself from them, so to order this multitude and establish their
constitution that, although in their private dispositions they strive against one
another, these yet so check one another that in their public conduct the result is the
same as if they had no such evil dispositions'" .20 In response to this 'problem',
here and elsewhere he speculates, in particular, that the economic demands of
'war' between states can require them to uphold certain civil freedoms and
constrain their belligerence, and that trade between states can weaken inclinations
to immoral violence and cultivate inclinations to peace."
In this context, Nietzsche's misunderstanding of Kant's claims regarding
the French Revolution can be appreciated. To recall, Nietzsche alleges that,
according to Kant, the French Revolution 'proved', or could only be 'explained'
by, a 'moral predisposition' or "'tendency [... ] towards the good" on the part of
17 On the need for a civil condition, see the passages referred to in n.16, and on the need for a 'civil'
relation between states, see, in particular, 124-8, KU 432-3, and TP 310-1.
18 See, for instance, 122-3, and ApH 328.
19 See 121-9, MAM 121-6, KU 432-3, TP 310-12, and EF 363-8.
20 EF 366. See also 122-6, KU 432-3, and TP 312.
21 See 127-8, MAM 119-20, TP 311, and EF 364 and 368.
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humanity. This allegation is presumably directed at claims which Kant makes in
the second part of his late work, The Conflict of the Faculties, which Nietzsche
apparently read between May and June 1887. In particular, this part of the work
refers to a public 'attitude' of 'sympathy', and even 'passion' or 'enthusiasm', for
the constitutional changes of the French Revolution, on the part of spectators of it.
Kant insists that this 'attitude' not only had rightful concerns, but that it was also
both universal and unselfish. He claims, furthermore, that its universality justifies
its attribution to human beings as such, and that its object is 'too momentous, too
intimately interwoven with the interests of humanity, and too widespread in its
influence' for the 'attitude' not to have a significant influence on later humanity.f
However, despite the apparently empirical nature of these claims, Kant prefaces
them by again denying precisely what Nietzsche alleges, namely, that he affirms
human progress on the grounds of empirical evidence.f Indeed, his following
remarks demonstrate that both the speculative status and the objects of these
claims correspond with those of Kant's earlier attempts to fill out his teleological
perspective on human history. In particular, he presents the 'attitude' towards the
French Revolution as admitting the speculation that humanity's 'unsociable
sociability' might prompt the development of human skill in political constitutions,
but not progress in moral goodness.i" Thus, although Nietzsche rightly points out
that Kant describes this 'attitude' as 'moral', he fails to note that Kant describes it
as 'moral' only in the 'unselfish' sense, rather than in his own sense?S
It might be objected that elsewhere, if only speculatively, Kant affirms
human progress in moral goodness in his own sense. In particular, in his earlier
22 SF 85, 86, 88. See also SF 87.
23 See SF 79 and 83-4.
24 See SF 91-3.
25 See SF 85-6. It follows, I would suggest, that the 'attitude' also does not express a moral
commitment or demand, as Krasnoff maintains in his 'The Fact of Politics', pp.29-34.
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essays he makes a few brief remarks which might suggest that he considers human
progress to extend to moral goodness - that is, to rationality not in the sense of
'culture', but in the sense of action according to morally good reasons. Most
suggestive, perhaps, are Kant's remarks in 'Conjectural Beginning' that 'the first
hint of man's development as a moral being' comes with the 'sense of decency'
which informs social customs, and that an 'obscure' appreciation of, or 'a distant
preparation' for, the status of each rational being as an 'end in himself also comes
with the development of reason." These are hardly conclusive contraventions of
the Critique's considered denial of speculation in human moral progress, however.
For the appreciation, or 'preparation', referred to is 'obscure', or 'distant', and
consists simply of the treatment of animals as mere 'means' which allegedly
follows on the gaining of rationality, while 'decency' is supposed to provide
merely a 'first incentive' to 'concealing all that might invite contempt', rather than
progress in acting according to morally good reasons.i" In other words, these
remarks continue Kant's speculations about the development of 'skill' and morally
coincident inclinations, rather than extend these speculations to moral goodness
itself. Despite Nietzsche's - and, indeed, many other commentators' - claim to the
contrary, therefore, Kant does not extend his affirmations of human progress to
moral goodness, in any respect.28
In conclusion, however, a final element of Kant's treatment of human
progress should be noted. That is, in 'On the Common Saying: ''That May be
26 MAM 113, 114. See also the remarks on Rousseau at MAM 116. Also suggestive, perhaps, is
Kant's reference to the development of 'a moral whole' of human society at 121, but the context,
and his following 'propositions', indicate that he is thus referring to the development of a civil
condition.
27 MAM 114, 113.
28 For recent examples of the contrary claim that Kant affirms human moral progress, at least in
certain respects, see Kleingeld, 'Kant, History, and the Idea of Moral Development', pp.62-4, and
Louden, Kant's Impure Ethics, pp.142-143, and 153-157. Equally implausible, Iwould suggest, is
Wood's claim that Kant's teleological human history concerns no determinate and final end at all,
but only 'freedom' or 'reason'. See Wood, 'Kant's Historical Materialism', pp.20-23.
248
Correct in Theory, but it is of no Use in Practice', Kant apparently claims that one
must nonetheless 'hope' for historical progress in human moral goodness. He
argues that this 'hope' is admissible as long as such development cannot be
'proved' impossible, and that it is required to fulfil a duty to make some
improvement to human 'posterity'. Furthermore, he claims that this 'hope' must be
addressed to how 'human nature' must be considered to promote 'culture', rather
than to morally better actions as such.29 It is possible that the object of Kant's
'hope' here is merely the development of a civil condition within and between
states, since he discusses only this development in the remainder of this part of the
essay." However, even if its object is human moral progress, Kant's 'hope' does
not express a particular theoretical explanation of human history or even a
teleological speculation of the kind that he offers, here and elsewhere, regarding
human 'culture'. Essentially, this 'hope' simply affirms that historical
development in human moral goodness is possible, and that a duty to pursue it is
therefore fulfilable, and thus possible. Beyond this, Kant simply suggests that,
without such 'hope', 'an earnest desire to do something profitable for the general
well-being would never have warmed the human heart' .31
29 TP 309, 310. See also TP 308.
30 See TP 310-3. Such an interpretation should be given to the similar remark at EF 365, I suggest.
31 TP 309.
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Conclusions
Nietzsche's dismissive claim in The Antichrist - that, according to Kant,
the French Revolution 'proved', or could only be 'explained' by, a 'moral
predisposition' or "'tendency [... J towards the good'" on the part of humanity -
therefore misrepresents the intended status and the objects of Kant's affirmations
of human progress, in general and in The Conflict of the Faculties in particular.
Firstly, although Kant's broad teleological perspective on human history has
theoretical grounds, his claims about particular instances and means of human
progress are not intended as claims based upon empirical evidence, but as
speculations guided by his teleological constraints, his broad empirical claim
regarding human beings' 'unsociable sociability', and his insistence on their
imperfect rationality. Secondly, on the grounds that (b') only a will can achieve
moral goodness, these speculations are restricted to progress in human 'skill' and
in inclinations coincident with moral requirements, ends which, Kant insists, serve
the end of moral goodness, but are distinct from it. Notably, these two basic
aspects of Kant's 'moral anthropology' are not only reflected in the second part of
The Conflict of the Faculties, at which Nietzsche presumably directs his remark,
but are also presented at some length in Kant's Critique of Judgement, a text with
which Nietzsche was apparently better acquainted.
250
Conclusions of part II
In this part of the thesis, I undertook to defend Kant's conception of the
moral agent against Nietzsche's explicit criticisms and certain other criticisms
commonly made in Nietzsche's name.
In the fifth chapter, I offered an interpretation of Kant's argument in the
first and second sections of the Groundwork. This revealed that Kant derives his
formulas as expressions of two distinctive features of moral goodness which
emphasise different aspects of one or both of these features, and that he identifies
these features by analysing a conception of the goodness of 'a good will' which he
attributes to moral common sense at the beginning of the first section. His analysis
can be summarised as follows. Its object, the conception of the goodness of 'a
good will', consists of two claims: a good will is (a) the only good which is good
in all contexts, and (b) a condition of the goodness of every other good. From (a),
Kant draws the conclusion that (a') a good will does what is morally good because
it is morally good. By distinguishing between action 'from duty' and action 'from'
inclination, he argues that this conclusion follows because, to be (a) good in all
contexts, a good will's motivation to do what is morally good must be necessarily
concerned with what is morally good, rather than contingently and therefore, at
most, coincidentally so concerned. From (b), on the other hand, he draws the
conclusion that (b') moral goodness is a goodness which only a will can achieve.
This conclusion follows, he argues, because the goodness of a good will, which he
equates with moral goodness, could not be (b) a condition of the goodness of every
other good if this condition could be fulfilled by other causes. From conclusions
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(a') and (b'), Kant proceeds to derive two distinctive features of moral goodness,
(i) and (ii). He derives the first such feature from (b'), by arguing that, if (b') moral
goodness is a goodness which only a will can achieve, then it must be (i) a
goodness of a will's reason for action alone. He then argues that moral goodness
must also be (ii) good for a will as such, on the grounds that (a') a good will does
what is morally good because it is morally goodness and (ii) this goodness must be
a goodness of its reason for action alone.
In the sixth chapter, I proceeded to consider the interpretation of the
formulas and their place in Kant's conception of moral judgement. My broadest
concern here was to demonstrate that Kant conceives of moral judgement as
judgement according to a system of duties, to be derived by considering contingent
conditions of varying generality under the distinctive features of moral goodness
(i) and (ii), as expressed, emphasised, and clarified by the formulas. I emphasised
that this conception reveals a number of common interpretations of the formulas to
be misleading, if not simply mistaken. It also reveals Nietzsche's criticisms of the
formula of universal law to be misplaced, since they misrepresent this formula
either as a 'test' of reasons for action in specific circumstances or as precluding
'pleasure' in the achievement or determination of moral goodness. Nor, I
mentioned, does this conception suggest that Kant shares Nietzsche's concern for
individual 'autonomy'. However, I also argued that Nietzsche's criticisms of the
common sense conception of agency, while not offering conclusive refutations of
Kant's conception of moral judgement, nonetheless require certain
accommodations from it. In particular, Kant should admit that, considered at a
higher level of particularity than prescriptions according to reasons can capture,
actions might be considered as not motivated by reasons, and that better causal
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'descriptions' might reveal that choice is not causally sufficient for action. Finally,
I argued that Nietzsche's demand for independent criticism of moral common
sense would be regarded as extravagant by Kant, given his ultimate
methodological commitment to common sense.
In the following chapters, I considered two further branches of Kant's
moral philosophy to which Nietzsche's explicit criticisms refer. In the seventh
chapter, I considered Kant's attempt to accommodate his claim that choice must be
considered as undetermined by antecedent causes, and the four arguments that he
provides for the claim itself. I argued that, while his attempt to accommodate this
claim is not vulnerable to Nietzsche's criticisms, Kant's four arguments for the
claim are independently unconvincing. In the eighth chapter, I demonstrated that,
despite a dismissive remark of Nietzsche's, Kant neither claims that there is
evidence of human progress nor conceives of human progress in moral terms.
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Part III
The Animal That May Promise: Nietzsche's Rival Analysis of the Moral
Agent
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9.
Nietzsche's rival analysis
In this chapter, I defend the third broad conclusion of the thesis, that
neglected elements of Nietzsche's moral philosophy provide for a critical
engagement with Kant's conception of the moral agent that is more sophisticated,
telling, and original than that articulated by Nietzsche's explicit criticisms of Kant.
In particular, I argue that, with his account of the 'animal that may promise' in the
Genealogy, Nietzsche presents an alternative, but nonetheless Kantian, conception
of the moral agent which reveals that Kant makes two significant, yet undefended,
assumptions in deriving the basis features of his own conception. While one
assumption merely regards their ultimately inconclusive differences over
motivation, the other presents a substantial challenge to Kant's interpretation of
one of his distinguishing features of moral goodness. In response, I propose a
resolution that owes something to both Kant and Nietzsche. Furthermore, I argue
that Nietzsche's emphasis on the historical origins and current condition of his
conception of the moral agent represents an attempt to vindicate that conception,
and that Kant could accept this manner of vindication.
The chapter is therefore divided into three sections, each based upon an
aspect of Nietzsche's account of the 'animal that may promise' at the beginning of
the second essay in the Genealogy. The first section identifies the conception of
choice presented by this account, and notes how this conception avoids the
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common sense claims regarding choice and reasons, and the related claims
regarding responsibility, to which Nietzsche objects elsewhere. The second,
lengthier section then considers the conception of goodness which accompanies
this account of the 'animal that may promise', and its implications for Kant's
conception of the moral agent. Finally, the third section turns briefly to
Nietzsche's remarks about the historical condition of the 'animal that may
promise', and the kind of vindication which they offer for his position.
256
The 'animal that may promise'
Nietzsche presents his positive conception of choice at the beginning of the
second essay of The Genealogy, as an account of what he calls the 'animal that
may promise'. Here he conceives of choice as an ability (he refers to it as 'ein
Yermbgen' and with 'konnen' and 'durfen) which itself comprises two abilities
and one inability, each of which he articulates in terms of memory. He maintains
that these two abilities and one inability oppose each other, but that in choice they
are hierarchically arranged such that one ability overcomes the other, which, in
tum, overcomes the inability. Thus he describes the ability to forget as first
overcoming the inability to forget - that is, the inability to "'cope [literally, be
finished, fertig werden]" with', or 'digest', experiences and desires, and the
processes of 'inanimation [Einverseelung], through which they are 'digested'.
Forgetting, then, limits an agent's consciousness - it 'digests', ensures the
'inhibition' of, or 'temporarily close[s] the doors and windows of consciousness'
to, her experiences, desires, and inanimistic processes. It thus gives the agent a
'present' , Nietzsche claims, 'a little stillness, a little tabula rasa of consciousness,
so that there is again space for new things, above all for the nobler functions and
functionaries, for ruling, foreseeing, predetermining (for our organism is arranged
oligarchically)'. He proceeds to claim that this noble ability to forget also makes
'space' for a yet 'nobler' ability, that of making and keeping a promise, which
involves 'an opposing ability, a memory', an ability which in choice opposes and
overcomes the ability to forget. Thus he writes that promising involves 'an active
willing-not-to-be-rid-of, a continuous willing of something once willed, a real
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memory of the will'. In promising, then, a choice is actively not forgotten, such
that in choosing the agent is able 'to stand security for himself as future'. I Finally,
Nietzsche also maintains that this 'memory of the will' requires a number of
subsidiary abilities,
so that between the original '1 will', '1 will do' and the actual discharge of the will,
its act, a world of strange new things, circumstances, even acts of will may be safely
put in between without this long chain of will breaking. But how much this
presupposes! In order to dispose of the future in advance in this way, man must first
have learned to distinguish necessary from chance events, to think causally, to see
and anticipate the distant as if it were present, to fix with certainty what the purpose
is and what the means to it, in general to be able to calculate, computej.ji
This account of the 'animal that may promise' expresses a conception of
conscious choice as causally significant for the chosen action, and as made for
reasons. It does not, however, make the two claims which comprise the common
sense conception of agency to which Nietzsche objects elsewhere. Firstly, it
conceives of choice as causally significant for the chosen action, despite the
'strange new things' that might intervene between choice and action. But, by
insisting that choice is an ability that presupposes other abilities and a certain
hierarchical arrangement among them, this conception does not consider choice
as causally sufficient for action. Indeed, in this as in its hierarchical structure, this
conception is suggestive of Nietzsche's phenomenology of choice in Beyond
Good and Evil, with which, I argued, he intends to raise doubt about the claim
1 GM II 1. For other remarks which associate the ability to will with the ability to forget, see JGB
230 andGD VIII 6.
2 GMII 1.
258
that choice is causally sufficient for action. This conception also does not claim
that choice is undetermined by antecedent causes, or endorse a sense of
responsibility which Nietzsche would dismiss as underwritten only by such 'free
will' and as over-inflated. With regard to responsibility in particular, he writes
that choice as he conceives it here provides the agent with 'the extraordinary
privilege of responsibility', but he does not suggest that an agent's responsibility
might extend to her 'strength' or her 'being this or that', as he alleges that
proponents of 'free will' unjustifiably extend it.'
Notably, here Nietzsche also explicitly distinguishes his sense of
responsibility from the sense to which Kant appeals in arguing from responsibility
to the spontaneity of choice. Of the notion that punishment might rest upon a
'presupposition about freedom or unfreedom of the will', Nietzsche writes, '[t]hat
thought, [... ] which has even had to serve for an explanation of how the feeling of
justice came into being on earth at all, "the criminal earned punishment because
he could have acted otherwise", is in fact an extremely late attained, even
sophisticated form of human judging and inferring'. He distinguishes this
particular sense of responsibility from 'those much more primitive distinctions
"intentional", "negligent", "accidental", "accountable", and their opposites' with
which he and his conception of choice are concerned." Anticipating this in my
discussion of Kant's argument from responsibility in the seventh chapter, I
proposed that, while Kant's premise is that an agent is responsible for what is
'within her control' in the sense that she could do otherwise, Nietzsche considers
an agent responsible simply for what is 'within her control' in the sense of not
being circumstantially or psychologically constrained. By thus endorsing an
3 GMII 2.
4GMII4.
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alternative, compatibilist sense of responsibility, I argued, Nietzsche might avoid
the incompatibilist conclusion of Kant's otherwise persuasive argument from
responsibility.
Secondly, although Nietzsche conceives of choice as made for reasons, he
does not claim that it is motivated by them. He insists that to choose requires the
agent to be able 'to fix with certainty what the purpose is and what the means to
it, in general to be able to calculate, compute'. He also claims that this reasoning
requires that the agent be able to 'forget' her passing desires and experiences. In
this, his conception of choice bears some similarity to Kant's definition of choice,
and particularly Kant's claim that to act according to reasons is to be 'free' in the
sense of 'affected, but not determined, by impulses'r' However, Nietzsche does
not claim that choice is motivated by the cognitive acknowledgement of reasons.
Indeed, he would be unlikely to do so, given that, as I have shown in the first part
of the thesis, elsewhere he rejects the corresponding common sense claim
regarding reasons, and consistently considers choice as instead motivated by
noncognitive states informed by reasons. In the following section, I will show that
he also confirms this position with regard to his positive conception of choice, as
presented by his account of the 'animal that may promise'.
S This aspect of Nietzsche's conception is also emphasised in late notes. See, for instance, KGW
VIII:29 [139, 169, and 178] (Autumn 1887) and 11 [353] (November 1887-March 1888). I
emphasise its similarity to Kant's claim about the 'freedom' of acting according to reasons in my
earlier account of the 'Kantian' form of Nietzsche's conception, in 'Nietzsche's Kantian Ethics',
pp.10-11.
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Nietzsche's Kantian ethics
I.
Nietzsche's account of the 'animal that may promise' at the beginning of
the second essay of the Genealogy is accompanied by an associated conception of
goodness." In particular, he proceeds to write the following of this 'animal', which
he now refers to as 'free' and as 'sovereign'.
The 'free' human being, the possessor of a long unbreakable will, also has in this
possession his measure of value: looking out from himself upon others, he honours
or he despises; and just as necessarily as he honours his equals, the strong and
reliable (those who may promise), - therefore, everyone who promises like a
sovereign, weightily, seldom, slowly, who is stingy with his trust, who distinguishes
when he trusts, who gives his word as something that can be relied upon because he
knows himself strong enough to uphold it against accidents, even 'against fate' -:
just as necessarily he will hold his kick ready for the feeble windbags who promise
but may not, and his switch for the liar who breaks his word at the very moment he
has it in his mouth. The proud knowledge of the extraordinary privilege of
responsibility, the consciousness of this rare freedom, this power over oneself and
fate, has in him sunk down to his lowest depths and become instinct, the dominating
instinct [... J this sovereign human being calls it his conscience ... [.],
6 I take the following to discredit the common denial that Nietzsche presents the 'animal that may
promise' as an ideal. See, for instance, Hatab, A Nietzschean Defense of Democracy, pp.37-8. My
account expands upon that given in my 'Nietzsche's Kantian Ethics', pp.14-21.
7 GMII2.
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Nietzsche, then, holds that the ability to choose provides its possessor with
'his measure of value'. Furthermore, Nietzsche's account of this 'measure'
indicates that he considers it to identify a particular kind of reasons of 'good and
bad', the reasons whose general features he presents in the first essay of the
Genealogy. In interpreting these general features in the second chapter of the
thesis, I showed that Nietzsche presents reasons of 'good and bad' as ultimately
justified only by appeal to a distinguishing characteristic of exemplary 'good', or
'bad', agents, a characteristic which is supposed to bestow 'goodness', or
'badness', on their actions. As I expressed it, such a reason requires an agent to do,
or not do, x ultimately because agents with a distinguishing characteristic y do, or
do not do, x. I also demonstrated that Nietzsche insists that obedience to such
reasons is motivated by an affirmation of one's 'self' as possessing the appropriate
'goodness' -bestowing characteristics. Since I was concerned with sketching
Nietzsche's 'revaluation' of the ostensibly identical reasons of 'good and evil',
however, I did not mention how he understands the requirements of reasons of
'good and bad' to be determined. Unsurprisingly, he presents these reasons as
requiring what would prove an agent's possession of the appropriate 'goodness'-
bestowing characteristics, rather than 'badness' -bestowing ones. However, besides
reflecting the nature of the particular characteristics concerned, Nietzsche insists
that these reasons' requirements are determined according to a constant and
creative mutual measurement among those credited with sharing a 'goodness'-
bestowing characteristic. He intimates this in the first essay of the Genealogy when
he writes of how the '''good ones" - that is, those credited with sharing a
'goodness' -bestowing characteristic - 'are so strictly held within limits inter pares
by custom, respect, usage, gratitude, still more by mutual suspicion, by jealousy,
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[... and] in relations to each other prove themselves so inventive in consideration,
self-control, delicacy, loyalty, pride, and friendship'i'' However, he expands upon
this remark only in sections of the chapter, 'What is noble?' , in Beyond Good and
Evil. The following passage provides a relatively extensive account.
egoism belongs to the essence of the noble soul, I mean the immovable faith that to a
being such as 'we are' other beings must be subordinate by their nature, and sacrifice
themselves to us. [ ... ] Under circumstances which make it hesitate at first, it admits
that there are equals-in-rights with it; as soon as it is clear as to this question of rank,
it moves among these equals and equals-in-rights with the same certainty in modesty
and tender reverence as it has in intercourse with itself [... ] it honours itself in them
and in the rights it concedes them, it does not doubt that the exchange of honours and
rights, as the essence of intercourse, likewise belongs to the natural condition of
things. The noble gives as it takes, out of the passionate and sensitive instinct of
requital which lies in its ground."
Nietzsche mentions a variety of 'goodness' -bestowing characteristics in
terms of which such 'requital' among 'equals' might be practiced, and thus the
requirements of reasons of 'good and bad' determined. In the first essay of the
Genealogy he refers to being 'blond-headed', a 'warrior', or 'truthful', for
instance. However, when he presents the ability to choose as a 'measure of value'
at the beginning of the second essay, he identifies this ability as such a 'goodness'-
bestowing characteristic, and therefore as that according to which, by 'requital'
among 'equals', requirements of reasons of 'good and bad' are to be determined.
In particular, Nietzsche there describes how, by 'looking out from himself upon
8 GM I 11. Nietzsche remarks similarly on enmity among the 'good ones' at GM I 10.
9 JGB 265. See also JGB 259,262,263,272, and 287, and the similar remarks at FW 3.
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others', one who is able to choose measures others according to this ability, and
'honours' those equally able to choose. Immediately after the quoted passage, he
also emphasises that being able to choose means 'that one may affirm oneself' .10 In
the light of his more extensive account of 'honour' among self-affirming 'equals'
in Beyond Good and Evil, then, Nietzsche can be presumed to consider the ability
to choose as a 'measure' which delimits a sphere of those to whom an agent has
duties and against whom she has rights, and among whom these duties and rights
are to be determined by a constant and creative mutual measurement of this ability.
This presumption finds confirmation and elaboration in Nietzsche's earlier
texts. Most notably, in a section of the preface to the Genealogy Nietzsche refers
to ten sections of his earlier texts which, he insists, prefigure claims made in the
Genealogy. Six of these ten sections present his notion of 'requital' in some detail,
and one of the six sections is one of two successive sections of Daybreak which
present lengthy analyses of 'requital' precisely in terms of the ability to choose.l1
The section of Daybreak begins by presenting 'requital' in terms of 'power', as
follows.
Our duties - are the rights of others over us. How have they acquired these rights?
By taking us to be capable of contracting and of requiting, positing us as similar and
equal to them, and consequently entrusting us with something, training. reproving,
supporting us. We fulfil our duty - that is: we justify that representation of our power
according to which everything was shown to us, we give back in the measure in
which one gave to us. It is therefore our pride which bids us do our duty, - when we
do something for others in return for something they have done for us, we will the
10 GMII 3.
11 Nietzsche refers to ten earlier passages at GM V 4. The other five that concern 'requital' are MA
45 and 92. and WS 22. 26. and 33.
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restoration of our autocracy, - for they have intervened in our sphere of power and
would have continued to have their hand in it if we did not practise, with 'duty', a
requital, that is, intervene in their power.'?
Crucially, here Nietzsche proceeds to equate one's 'power' with one's
ability to choose, and also to emphasise that it is one's own and others' beliefs
about one's 'power' which determines one's duties and rights. Thus he writes, 'the
feeling of duty depends upon our having the same belief in regard to the extent of
our power as others have: that is, that we are able to promise certain things and
bind ourselves to perform them {"freedom of will,,)'.13For Nietzsche, then, one's
duties and rights correspond precisely with the degree of one's ability to choose, as
this is posited by oneself and by others, and determining these duties and rights
therefore 'constantly needs the refined tact of a balance', to weigh the shifting
degrees of one's own and others' posited ability to choose." Notably, he includes
benevolence among these duties and rights, as a concern for maintaining a 'sphere
of power' extended to include the spheres of subordinate, unequal others, but he
also insists that duties and rights extend no further beyond one's equals than thisY
Nietzsche restates this particular account of 'requital' in the following
section of Daybreak, and in sections of Human, All Too Human and The Gay
Science." As he indicates when referring to it in the preface to the Genealogy, he
also considers it particularly significant for the explanation of political duties and
rights, or 'justice', as 'a balance between those of approximately equal power'. It
is unsurprising, then, that after presenting his conception of the ability to choose as
12 M 112.
13 M 112. Nietzsche also emphasises 'believed' power atM 113, 146, and 326.
14 M 112.
15 SeeM 112.
16 See MA 44, M 113, and FW 13. Notably, Nietzsche also refers toM 113 in GM II 6.
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a 'measure of value' at the beginning of the second essay, Nietzsche proceeds to
present the requirements of 'justice' as determined by the practice of 'comparing,
measuring, calculating power against power'. In particular, he defines 'justice' as
'the good will among those of approximately equal power to come to terms with
one another, to "understand" each other through a balance - and, regarding those
of less power, to force them to a balance among themselves'. Like other duties and
rights determined according to this 'measure of value', therefore, political duties
and rights are to be determined by constant and creative mutual measurement of
the ability to choose. Thus determined, Nietzsche proceeds to claim, political
duties and rights are duties and rights 'against the whole' of a 'community' of
agents, which may coerce its members to uphold them. He also considers them to
take priority over other, similarly determined duties and rights - as he puts it,
political duties and rights establish 'exceptional conditions, as partial restrictions
of the true will of life, which is out after power' .17 As he proceeds to emphasise,
with this account he supposes to dispose of Eugen Dtihring's particular kind of
retributivist theory, which bases justice precisely on 'ressentiment', and the more
general invoking of '[a]n order of right [Recht] conceived of as sovereign and
universal', according to which the requirements of 'justice' would be
determined."
17 GM V 4, II 8,9, 11. At GM II 9, Nietzsche adds that these obligations serve to secure 'all the
goods and conveniences of communal life' , among which he includes being 'sheltered, taken care
of, in peace and trust, carefree with regard to certain harms and hostilities to which the human
being outside, the "outlaw", is exposed'. For his account of 'justice', see also JGB 259 and GM II
10, and, for similar earlier accounts not expressed in terms of the ability to choose, see WS 22, and
the two other sections to which GM V 4 refers in this regard, MA 92 and WS 26.
18 See GM II 11. Dilhring's theory is presented in, for instance, his Der Weith des Lebens: Eine
philosophische Betrachtung, published in 1865, and his Cursus der Philosophie als streng
wissenschaftlicher Weltanschauung und Lebensgestaltung, published in 1875. Nietzsche's library
includes both of these texts, along with a number of Duhring's numerous other publications. In
Nietzsche's copy, the appendix of Der Weith des Lebens on 'Die transcendente Befriedigung der
Rache' is particularly well-marked, and he made an extensive critical summary of the book in
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The rest of the Genealogy is occupied with Nietzsche's 'revaluations', as I
presented them in the first part of the thesis. Considered with regard to these
'revaluations', however, the conception of goodness introduced at the beginning of
the second essay does not simply identify a particular kind of the reasons of 'good
and bad', the general features of which are presented in the first essay. It also
supplements the 'revaluations' in the second and third essays. In the third essay the
supplementation involves a further issue, which I will consider, along with this
supplementation, in the third section of this chapter. The supplementation in the
second essay, on the other hand, is relatively straightforward. In that essay, to
recall, Nietzsche argues that a kind of religious reason to deny certain 'instincts'
could be obeyed only from instincts of cruelty, turned against the agent herself.
Importantly, however, he also calls such motivation 'bad conscience' and, indeed,
he calls its motivating obedience to these religious reasons in particular
'conscience disturbed' and 'conscience-vivisection' .19 Nietzsche thus refers back
to the conception of goodness that he expresses at the beginning of the section - a
conception which, as he emphasises there, he considers to constitute an agent's
'conscience' - and indicates that he intends not only to identify the noncognitive
state that motivates obedience to this particular kind of reasons, but also to
evaluate it according to its failure to achieve this particular goodness.i"
1875, to be found at KGWVI:l 9 [1] (Summer 1875). For a helpful summary of Duhring's theory,
see Small, Nietzsche in Context, pp.I72-4.
19 The latter two remarks are made at GM II 24.
20 One might offer a corresponding interpretation of Nietzsche's treatment of political obligations at
JGB 199, the only section of JGB that refers to 'bad conscience'. Similar remarks are made at FW
5.
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II.
The conception of goodness that Nietzsche presents at the beginning of the
second essay of the Genealogy, and expands upon elsewhere, effectively provides
an analysis of the conception of the goodness of 'a good will' which Kant analyses
in arriving at his own conception of moral goodness. Furthermore, Nietzsche's
analysis differs from Kant's in two substantial ways, and thus reveals that Kant
imports two extraneous and controversial claims into his analysis.
I demonstrated in the fifth chapter that Kant's analysis of the conception of
the goodness of a good will in the Groundwork begins as follows. He first
identifies two claims that constitute this conception: a good will is conceived of as
(a) the only good which is good in all contexts, and (b) a condition of the goodness
of every other good. From (a), Kant draws the conclusion that (a') a good will does
what is morally good because it is morally good. By distinguishing between action
'from duty' and action 'from' inclination, he argues that this conclusion follows
because, to be (a) good in all contexts, a good will's motivation to do what is
morally good must be necessarily concerned with what is morally good, rather
than contingently and therefore, at most, coincidentally so concerned. From (b), on
the other hand, he draws the conclusion that (b') moral goodness is a goodness
which only a will can achieve. This conclusion follows, he argues, because the
goodness of a good will, which he equates with moral goodness, could not be (b) a
condition of the goodness of every other good if this condition could be fulfilled
by other causes.
With the conception of goodness that he presents at the beginning of the
second essay of the Genealogy, Nietzsche effectively endorses these conclusions.
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Firstly, he presents this goodness as achieved only by an agent motivated by her
affirmation of herself as possessing the appropriate 'goodness' -bestowing
characteristic - in this case, as possessing the ability to choose. Since this
characteristic is precisely what ultimately bestows 'goodness' on the reasons
which she thus obeys, her motivation is necessarily, rather than contingently,
concerned with the pertinent 'goodness'. Like Kant's 'good will', then, she does
what is good because it is good. Secondly, the reasons of 'good and bad' that a
'goodness' -bestowing characteristic ultimately justifies are requirements to do
what would prove the appropriate characteristic, and therefore, by definition, can
be fulfilled only by an agent with the appropriate characteristic. In the case of
Nietzsche's conception of goodness, the appropriate characteristic is the ability to
choose, and therefore this goodness can be achieved only by an agent with the
ability to choose. Like the goodness of Kant's 'good will', then, it is a goodness
which only a 'will' can achieve.
However, Nietzsche's conception of goodness also throws doubt upon the
two distinctive features of moral goodness which Kant proceeds to derive from
(a') and (b'). As I demonstrated in the fifth chapter, Kant derives the first such
feature from (b'), by arguing that, if (b') moral goodness is a goodness which only
a will can achieve, then it must be (i) a goodness of a will's reason for action
alone. He then argues that moral goodness must also be (ii) good for a will as such,
since (a') a good will does what is morally good because it is morally good and (ii)
this goodness must be a goodness of its reason for action alone. Importantly, as he
indicates with his emphasis and employment of (ii) by means of the formula of
universal law, he equates what is (ii) good for a will as such with what holds
equally for any agent in relevantly similar circumstances.
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Nietzsche's conception of goodness reveals that (i) and (ii) follow from (a')
and (b') only on the grounds of two extraneous and controversial assumptions
about the ability to choose, or 'will'. Firstly, although Nietzsche's conception of
goodness effectively endorses (b'), it considers the goodness which (b') only a
'will' can achieve to be (Nietzsche's modified version of (i) a goodness of its
noncognitive motivating state alone, rather than (i) a goodness of its reason for
action alone. For, as I anticipated in the first section, with his account of the
'animal that may promise' Nietzsche again considers choice to be motivated by
noncognitive states informed by reasons, rather than by reasons. He indicates this
by referring to the state of self-affirmation that motivates obedience to the
pertinent reasons of 'good and bad' as an 'instinct', and, when it motivates, as a
'dominating instinct'. Thus he writes of the 'free' or 'sovereign' agent - that is, the
agent who achieves the goodness which (b') only his ability to choose can achieve
- that 'the consciousness of this rare freedom, this power over oneself and fate, has
in him sunk down to his lowest depths and become instinct, the dominating
instinct' .
Notably, that Nietzsche thus endorses a modified version of (i) explains his
employment of a conception of 'community' which corresponds to that employed
by Kant in deriving other-regarding duties and rights in The Metaphysics of
Morals. As I demonstrated in the sixth chapter, Kant employs his conception of a
'community' of mutually vulnerable agents in association with formulas that he
intends to emphasise (i), including the formula that expresses moral goodness as a
will's taking will itself to provide a reason for action. Correspondingly, Nietzsche
presents other-regarding duties and rights as determined by 'requital' between
agents each of whom extends her own noncognitive 'self-affirmation' of the ability
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to choose to others equally able to choose, and each of whom is vulnerable to
others' choices 'intervening' in her own ability to choose. With regard to political
duties and rights in particular, I suggest, he identifies mutual vulnerabilities to
'ressentiment' and to the misconception of political duties and rights, in contrast
with the mutual vulnerabilities regarding material things' 'place' to which Kant
appeals.r'
Despite this correspondence, however, the difference between Kant's and
Nietzsche's versions of (i) reveals that Kant's argument from (b') to (i) relies upon
the extraneous and controversial assumption that choice is made for reasons, in the
sense that it is motivated by the cognitive acknowledgement of reasons. In
discussing Nietzsche's criticism of the equivalent common sense claim regarding
reasons in the sixth chapter, I argued that Kant could uphold this claim against
Nietzsche's criticism, with a certain accommodation. Nonetheless, Kant also offers
no positive grounds for the claim other than its supposed place in the conception of
moral goodness as (i) that he derives by analysis from the conception of the
goodness of 'a good will'. Thus in the Groundwork he introduces an account of
'practical reason' in order to express this feature of moral goodness. Comparison
with Nietzsche's conception of goodness reveals that even these grounds for the
claim are lacking, for the conception of the goodness of 'a good will' in fact
includes no commitment to practical reason. Indeed, it includes no commitment
regarding the nature of motivation at all, and thus, like Kant's commitment to
practical reason, Nietzsche's contrary commitment remains ultimately undefended.
That said, Nietzsche's conception of goodness nonetheless performs the valuable
function of showing how, if Kant's commitment were surrendered, a conception of
21 I argue for and evaluate this correspondence between Kant's and Nietzsche's conceptions of
'community' in more detail, and with respect to political duties and rights in particular, in my
'Vulnerabilities of Agency'.
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moral goodness might still be upheld that is 'Kantian' in the sense of Nietzsche's
modified version of (i), and its elucidation by (b) and (b').
Nietzsche's conception of goodness reveals that Kant also makes a second
extraneous and controversial assumption about the ability to choose, or 'will',
when he argues from (a') and (i) to (ii). Nietzsche effectively endorses a modified
version of this argument - that is, he effectively holds that, since the agent that
achieves goodness (a') does what is good because it is good and (Nietzsche's
modified version of (il) achieves a goodness of her noncognitive motivating state
alone, this goodness is (ii) good for a will as such. However, while Kant equates
what is (ii) good for a will as such with what holds equally for any agent in
relevantly similar circumstances, Nietzsche considers what is (ii) good for a will as
such to vary not only by circumstances, but also across agents and over time. This
is because, unlike Kant, Nietzsche considers the ability to choose, or 'will', itself
to vary across agents and over time. Indeed, this is the sense of his treatment of the
ability to choose as a 'goodness'-bestowing characteristic whose requirements are
determined according to the degrees and constant mutual measurement of agents'
possession of it. In presenting this ability as a 'measure of value' at the beginning
of the second essay of the Genealogy, for instance, Nietzsche emphasises the
distinction between any particular sphere of 'equals', defined by a particular
degree of ability to choose, and the 'feeble windbags' who are unable to choose to
this degree. For Nietzsche, therefore, a goodness that is (i) good for a will as such
varies across agents and over time because it varies according to the degree of the
ability to choose, or 'will', and this degree varies across agents and over time.
Notably, this position explains Nietzsche's often-aired suspicion of appeals to
'equality'. In Twilight of the Idols, for instance, he writes that '[t]he doctrine of
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equality' is a 'poison' which 'appears to be preached by justice itself, whereas it is
the end of justice ... "Equal for equals, unequal for unequals" - that would be the
true voice of justice: and what follows from it, "Never make unequals equal'" .22
Nietzsche's conception of goodness thus reveals that, by equating what is
(ii) good for a will as such with what holds equally for any agent in relevantly
similar circumstances and so assuming that the ability to choose, or 'will', does not
vary across agents or over time, Kant makes an assumption that is not included in
the conception of the goodness of 'a good will' from which he intends to derive
(ii). Given that, like the first assumption, Kant provides this assumption with no
other grounds than its supposed place in the conception of moral goodness implicit
in 'a good will', Nietzsche's conception of goodness presents a serious challenge
to Kant's conception of the moral agent. For the premise of variation in the ability
to choose, or 'will', is a plausible one, and, if so, such variation should be admitted
as morally pertinent by a conception of goodness distinguished by (ii).
Furthermore, if such variation in the ability to choose is admitted to the basic
conception of goodness as (i) and (ii), then, as Nietzsche emphasises, the
requirements of this goodness must vary according to the degree of this ability. In
particular, agents' other-regarding duties and rights must hold only across their
'equals' in this ability, and extend to other agents only derivatively, if at all. I take
it that, despite Nietzsche's enthusiasm for them, these implications of the premise
are profoundly unattractive, for Kant and for moral cornmon sense. But they
account equally for the conception of the goodness of 'a good will' which Kant
22 GD IX 48. See also MA 92. WS 22. 26. and 33. Z II 7. JGB 202, 203, 259, and 272, GD IX 37.
and A 43 and 57. and KGWVII:3 37 [8] (June-July 1885). VIII:2 9 [173] (Autumn 1887) and 11
[127.142.148. and 156] (November 1887-March 1888).
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attributes to moral common sense, and from which he derives his conception of
moral goodness as (i) and (ii).
It is therefore fortunate that, once again, Kant's conception of moral
judgement can accommodate Nietzsche's plausible premise while resisting the
conclusions which Nietzsche draws from it. For, as I explained in the sixth
chapter, Kant admits the moral pertinence of contingent conditions of wills, of
varying generality, insofar as these conditions are considered under (i) and (ii) in
the derivation of a system of duties, whose generality therefore varies accordingly.
Although he displays no particular appreciation of variation in the ability to will,
therefore, he could admit such variation as a contingent condition of wills, and so
admit its pertinence to the derivation of duties and rights, while refusing to admit it
to the basic conception of moral goodness as (i) and (ii). He could thus uphold his
equation of what is (i) good for a will as such with what holds equally for any
agent in relevantly similar circumstances, and resist Nietzsche's contrary
conclusion, that such goodness varies across agents and over time, and, in
particular, that the requirements of such goodness hold only across 'equals' in the
ability to choose. Just as his general duty of beneficence is derived by admitting
the 'need' and vicinity of human wills without holding on the grounds of such
'need' and vicinity, and his general political obligation is derived by admitting the
finitude of material things' 'places' without holding on the grounds of such
finitude, then, Kant could derive general and specific duties and rights by appeal to
variation in the ability to choose without insisting that they hold on the grounds of
such variation. like the response to Nietzsche's criticism of practical reason, this
is to accommodate, rather than defend, Kant's assumption. But it demonstrates
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how a defensible Kantian conception of the moral agent must owe something to
both Kant and Nietzsche.
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History and common sense
In presenting his account of the 'animal that may promise' at the beginning
of the second essay of the Genealogy, Nietzsche also emphasises its historical
origins and current condition. In the sections immediately following his account,
he attributes the development of the ability to choose, and of the commitment to
this ability as a 'goodness' -bestowing characteristic, to the relationship between
creditor and debtor, under which promising was first practised.f However, in first
presenting his account, he also maintains that to choose, and particularly to reason
over choice, requires that the agent 'must for the moment have become calculable,
regular, necessary, also in his own representation of himself', and that a 'condition
and preparation' for the 'task' of developing the ability to choose was therefore
'the more specific task of first making men to a certain degree necessary, uniform,
like among like, regular, and consequently calculable'. This preparatory 'task'
Nietzsche attributes to what he calls 'the morality of custom', such that the
fulfilment of this task retrospectively provides this 'morality' with 'its meaning, its
great justification, however much hardness, tyranny, mindlessness, and idiocy is
inherent in it' .24 Crucially, in proceeding from this preparatory 'task' to the basic
'task' of developing the ability to choose and the commitment to it as a
'goodness' -bestowing characteristic, he also implies that 'the morality of custom'
provided the practices of promising with which, under the relationship between
creditor and debtor, this further 'task' was fulfilled. Implicitly, therefore,
23 See GMII 3-6, 8-11, and 14-15.
24 GMII 1,2.
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Nietzsche's claim is that 'the morality of custom' should be credited with both
'tasks' .
As he explains at some length in Human, All Too Human and Daybreak,
Nietzsche considers 'the morality of custom' to constitute a particular, primitive
relation between a community, its customs, and natural events." For the purposes
of identifying the historical origins and current condition of the 'animal that may
promise', however, 'the morality of custom' simply represents arbitrary moral
standards - or 'hardness, tyranny, mindlessness, and idiocy' - obedience to which
provides the practices of promising which develop the ability to choose and the
commitment to this ability as a 'goodness' -bestowing characteristic. By
emphasising 'the morality of custom', then, Nietzsche echoes Kant's affirmation
of human history's contingency and lack of moral goodness. However, while
Nietzsche also echoes Kant by insisting that the goodness required can be achieved
only by the ability to choose, and not by human history, he differs from Kant by
nonetheless insisting that human history develops the ability to choose and the
commitment to the associated conception of goodness. In particular, he writes that,
if 'we place ourselves at the end of the enormous process, [... ] where society and
its morality of custom finally brings to light that to which it was merely a means:
then we find as the ripest fruit on its tree the sovereign individual, the individual
similar only himself, freed again from the morality of custom, autonomous [and]
supermoral [... ], in short the human being with his own independent long will,
who may promise' .26 Apparently, then, Nietzsche considers human history not to
account for our achievement of goodness as he conceives of it, but to nonetheless
2S See. in particular. MA 96-9. and 111. and M 9.10. 18.23.31.33.40. 130. and 142. I provide a
more extensive account of Nietzsche's understanding of this relation. and note some of its origins
in his reading. in my "'The Animal That May Promise ..•• pp.114-5 and 119-20. and n.7.
26 GM II 2.
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account for our commitment to this goodness and our ability to achieve it, and for
this commitment's being 'freed' from other commitments under which it, along
with the ability to choose, developed.
Nietzsche thus, I propose, intends to vindicate his conception of goodness
on grounds internal to moral common sense. As I have shown in the first part of
the thesis, Nietzsche insists that moral common sense articulates a plurality of
moral conceptions and he generally complains that moral philosophers such as
Kant have simply stated a selection of these moral conceptions, without criticising
them on grounds independent of common sense, and, in particular, without raising
his particular concern for 'humanity'. In the sixth chapter, I argued that Kant
would be unmoved by such complaints, since, at least according to his considered
position, he recognises no such independent grounds. However, with regard to the
'animal that may promise', Nietzsche's position is a little different. Admittedly, he
again raises his concern for 'humanity', by writing of the 'sovereign individual'
that there is 'in him a proud consciousness, quivering in every muscle, of what has
at length been achieved and become flesh in him, a consciousness of his own
power and freedom, a feeling of the completion of humanity' .27 But here
Nietzsche's emphasis is on the agent's own 'feeling', and his remarks about the
historical origins and current condition of this 'feeling' suggest that, while he
includes it within common sense, he also considers it to take priority over other
common sense moral conceptions - as represented by the 'hardness, tyranny,
mindlessness, and idiocy' of 'the morality of custom'. His grounds for so
considering this particular common sense 'feeling' regard the relations between,
on the one hand, its origins and current condition and, on the other, those of other
27 GM II 2.
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common sense moral conceptions. In particular, he claims that the commitment to
his conception of goodness has been 'freed' from other commitments under which
it developed. Crucially, although this claim provide grounds for criticising and
ranking common sense conceptions, it is also internal to common sense. It
therefore, I suggest, exemplifies a means of criticising and ranking common sense
conceptions which, given his commitment to the ultimate authority of common
sense, Kant could accept, although he does not himself appreciate or employ it.
Incidentally, and in conclusion, this means of criticising common sense
conceptions might also explain the atypical nature of Nietzsche's appeals to
'humanity' in the second and third essays. As I noted in the second chapter of the
thesis, the first essay offers typical remarks about the consequences for 'humanity'
of obedience to the reasons discussed there, and are presented as reflecting
Nietzsche's own particular concern. In the second essay, however, his brief
remarks about 'humanity' are restricted to his account of political duties and
rights, and, in particular, to the consequences for other duties and rights
determined by 'requital' of the priority of these distinctively political ones.28 In
other words, these remarks express an exclusive concern for the conception of
goodness presented at the beginning of the second essay, and are not presented as
reflecting Nietzsche's own particular concern. Furthermore, although in evaluating
'ascetic ideals' according to 'humanity' in the third essay Nietzsche again
expresses his typical concerns, there he also suggests a concern for this conception
of goodness. As I noted when briefly discussing this evaluation in the second
chapter, Nietzsche expresses it in terms of what he calls 'the basic fact of the
human will, its horror vacui: it needs a goal', and he proceeds to treat the 'goal'
28 See GM II 11.
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required as an answer to the question, "'what is humanity in general for?'''. I
treated this expression as atypical, in the sense that it attributes to 'the human will'
as such a concern that Nietzsche elsewhere presents as his own particular concern,
determined by his own particular noncognitive motivating states. However, this
atypical feature is perhaps explained by a remark regarding 'self-affirmation' that
Nietzsche makes in the last section of the essay: he remarks that only with an
answer to the question, "'what is humanity in general for?"', is humanity able 'to
justify, to explain, to affirm itself' .29 Such 'self-affirmation' could, of course, refer
simply to humanity's having a 'goal' of which Nietzsche approves, on the basis of
his own particular noncognitive motivating states or, perhaps, some other standard.
However, that here he extends his concern for such a 'goal' precisely to 'the
human will' as such - rather than to, say, other human abilities, instincts,
characteristics - suggests that the 'self-affirmation' concerned might instead
correspond to the 'self-affirmation' of the ability to choose, or 'will', that he
articulates at the beginning of the second essay. If so, in the third essay Nietzsche
would be proposing to evaluate humanity collectively precisely as in the second
essay he proposes to evaluate each agent individually - that is, according to its
fulfilment of requirements whose ultimate justification lies in their proving its
ability to choose. Furthermore, his failure to present his appeals to 'humanity' in
the second and third essays as reflecting his own particular concern would be
explained by the internal criticism of common sense with which, I have suggested,
he explains the priority of his conception of goodness at the beginning of the
second essay.
29 GMIII28.
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Conclusions
In this chapter, I have argued that the first sections of the second essay of
the Genealogy provide for a critical engagement with Kant's conception of the
moral agent that is more telling, and, indeed, also more original and sophisticated,
than that articulated by Nietzsche's explicit criticisms of Kant. Besides offering a
conception of choice that is consistent with Nietzsche's critical treatment of the
common sense conception, these sections present a conception of goodness that,
while Kantian, raises a serious challenge to Kant's interpretation of the
'unconditional' character of moral goodness. Furthermore, I proposed that these
sections also provide a means of internally criticising and ranking common sense
moral conceptions that would develop Kant's own methodological commitment to
moral common sense. Although I argued that a certain feature of Kant's
understanding of the derivation of duties and rights could be exploited in order to
defuse the challenge to his interpretation of the 'unconditional' character of moral
goodness, and that Kant could also accept the internal criticism of moral common
sense, these are nonetheless substantial 'Kantian' modifications of Kant's own
conception of the moral agent.
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